Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1975



THE WARSAW PACT
Lawrence T. Caldwell

Generations and Politics in the USSR
Walter D. Connor

THE "NATIONAL" ISSUE

The Baltic SSR's
V. Stanley Vardys

China
June Teufel Dreyer

Book Reviews
John Erickson
Frank K. Roberts
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Jane P. Shapiro
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Christopher Howe

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1975 VOL XXIV

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Cover: Soviet Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations. Photo by EUPRA.

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The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change

By Lawrence T. Caldwell

The period since 1969 has witnessed alterations in East-West relations more profound than any since the formation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These developments, taken together, have come to be termed "détente." While détente clearly refers to a process which has not yet run its course, the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with the summit meeting in Helsinki in July 1975 brought to an end a reasonably well-defined period of Warsaw Pact foreign policy. The campaign for this conference had dominated the collective policy of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the individual foreign policies of its member states since the idea surfaced in its modern form at the Budapest meeting of the WTO's Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in March 1969.[1]

This particular juncture, therefore, provides an appropriate point at which to address a key question: What has happened to the political framework of Eastern Europe during the process of intensified negotiations and contacts between East and West? The timeliness of such an inquiry is underscored by recent public statements of Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders. A major theme of these statements has been the claim that increased coordination of WTO foreign and military policies has contributed to the success of détente. In his speech on the 1974 anniversary of the October Revolution, for example, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko posited an almost causal relationship between "the struggle for peace and socialism" and the coordination of Pact policies:

We act from common, agreed positions. . . . History has never known such unity. . . . The Warsaw Pact is a sure defender of their [members'] security. Within the framework of its organization, political and military cooperation among the fraternal countries in the name of the cause of peace is being perfected.

The socialist states, in combining organically national interests with the interests of the community as a whole, have accumulated valuable experience in coordinating their foreign policy. . . .[2]

The elections speeches of Soviet leaders in June 1975 strongly reiterated this proposition. They represented the role of the Warsaw Pact, and especially

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 18, 1969. Marshall Shulman has discussed the origins of the Security Conference idea and the importance of the March 1969 version in his excellent article, "A European Security Conference," reproduced in *Survival* (London), December 1969, pp. 373-81. Robert Legvold has analyzed how the Conference idea changed under the impact of political change in the Federal Republic of Germany in a sound piece, "European Security Conference," *Survey* (London), Summer 1970, pp. 41-51. The author of the present article has traced the diplomacy whereby CSCE and the mutual force reduction talks (MFR) were intertwined in "Conspiracy, Bargaining and Transformation: Three Views of Soviet Intentions in Europe," *Worldview* (New York), November 1974, pp. 44-51.

[2] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1974. This was also a major theme of Leonid Brezhnev's speech to the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in March 1975. See *ibid.*, March 19, 1975.

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

Members of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization meet in Budapest in March 1969.

—Photo by Jeno Papp via Eastfoto.

of policy coordination in the Political Consultative Committee, as decisive in "bringing about the positive shifts in Europe's political climate." [3]

Such claims about the contribution of policy coordination to the success of détente might be dismissed as an exercise in alliance-building. But it cannot easily be denied that the period since 1969 has produced significant achievements for Soviet and East European foreign policies. Two developments have seemed generally to validate the détente policy from the Soviet point of view: the improved climate in East-West relations and the significant advances registered by Communists and Socialists in many countries. Moreover, this period has also seen substantial improvement in the relations between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. In March 1969, for instance, Moscow, with the August 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia hanging over its head, could only risk a two-hour meeting of the Pact's PCC; however, that level of tension has long since disappeared. Indeed, all the non-Soviet members of the organization cooperated in efforts to convene and bring to fruition the CSCE.

Certainly, too, there have been changes in the WTO during recent years. The command structure of the organization has been modified. Arrangements for political consultation have been expanded, and more use has been made of them. The quantity and quality of Pact forces have been altered. Along with these alterations, there have been shifts in military doctrine.

But the crucial issue, of course, is whether such changes have actually transformed, or are transforming, relationships in Eastern Europe in any basic way. This article will attempt to arrive at some tentative judgments on that score. Although the author recognizes that a full treatment of the subject would require consideration of its economic dimensions through an analysis of the pattern of relationships within Comecon, he believes that an examination of Warsaw Pact relationships can still afford important insights. Therefore, the discussion will concentrate on the WTO.

The Warsaw Pact is perceived by its members primarily as a military alliance, and military details are the most jealously guarded of all secrets in the Byzantine and paranoid world of Soviet informational security. While the picture that we can piece together is sketchy, sufficient details do exist to permit some cautious hypotheses about the character of the changes in the WTO. Possibly the most interesting of the changes have occurred in the command structure.

The New Command Structure

On March 26, 1969, in the wake of the intervention in Czechoslovakia the previous August and the eruption of the Sino-Soviet border conflict earlier in March, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact, an organ somewhat like the NATO Council, met in Budapest and adopted several measures of institutional reorganization. By Warsaw Pact standards, the meeting was almost as notable for its relatively important content as for its brevity (it lasted less than two hours).

[3] The quotation comes from the speech of A. N. Kosygin, as reported in *ibid.*, June 12, 1975. A. P. Kirilenko employed a parallel formulation in a speech broadcast live from Leningrad on June 10, 1975 (see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union,* June 19, 1975, p. R-14). Brezhnev *(Pravda,* June 14, 1975) and N. V. Podgorny (*ibid.*, June 13, 1975) used themes consistent with the others but did not stress the foreign-policy coordination of the WTO. Yu. V. Andropov's speech (*ibid.*, June 10, 1975) had quite a different flavor altogether, stressing the dangers of ideological penetration by the capitalist states in a manner considerably out of step with the comments of the other members of the leadership.

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The decisions of the Budapest meeting probably had less effect on the principal institution of the Warsaw Pact, the PCC, than on any other organ. Its membership was changed slightly. Prior to 1969, the PCC had been comprised of party first secretaries, chairmen of the respective councils of ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. But the Budapest meeting established a separate Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM), and the defense ministers are apparently no longer included in PCC meetings. At least, that has been the character of the participation in the five full meetings since the Budapest reorganization (see Table 1).

While the PCC retained its status as the preeminent institution of the WTO and still apparently provides overall direction to the alliance, it obviously has limited functions as an organ of political consultation, for unlike its NATO counterpart, it has convened irregularly and infrequently (see Table 1). As will be argued later, however, other less formal modes of consultation among the WTO's political leaders have come into being as substitutes for PCC gatherings.

Of more importance, the Budapest meeting created a Committee of Defense Ministers. As a result of this step, the role of the national defense ministers in the WTO underwent a dramatic change. Under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955, the "defense ministers or other military leaders of the signatory states" were to serve as deputy commanders in chief of the Pact armed forces.[4] In practice, this had meant that military decisions passed directly from the WTO Commander in Chief (always a Soviet general) to the national contingents through their defense ministers. The 1969 reforms, in assigning a new formal role to the defense ministers, also made the deputy ministers of defense of the participating states the deputy commanders in chief of the WTO's joint forces. Such a modification of relationships tended to strengthen the subordination of command to national decision-making authority, at least in peacetime. Whereas a minister of defense certainly had always been subordinate to his home party and government authority, a deputy minister now is probably required not only to report to his national council of ministers and central committee, but to do so through his minister. This additional bureaucratic step within national decision-making

[4] Reprinted as Document One in Robin Remington's useful study, *The Warsaw Pact, Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971, pp. 201-06.

East European defense ministers are welcomed to Moscow in January 1975 on the occasion of a meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: from left, Soviet Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact forces; Army General W. Jaruzelski (Poland); Col. Gen. L. Czinege (Hungary); Marshal A. A. Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister; N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Army General H. Hoffmann (GDR); Army General D. Dzurov (Bulgaria); Army General I. Ionita (Romania); Soviet Army General S. M. Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact; and Army General M. Dzur (CSSR).

—Photo by V. Cheredintsev for TASS via Sovfoto.

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processes thus afforded national authorities more opportunity—at least potentially—to evaluate the particular decisions transmitted to them.[5]

Another significant innovation of the Budapest PCC meeting was the establishment of a Military Council. Malcolm Mackintosh has attempted to construct a picture of this body and has argued that its creation represents the major change of the 1969 reforms.[6] The Council apparently includes the Commander in Chief (Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky), a Deputy Commander in Chief (Lt. Gen. I. V. Stepaniuk), the Chief of Staff (Army Gen. S. M. Shtemenko), and representatives of general officer rank from each of the participating states. Although little is known about its actual functions, one might conclude from the timing of some of its meetings—e.g., in Moscow (1969) and in Bucharest (1972)—that it has the responsibility of advising the Committee of Defense Ministers. But, as Table 1 makes clear, the evidence simply is not satisfactory. On the basis of available information, it appears that the Military Council has not always met prior to sessions of the Committee of

(Footnotes 5 and 6 appear on p. 6.)

Table 1: The Warsaw Treaty Organization—

Date and Place	Type of meeting [a]	Topics and (in italics) statements or decisions
1969		
Mar. 17—Budapest	Full PCC	*Appeal on European security, organizational reforms*
Oct. 30—Prague	For. mins.[b]	European Security Conference and, implicitly, the new FRG gov't.; *approval of bilateral talks with West*
Dec. 3-4—Moscow	Party and state heads	Initiatives of new FRG government
Dec. 9-10—Moscow	MC	No agenda announced
Dec. 22-23—Moscow	CDM	Frontier security, defense capability of WTO armies
1970		
Apr. 27-28—Budapest	MC	Troop training, headquarters staffs, combat readiness of joint armed forces
May 8-10—Prague	Party heads [c]	(On 25th anniversary of liberation of Czechoslovakia), no formal meeting or agenda announced
May 21-22—Sofia	CDM	Defense capability of WTO nations, combat readiness
June 21-22—Budapest	For. mins.	European Security Conference
Aug. 20—Moscow	Full PCC	*Endorsement of USSR-FRG treaty*
Oct. 27-30—Varna	MC	Troop training, HQ staffs, combat readiness
Dec. 2—East Berlin	Full PCC	*Statements on Eur. security, Vietnam, Middle East*
Dec. 21-23—Budapest	CDM	No agenda announced
1971		
Feb. 18-19—Bucharest	For. mins.	European Security Conference, campaign for recognition of GDR
Mar. 2-3—Budapest	CDM	No agenda announced
Mar. 31-Apr. 9—Moscow	Party heads [c]	(At 24th CPSU Congress), no formal meeting or agenda announced
May 12-15—East Berlin	MC	Operational effectiveness

[a] Columns differentiate meetings of the full Political Consultative Committee (PCC); sectors of the PCC (party first secretaries and/or heads of governments or foreign ministers of the WTO states); the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM); and the Military Council (MC).

[b] Plus Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief I. I. Yakubovsky.

[c] It is assumed here that the party heads, being assembled for the indicated event, took the opportunity to confer on Warsaw Pact and other matters.

[d] Minus Romanian Party First Secretary (and chief of state) Nicolae Ceausescu; plus Mongolian Party First Secretary Yumzhagyn Tsedenbal.

[e] Plus Mongolian party chief Tsedenbal.

[f] Minus Romanian party chief Ceausescu.

SOURCE NOTE: The information in this table is probably incomplete, especially as it concerns the meetings of the Committee of Defense Ministers. It was pieced together from Soviet publications and from Radio Free Europe research reports on East European published sources. The author takes full responsibility for any errors or omissions.

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Defense Ministers, and that announced meetings of the latter organ have not always followed those of the Military Council. Nonetheless, Mackintosh's judgment that the Military Council amounts to a "significant concession" by Moscow in that it provides increased access to policy discussion for the East Europeans seems reasonable.

If the Military Council does act in an advisory or staff capacity to the Committee of Defense Ministers, or if the Committee of Defense Ministers serves as a meaningful review board for the decisions of the Military Council, such reforms would indeed be important. However, the infrequency with which the Committee of Defense Ministers has been convened suggests that the Committee has less formal functions; so the significance of the establishment of the Committee probably amounts to removing national defense ministers from a subordinate position to the Commander in Chief.

Still another institutional modification approved at the Budapest gathering was the creation of the "Staff of the Joint Armed Forces," headed by General Shtemenko as Chief of Staff. Ross Johnson holds that this body constitutes the Pact's first permanent

Patterns of Consultation, 1969-1975

Date and Place	Type of meeting [a]			Topics and (in italics) statements or decisions
1971 (continued)				
Aug. 2—Crimea		Party heads [d]		Comecon cooperation, the world Communist movement, European security
Oct. 26-29—Warsaw			MC	No agenda announced
Nov. 30-Dec. 1—Warsaw		For. mins.		European Security Conference
Dec. 8—Warsaw		Party heads		(At 6th PUWP Congress), European Security Conference, force reduction, NATO
1972				
Jan. 25-26—Prague	Full PCC			*Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe* (proposing conference agenda), *statement on Vietnam*
Apr. 11-12—Bucharest			MC	Increasing military cooperation
July 31—Crimea		Party heads [a]		Soviet détente policy, treaties with FRG, Comecon and WTO coordination
Oct. 17-20—Minsk			MC	No agenda announced
Dec. 20-24—Moscow		Party heads [c]		(On 50th anniversary of USSR), no formal meeting or agenda announced
1973				
Jan. 15-16—Moscow		For. mins.		Security in Europe
Feb. 8—Warsaw			CDM	No agenda announced
May 16-17—Sofia			MC	Activities of joint armed forces
July 30-31—Crimea		Party heads [a]		CSCE, extension of political détente to military field, Soviet-US policy, Comecon
Oct. 30-Nov. 1—Prague			MC	No agenda announced
1974				
Feb. 6-7—Bucharest			CDM	Military organization of Warsaw Pact
Mar. 27-28—Budapest			MC	No agenda announced
Apr. 17-18—Warsaw	Full PCC			CSCE and mutual force reduction, *statements on Middle East and Vietnam*
Nov. 19-21—East Berlin			MC	Training in 1975
1975				
Jan. 7-8—Moscow			CDM	No agenda announced
March 18—Budapest		Party heads [f]		(At 11th HSWP Congress), bloc affairs—most likely Romania, CSCE
May 19-21—Warsaw			MC	(On 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact), no agenda announced

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Joint Staff, maintaining that the staff had functioned on an *ad hoc* basis prior to 1969.[7] Although the Chief of Staff, the First Deputy Chief of Staff (Lt. Gen. K. K. Pashuk) and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff are Soviet officers, each other national armed force also contributes a Deputy Chief of Staff of major-general or rear-admiral rank. Currently, the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces has responsibilities for conducting training exercises and may have advisory functions for the Joint Command and the Military Council, but it probably does not amount to a theater headquarters which would operate in a fashion similar to the way in which NATO/SHAPE would be expected to do in the event of hostilities. However, such a conclusion depends in large part on analysis of the Czechoslovak intervention in 1968—*i.e.*, before the Budapest reforms. Once combat operations were undertaken at that time, the WTO Joint Command relinquished military functions to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, Army Gen. I. G. Pavlovsky, who directed the combined forces of the Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and East German armies.[8] Eventually, to be sure, the setting up of a permanent Joint Staff could produce a significant alteration in Warsaw Pact operations. In this connection, it is worth noting the existence of reports that the WTO now has a forward headquarters permanently in operation at Lvov in the Ukraine.[9] The combination of a permanent Joint Staff and a permanent headquarters would distinctly

Janos Kadar, left, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, receives Soviet Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, to Budapest in March 1974 for a meeting of the Pact's Military Council, which Yakubovsky chairs.

—Wide World.

enhance the WTO's capability to act as a military command in the event of hostilities. Nonetheless, to contend that such a transformation has already taken place seems premature. In any case, logistics, command and control, and air defense would all evidently still be provided primarily by Soviet forces, for the WTO does not possess these capabilities.

The relationship of the new Staff of the Joint Armed Forces to the older Joint Command is not entirely clear, but the fact that Marshal Yakubovsky outranks General Shtemenko in both the Joint Command and the Military Council suggests that the former exercises general policy supervision over the Staff. Thus, the picture that emerges of the interrelationships within the WTO's new command structure is as follows (see Figure 1): The PCC provides broad foreign policy coordination among the Pact states and apparently receives reports from the Committee of Defense Ministers as well as directly from the Commander in Chief on military questions. Marshal Yakubovsky's presence at PCC meetings when the Defense Ministers have not been in attendance suggests (1) that the Committee of Defense Ministers essentially affords a channel of communication with national defense planners; (2) that the Committee of Defense Ministers has little advisory responsibility outside of the roles of its members in

[5] The opposite outcome of the change—*i.e.*, the removal of the deputy minister from his normal bureaucratic chain of command—would have amounted to a step back toward Stalinist forms of Soviet domination. Such a step would almost certainly have provoked violent objections from the East European members. The absence of such objections from the public record, and indeed the tone of commentary within the Pact on the question of national control, suggests the conclusion indicated here. For a good discussion of East European commentary, see R. W. Herrick, "Warsaw Pact Restructuring Strengthens Principle of National Control," Radio Liberty, *Dispatch* (Munich), March 6, 1970.

[6] "The Warsaw Pact Today," *Survival*, May-June 1974, pp. 122-26. This article contains the most complete general summary of the 1969 reforms yet published. Remington (*op. cit.*, pp. 128-33) provides some analysis of them, and so does Richard Staar (in *The Communist Regimes of Eastern Europe*, 2nd rev. ed., Stanford, The Hoover Institution, 1971, pp. 219-24), although his emphasis is on the period prior to 1970. The most complete analysis known to this author is a paper by A. Ross Johnson entitled "Soviet-East European Relations: The Military Aspect," which was presented at the Conference on the International Politics of Eastern Europe at Columbia University on March 27-28, 1974, and which will appear in a forthcoming book edited by Charles Gati and put out by Praeger Publishers.

[7] Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 16 of the unpublished manuscript.

[8] Mackintosh, *loc. cit.*, p. 122.

[9] *Ibid.*

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national governments; and (3) that the PCC is advised on military considerations fundamentally by the Commander in Chief. The Military Council, however, probably does report to the defense ministers, either in the Committee of Defense Ministers or individually within national decision-making structures; thus, it carries out a communications function. The Joint Command oversees military operations and issues broad policy guidance for the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. No doubt it functions formally under the Military Council, but Yakubovsky's chairmanship of the Council suggests that that body probably serves merely as a liaison element and plays a subordinate role. The Staff, then, directs actual training and implements the policies of the Joint Command.

There also were apparently some new institutional arrangements set up at the Budapest meeting to supervise technological development related to weapons systems, but almost nothing is known about them. Whatever they might be, it seems very likely that they constituted the least significant of the modifications in Pact procedures. The Soviet Union remains the sole supplier of the Pact's most technologically advanced weaponry, and it has always jealously guarded its monopoly not only over the operation of advanced weapons systems, but also over most research and development and all production of advanced weapons systems.

Implications of the Reforms

Two analytical questions are posed by this quick review of the reforms effected in the WTO organization at the Political Consultative Committee's 1969 meeting in Budapest. First, have these modifications in Pact procedures affected the alliance's military capacities? The answer to this question is fairly clear—no. At least, none of the changes has shown any sign of directly affecting the combat capacities of the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps the cumulative adjustments—especially the addition of the Military Council to give East European officers a vehicle for more active participation in the planning process—might be thought to have increased the sense of professional pride and hence the combat effectiveness and reliability of the East European contingents. But assessments of the morale and political reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact troops have always been exceedingly difficult; and it might just as plausibly be argued that whatever advantages have been achieved in this regard have been lost through the more cumbersome communication process resulting from the substitution of deputy defense ministers in the Joint Command. In any case, these are judgments based on such slender evidence that their practical military value is highly dubious. It would therefore be prudent to hold that in the event of hostilities the Soviet command structure would in all likelihood prevail just as it did in August 1968, and that the 1969 reforms had no meaningful impact on the military capacities of the Warsaw Pact.

Second, what have been the political effects of the reforms? This question is by far the more interesting of the two. Here, the conclusions of Robin Remington and Ross Johnson seem persuasive: the reforms (1) were the outgrowth of agitation by the East Europeans—notably the Romanians and Czechoslovaks (before August 1968)—to expand their national roles in the military decision-making of the WTO, and (2) did in fact set up a somewhat more adequate mechanism through which they could make inputs into the decision-making process.[10] Three features of the reforms afford the basis for such an assessment. To begin with, the creation of a permanent Joint Staff which includes the deputy chiefs of staff from each of the countries that belong to the Pact could increase the voice of the national military leaderships in the policymaking process. Moreover, the establishment of the permanent Staff, with the possible creation of the first permanent WTO headquarters at Lvov, enhances the chance that at some time in the future the WTO command might be able to retain operational control of its own forces in the event hostilities break out, rather than their becoming subordinate to the national command of the USSR. Secondly, the setting up of the Military Council provides a forum for the East Europeans to make additional substantive inputs into military planning prior to the time that the Committee of Defense Ministers or the PCC takes decisions. Thirdly, the shift of the Pact defense ministers out of the line of command bolsters the subordination of the Pact to national command authorities.

However, the recent pattern of interparty consultation on broad matters of policy suggests that these conclusions might need to be qualified somewhat. Information about what has gone on during meetings of Warsaw Pact institutions is sketchy at best. Indeed, we do not even have reliable information on

[10] Remington, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30; Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14 of the unpublished manuscript. See also Herrick, *op. cit.*

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Figure 1: The Warsaw Treaty Organization in the 1970's


POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
Party First Secretaries, Heads of Government, and Foreign Ministers of the Member States
Joint Command of Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces
Commander in Chief: Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky (USSR)
First Deputy CinC: Army Gen. S. M. Shtemenko (USSR)
Deputy CinC's:
Lt. Gen. I. V. Stepaniuk (USSR)
Col. Gen. A. G. Semerdzhiev (Bulgaria)
Col. Gen. K. Rusov (CSSR)
Col. Gen. H. Kessler (GDR)
Lt. Gen. K. Csemi (Hungary)
Lt. Gen. E. Molczyk (Poland)
Col. Gen. M. Nicolescu (Romania)
incumbent dep. ministers of national defense in other Pact countries
Staff of the Joint Armed Forces
Chief of Staff: Army Gen. S. M. Shtemenko (USSR)
First Deputy CoS: Lt. Gen. K. K. Pashuk (USSR)
Deputy CoS's:
Lt. Gen. M. Korbelia (USSR)
Maj. Gen. I. D. Krystev (USSR)
Maj. Gen. N. Vaganov (Bulgaria)
Lt. Gen. K. Lange (GDR)
Maj. Gen. L. Szilagyi (Hungary)
Vice Adm. Z. Studzinski (Poland)
CSSR and Romanian reps. unknown
Permanent WTO headquartes in Lvov, USSR
Joint Armed Forces
East European national contingents
Central Group (in CSSR)
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GDR)
Northern Group (in Poland)
Southern Group (in Hungary)
Soviet forces permanently assigned to WTO
Units of Baltic Military District
Units of Belorussian Military District
Units of Carpathian Military District
Soviet forces possibly attached in operational setting
Committee of Defense Ministers
Marshal A. A. Grechko (USSR)
Army Gen. D. Dzhurov (Bulgaria)
Army Gen. M. Dzur (CSSR)
Army Gen. H. Hoffman (GDR)
Col. Gen. L. Czinege (Hungary)
Army Gen. W. Jaruzelski (Poland)
Army Gen. I. Ionita (Romania)
Military Council
Chairman: Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky
Other Soviet members:
Army Gen. S. M. Shtemenko
Lt. Gen. I. V. Stepaniuk
Lt. Gen. Y. Y. Pastushenko
Lt. Gen. N. I. Truzhennikov
East European members:
Officers of lieutenant-general or vice-admiral rank
Committee for Coordination of Weapons and Technology
apparent hierarchial relationship
possible institution

SOURCES: Principal sources include Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today," *Survival* (London), May-June 1974, p. 123; R. W. Herrick, "Warsaw Pact Restructuring Strengthens Principle of National Control," Radio Liberty, *Dispatch* (Munich), March 6, 1970, pp. 6-8; A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Relations: The Military Aspect," article to appear in a forthcoming volume edited by Charles Gati and published by Praeger; CIA, *Reference Aid: Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials*, Washington DC, 1974.

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when the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council have convened. But sessions of the Political Consultative Committee probably do not occur without publicity, and the frequency of these gatherings raises some questions about whether the 1969 reforms actually increased the role of the East European states in Pact affairs. From 1956 to 1968, the PCC met nine times; in the six and a half years since the March 17, 1969, session, it has convened five times (see Table 1). With the exception of the first two years after the reforms, when three meetings were held, there has not been a significant increase in the frequency of PCC gatherings. That fact alone, of course, would not necessarily require modification of the conclusion that the reforms gave the East Europeans a greater role in the WTO, for the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council clearly constituted the principal new institutions through which the East Europeans might have played a larger role. But the available information on these organs does not permit confident generalization about their practical significance (see Table 1).

At the same time, as the data in Table 1 make clear, political consultation among the members of the Warsaw Pact has been very intense. The members have made significant use of both bilateral meetings between the leaderships of individual states and of improvised meetings outside the Warsaw Pact's formal structure to coordinate foreign policy in particular. The foreign ministers of WTO countries convened five times from the fall of 1969 through January 1973, the period when the Soviet Union was shaping its détente policy. Special gatherings of party leaders took place in December 1969, May 1970, March-April 1971, August 1971, July 1972, December 1972, July 1973, and March 1975. It is not clear why the 1969 meeting was called simply a "meeting of party and state leaders.[11] The May 1970, March-April 1971, December 1972, and March 1975 gatherings all had ostensible ceremonial functions, although in each case business was no doubt conducted. Presumably, the other three "vacation" gatherings in the Crimea did not qualify as sessions of the PCC because First Secretary Y. Tsedenbal of the Mongolian People's Republic was present and, in the case of the 1971 meeting, because General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu of the Romanian Communist Party did not attend; but the reason may have more to do with legal than with political considerations. Each of the Political Consultative Committee's sessions has included at least heads of government and foreign ministers for each of the East European delegations in addition to first secretaries of the parties, and the first two groups of officials did not participate in the Crimea gatherings.

This pattern, then, suggests that the infrequency of PCC meetings has reflected bureaucratic convenience or a conscious desire to limit the number of sessions at which the full membership of the PCC participates. Certainly, the total number of meetings of foreign ministers and a less-than-full PCC between late 1969 and early 1973 (see Table 1) would indicate an impressive amount of top-level consultation within the WTO.

The obvious reduction in the frequency of these consultations in the last two years does, to be sure, raise some problems with respect to this interpretation, but a reasonable explanation for it exists. During the 1969-73 period, the gatherings of the foreign ministers, of the party first secretaries, and of the PCC were devoted largely to the subject of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and it is probably not coincidental that the pattern of consultation became much less intense after the formal agreement was reached to convene the CSCE in July 1973. While it has not been widely noted, one function of the security conference idea seems to have been to support the drive for increased coordination within the Warsaw Pact. Certainly, both the timing of the Budapest appeal of March 1969 *(i.e.,* after the Czechoslovak intervention had unsettled the bloc) and the reduction in frequency of consultation once the conference was on track point to that conclusion. The campaign for the CSCE thus provided the WTO with a clear purpose—one which did not provoke substantial disharmony within its ranks. Once the CSCE was under way, however, the objective of creating an atmosphere conducive to greater cooperation among WTO members had been achieved, and the various political leaderships may have run dry of political inspiration or, more likely, felt a mounting uneasiness that the agenda might now be cleared for more controversial issues. The Soviet campaigns to stage a European Communist Party Conference and an International Conference of Workers' and Communist Parties suggest that Moscow had reached precisely such a judgment. But on the issues these conferences raise, the kind of harmony that the Pact members exhibited with respect to the CSCE does not prevail. Hence, efforts

[11] *Pravda,* Dec. 5, 1969.

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Table 2: Warsaw Pact Ground Forces in Combat Formations, 1968 and 1974

Country	Armored Divisions 1968	Armored Divisions 1974	Armored Manpower 1968	Armored Manpower 1974	Infantry/motorized Divisions 1968	Infantry/motorized Divisions 1974	Infantry/motorized Manpower 1968	Infantry/motorized Manpower 1974	Total manpower 1968	Total manpower 1974
USSR in EE	13	16	133,000	152,000	13	15	139,000	175,000	272,000	327,000
GDR	2	2	19,000	19,000	4	4	48,000	48,000	67,000	67,000
Poland	5	5	47,500	47,500	8[a]	8[a]	96,000	96,000	143,500	143,500
Czechoslovakia	5	5	47,500	47,500	9	5¼	108,000	62,000	155,500	109,500
Hungary	1	1	9,500	9,500	5	5	60,000	60,000	69,500	69,500
Romania	2	2	19,000	19,000	7[b]	8[c]	84,000	96,000	103,000	115,000
Bulgaria	4	1	38,000	10,000	8	8	96,000	96,000	134,000	106,000
TOTAL	33	32	313,500	304,500	53	53¼	631,000	633,000	944,500	937,500

[a] Excluded from this figure are one airborne and one amphibious assault division, there being no comparable forces in other WTO national contingents.

[b] Excluded from this figure are some independent mountain units.

[c] Excluded from this figure are two mountain brigades and one airborne regiment, there being no comparable forces in other WTO national contingents.

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1968-69* and *The Military Balance, 1974-75*, London, 1968 and 1974.

to achieve foreign policy coordination have been less frequent.

It is risky, however, to press speculation based on the pattern of consultation among WTO members too far. One suspects that the pattern is influenced by many factors, including bureaucratic considerations and the mere problem of scheduling the time of busy people. Moreover, apparent gaps in consultation during the period since 1969 frequently have quite simple explanations. For example, the first secretaries of the Warsaw Pact's Communist parties did not meet formally as a group between the Crimean gathering of July 1972 and the Crimean WTO summit of the following July, but even a partial list of Pact political activities—to say nothing of the numerous undertakings of Comecon—reveals substantial interparty contacts: in November 1973, Bulgarian First Secretary Todor Zhivkov visited the USSR, and the USSR's General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev traveled to Hungary; in December, every WTO state sent its party first secretary to Moscow for the 50th anniversary of the USSR; in January 1973, the Pact foreign ministers met; in February 1973, Brezhnev paid a state visit to Czechoslovakia. Thus, what might on the surface seem to have been a slow period for party exchange at the highest level was in fact a period rich in bilateral meetings and one which provided an opportunity for all first secretaries to meet on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union. Similarly, a nine-month lag between December 1970 and August 1971 was mitigated by the attendance of all the first secretaries at the 24th Soviet Party Congress.

In sum, then, the overall pattern of WTO consultation on matters of foreign policy probably does support the assessment that one tends to reach after an examination of the Budapest institutional reforms themselves. Since 1969, the USSR has tried to pump new life into the structure of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, this effort has stemmed from a combination of the requirements of détente and the demand of the East European members of the WTO for a larger role in Pact affairs.

Force Structure and Equipment

One must be cautious, however, in arguing that détente has promoted foreign policy coordination within the Pact and that the Budapest reforms have enhanced the role of the alliance's East European members, for such conclusions present an image of change within the WTO not entirely warranted if one considers the strictly military aspects of the WTO. Here one finds less pervasive change—or, perhaps, slower change—in Pact practices.

A major quantitative alteration in Warsaw Pact armed forces came as a result of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Prior to that operation, Soviet forces in the WTO countries had totaled 26 divisions (20 in the German Democratic Republic, two in Poland, and four in Hungary). To these were

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added six divisions in August 1968—one more in Poland and five in Czechoslovakia. While the precise strength of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is exceedingly difficult to ascertain, Soviet ground troops numbered about 250,000 before 1968 and 300,000 afterwards. Table 2 presents a rough comparison of total WTO ground forces in 1968 and 1974 (it ought to be noted that arriving at comparable data for 1968 and 1974 required some adjustment of the estimates of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, from which the table is derived). These figures do not include about 10 divisions, with something more than 100,000 men, which are stationed in the eastern military districts of the USSR and might, in some scenarios, be available for rapid reinforcement of Pact forces.

Manpower figures for ground forces alone, however, give only a very rough notion of the increase in Pact capabilities. As Table 3 shows, the additional Soviet divisions augmented the number of tanks in Eastern Europe by 2,400. (Here again, the IISS estimates have been adjusted to achieve comparability between the 1968 and 1974 data.)

In part, to be sure, the new Soviet troops and materiel were offset by reductions in Czechoslovakia's forces and equipment. But from NATO's perspective and presumably from that of Pact commanders as well, the substitution of Soviet divisions for Czechoslovak ones amounted to an upgrading of the WTO's capabilities, especially in light of the dissatisfactions that surfaced in the Czechoslovak army during the "Prague Spring" of 1968.

The foregoing estimates had not changed appreciably up to mid-1975, although NATO and US estimates of the quantity of equipment that Pact forces possessed had undergone some revision, and although the International Institute of Strategic Studies held that the USSR had now withdrawn the additional division that it had deployed in Poland in 1968.[12] It should be noted that once the discussions regarding the mutual reduction of forces in Europe had begun in Vienna in 1973, and once the Western countries had therefore commenced to devote more intelligence resources to "counting" Pact forces, Western estimates of the equipment of these forces were upgraded in some categories and downgraded in others.

On the qualitative side, the changes are more difficult to assess, but they have probably been far more important than the quantitative ones. The T-62 tank, which performed very well for the Egyptians during the 1973 October war in the Sinai, constitutes a clear improvement over its earlier counterpart, the T-54/55, and it is now part of the equipment of all member forces of the WTO (see Table 3), though Poland and East Germany presumably have greater numbers of them than the other countries. IISS estimates also indicate that all the Pact countries except Czechoslovakia have acquired the PT-76 light tank

[12] The revised IISS estimate first appeared, without explanation, in the Institute's *The Military Balance 1970-1971*, London, 1970, p. 7. This change, it should be pointed out, may have been the result of Western recalculations rather than of an appreciable drawdown in Soviet troops.

Table 3: Warsaw Pact Armor, 1968 and 1974

	Tanks in 1968 [a]	Tanks in 1974 [b]	Type (and number, where known) in 1974 [c]
USSR	7,020	9,025	T-10 heavy tanks; T-62 and T-54/55 medium tanks; PT-76 light tanks
GDR	1,800	2,400	T-62's, T-54/55's, and T-34's; PT-76's (about 130)
Poland	2,800	3,650	T-62's, T-54/55's, and T-34's; PT-76's (250)
Czechoslovakia	2,700	3,500	T-62's, T-54/55's, and T-34's
Hungary	700	1,780	T-62's (30), T-54/55's; PT-76's (150)
Romania	1,200	1,970	T-54/55's and T-34's; PT-76's (270)
Bulgaria	2,000+	2,250	T-62's (some 50), T-54/55's; PT-76's (250)
TOTAL	18,220+	24,575	

[a] Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1968-69*, London, 1968. Figures for the East European countries' inventories were taken directly from the text. Soviet tanks were estimated on the basis of 350 per armored division (10 in the GDR, 1 in Poland, and 2 in Hungary) and 190 per mechanized infantry division.

[b] Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1974-75*, London, 1974. Figures for East European countries' inventories were taken directly from the text. Soviet tanks were estimated on the basis of 325 per armored division (10 in the GDR, 2 in Poland, 2 in Hungary, and 2 in Czechoslovakia) and 255 per mechanized infantry division. (It should be noted that the figures provided on pp. 8-14 differ from those given in the table on p. 101 of the referenced source. However, the former are presumed to be more comparable to data provided in *The Military Balance, 1968-69.)*

[c] All T-62 and PT-76 tanks in East European inventories were added after 1968, although both were present in the Soviet contingents prior to that date.

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since 1968. During the 1973 October war, the Egyptians used this tank, which has excellent amphibious capabilities (in contrast to the T-62 and T-54/55, which have only some "wading" capabilities), during the initial crossing of the Suez Canal and then operated very effectively with it in opening holes in the Bar-Lev line.[13] There has for some time been discussion of a "follow-on" Soviet tank—the M-1970—but it has not yet become widely enough dispersed in Soviet inventories to permit analysis of its capabilities and, more trenchant for present purposes, has not yet been observed in the inventories of other Pact countries.[14]

Although tanks have been perhaps the single item of greatest concern to NATO and American planners (the USSR has been producing about 3,000 a year, as compared with about 600 for the United States), the somewhat superior technology of NATO tanks and NATO's higher-quality and more widely dispersed anti-tank capabilities partially offset the numerical advantage of the WTO vis-à-vis NATO (24,575 against approximately 9,250, in 1974).[15] Nonetheless, qualitative improvements not only in tanks but also in the BMD (an armored troop-carrying vehicle) constitute one of the principal upgradings of Warsaw Pact equipment.

But there have been others as well. Since 1968, all WTO national units have received anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW's)—the Snapper, the Sagger, and the Swatter.[16] Each is optically sighted and wire-guided. The Snapper and Swatter are mounted on armored vehicles; but the Sagger can be carried by a man. All proved lethal in the 1973 October war in the Sinai.

With respect to other missiles, every Pact country has the Frog surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of 10-45 miles and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The USSR, however, retains custody of the warheads. All Pact states also deploy the Scud, whose more modern variant (1965) has a range of 185 miles and is capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads.[17] IISS data suggest that every Pact nation except Romania possesses the SA-2 surface-to-air missile ("Guideline" in NATO terminology), which is a high-altitude, command-guided, and vehicle-towed missile. They indicate, too, that Bulgaria and Poland both have the SA-7 surface-to-air missile, which can be carried by troops and guided optically.[18]

These are impressive weapons, but they are not the most modern in Soviet inventories. In particular, Soviet forces possess an improved ATGW—the RPG-7—and a variety of other surface-to-air missiles —*e.g.*, the SA-6, which is vehicle-mounted and far more effective against low-flying aircraft than anything in the hands of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies. On February 26, 1975, General George S. Brown, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Appropriations Committee that the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany had "between

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[13] A good military analysis of the October war in public sources can be found in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1973*, London, 1974, pp. 16-27 and 52-55.

[14] See especially the testimony of General George S. Brown, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations on Feb. 26, 1975, in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations, 1st Sess., 94th Cong.* (hereinafter cited as *Hearings*), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, Part 1, pp. 161 and 167.

[15] Numbers of tanks are hard to calculate, but by all calculations the WTO has a substantial quantitative advantage over NATO. The figures cited above are taken from Table 3 and from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1974-1975*, London, 1974. The NATO figure includes all medium and heavy tanks that are in the inventories of NATO members and positioned on the European continent, although not all of these are designated for the same theater within the region. Thus, it includes French and British tanks, but it excludes Norwegian and Turkish tanks for reasons of theater designation and Portuguese tanks for political reasons.

While information on comparative tank technology is difficult to obtain and judgments on the subject are controversial, the main US tank, the M-60, is generally thought to be considerably superior to the Soviet T-54/55 and superior in some respects to the Soviet T-62. Some analysts argue that the new Soviet tank, the M-1970, which is presumed to be in production in the USSR but has not yet appeared in the inventories of any other members of the WTO, may be superior to the M-60 in some respects, but that the planned new-generation US tank, the XM-1, will be clearly superior to all Soviet tanks in armor, in firepower, and in mobility. For comparisons, see the testimony of General Brown in *Hearings*, Part 1, pp. 161, 167, and 193.

The situation with respect to anti-tank missiles is also complicated. While the ground forces of the WTO have more anti-tank missiles than do the ground forces of NATO, the WTO weapons are probably technically inferior to the NATO weapons; moreover, the United States and NATO possess greater air-launched anti-tank capabilities than do the USSR and the WTO. See the testimony of General Brown in *ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 169-70, and the testimony of General F. C. Weyland, the US Army Chief of Staff, in *ibid.*, Part 2 pp. 281-83. It should be noted that anti-tank weapons constitute one area where technology is changing very rapidly. The US, for example, has greatly increased its production of the TOW and DRAGON, both new-generation anti-tank missiles. See US Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977* (hereinafter *Defense Posture Statement*), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. iii-55.

[16] The International Institute for Strategic Studies first indicated that these weapons were in the inventories of East European armies in its *The Military Balance 1971-72*, London, 1971, pp. 9-11.

[17] *The Military Balance 1974-75*, pp. 76 and 84.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

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

Three advanced Soviet weapons, of which only the bottom two are currently in the arms inventories of all Warsaw Pact states: top, the Soviet MIG-25 interceptor (NATO designation, "Foxbat"); middle, T-62 tanks executing a river-crossing during joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers in October 1969; bottom, a "Frog-7" surface-to-surface missile ready for launching in Poland.

—Photo credits, top to bottom: V. Peslyak for TASS via Sovfoto; V. Musselian for TASS via Sovfoto; Wojskowa Agencia Fotograficzna via EUPRA.

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50 and 75 battalions of SA-2's, SA-3's, [and] SA-4's, as well as several regiments of SA-6's." [19] No doubt, these form an integrated air defense environment for the GDR as well as for the Soviet forces, perhaps thereby—in the Soviet view—mitigating any need for separate East German capabilities.

Air defenses, of course, include interceptor aircraft as well as missiles, but here again one finds a pattern of Pact dependence on the USSR.[20] All Pact states possess MIG's of the 17, 19, and 21 varieties. In addition, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary have the SU-7 short-range fighter-bomber, and the first three also have the Il-28 longer-range fighter-bomber. But every one of these planes appeared in Soviet inventories before 1960, although they have been modified significantly in subsequent years (in the case of the MIG-21 [Fishbed-J], as recently as 1970). Moreover, the USSR boasts newer interceptors—the Foxbat (MIG-25), the Flagon E (SU-15), and an air-to-air version of the Flogger (MIG-23). All were first shown in 1967, and they went into service in 1971, 1974, and 1971, respectively. However, none has yet been placed in non-Soviet WTO national air forces. The Soviet Air Force also has the Fencer (SU-19), a fighter-bomber with variable-geometry wings, and a Flogger modified for ground attack. These, too, have been held back from other WTO air forces.

The dependence of other WTO countries on the Soviet Union for air defense is further underlined by the absence of any separate air defense command for the Pact. Instead, the Pact relies on the Soviet Air Defense Command, now headed by Marshal P. F. Batitsky.

All the equipment just discussed, it should be noted, has been created and deployed in accordance with Soviet military doctrine. Doctrine and forces, of course, have a symbiotic relationship. Although much of official Soviet military doctrine is shrouded in great secrecy, discussion in the military press provides some indication of the content of that doctrine.[21] When hardware and forces appear in the field, they constitute a final test of the nature of the official doctrine. Judged by the discussion in the military press, by the disposition of Soviet forces, and by practices in military training exercises, the principal alteration in the doctrine of the WTO during the last decade has been preparation for combat operations with tactical nuclear weapons. Whereas public discussion of Soviet doctrine until the mid-1960's largely maintained that any use of tactical nuclear weapons would result in a prompt escalation to general nuclear war, after the fall of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 increasing attention was paid to tactical nuclear weapons, and statements began to appear in the military press with slightly different nuances of meaning. Some Soviet sources admitted the possibility that war in Europe might under some circumstances be restricted to a tactical nuclear confrontation and not escalate—at least, not immediately—into strategic nuclear war. Warsaw Pact joint exercises after 1964 also stressed combat in a nuclear environment.[22] Thus, the indications in the public discussion of military doctrine appear to be confirmed by an examination of WTO training and equipment.

In the view of Soviet military theorists, tactical nuclear war required seizure of the initiative, highly mobile forces, and widely dispersed formations.[23] These requirements, in turn, dictated not only an emphasis on tanks and armored personnel carriers and the employment of vast quantities of mobile surface-to-air missiles, but also some capabilities at a lower level than those described above—*e.g.*, widely dispersed bridge-crossing material and tank units with an in-formation decontamination capability.

Out of this brief description of Soviet and Pact

[19] See *Hearings*, Part 1, p. 183.

[20] For descriptions of aircraft characteristics and East European air forces, see *The Military Balance 1974-75*, pp. 11-14 and 74. Some assessments are also provided in General Brown's testimony, *Hearings*, Part 1, pp. 147, 162, and 178-84.

[21] For many years, the work of Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation has been authoritative on the subject of Soviet military doctrine. See especially his *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970 pp. 451-58, 477-82. Two useful and more recent discussions can be found in Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance*, Adelphi Paper, No. 89, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972; and John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power*, Special Supplement to *Strategic Review* (Washington), Spring 1973.

[22] Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 478-80, and Erickson, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-08.

[23] See especially A. A. Sidorenko, *Nastuplenie* (The Offensive), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, pp. 57-64. This book has been translated in a useful series put out by the United States Air Force. (For bibliographic information and a review of the first four volumes in the series, see p. 63 of this issue—Eds.) Sidorenko's position on the conduct of tactical nuclear does not differ a great deal from that set forth in the 1962 edition of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's important work, *Voennaia Strategiia* (Military Strategy). See *Military Strategy* (an English-Language translation), New York, Praeger Publishers, 1963, pp. 278-95. The difference is one of emphasis. In the early 1960's, Sokolovsky's volume envisioned tactical nuclear warfare as a feature of general and global nuclear war. As the decade wore on, the possibility of limiting nuclear war, and even of conducting non-nuclear war, between "the imperialists and socialists" began to be discussed by military writers. None of this discussion, however, excluded the possibility that war between the US and the USSR would become general and nuclear.

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forces emerges a picture of enhanced military capabilities within the Warsaw Pact. Pact forces have been upgraded quantitatively and—more important—qualitatively during the period under examination here. Yet the pattern of military capabilities of the WTO continues to ensure the military predominance of the USSR and to make the armed forces of the East European states almost wholly dependent on the Soviet Union in two ways. First, the Warsaw Pact lacks any capabilities in some critical areas—strategic deterrence and air defense being the most significant. Second, the East European members of the Pact possess none of the most modern generations of Soviet weapons, for the USSR has carefully and systematically withheld these weapons from distribution. This is most obvious with respect to fighter-bombers and interceptor aircraft, but it is also true in regard to items like the SA-6 and tanks.

In combat terms, the preceding elements of dependency on the Soviet Union promote alliance cohesion by ensuring that any East European state would have difficulty maintaining an effective defense posture outside the Pact—either against another WTO member or against NATO—and by simplifying command and control problems through absolute integration of forces. At the same time, the second element in particular could pose long-term difficulties within the alliance. In recent years, not only North Vietnam but also Egypt and Syria have received Soviet equipment as yet unintegrated into the national armed forces of Pact members, and while one cannot predict whether there might be further manifestations of the kind of resentments that the Romanians have occasionally hinted at and the Czechoslovaks demonstrated in 1968, one cannot help feeling that the professional military establishments of loyal allies must find the contrast between their total dependence on the Soviet Union for current-generation technology and the access of armed forces outside the WTO structure to such technology especially galling.

Nothing in the Helsinki CSCE document substantially affects this general picture, but the agreement of each signatory to give 21 days' prior notification of military maneuvers involving in excess of 25,000 troops "which take place in an area within 250 kilometers from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating state" could ultimately have some significance for relationships within the Pact.[24] While the obligation "rests on a voluntary basis," its fulfillment over time not only would do a great deal to ease tensions between East and West by establishing at least minimum cooperation on military affairs, but also might further inhibit operations like that launched in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Prior notification followed by intervention would, of course, have the counterproductive effect of devaluing the CSCE agreements, and clandestine intervention would be even more injurious to the whole CSCE framework. It should be pointed out, however, that prior notification will not materially improve intelligence-gathering, for troop movements of the contemplated size are difficult to camouflage even in the absence of the agreement.

At the same time, the proposals under consideration in the mutual force reductions (MFR) negotiations in progress in Vienna could potentially have far greater impact. NATO has proposed reductions in two stages. The first would involve the withdrawal of 29,000 American troops and 68,000 Soviet troops, after which negotiations for the second round would aim at cutting back forces to a common ceiling of 700,000 troops for NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[25] The USSR's original proposal called for a first-stage reduction of 20,000 troops by each side, although this proposal was modified on October 31, 1974, to permit the initial cutbacks to come from the forces of the Soviet Union and the United States alone.[26] This first stage was to be followed by reductions of 5 percent and 10 percent in successive years. While the two proposals obviously reflect very different conceptions of the military balance, either one would affect Warsaw Pact capabilities and might also bring about significant adjustments in the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, with a corresponding diminution of Soviet preponderance within WTO forces.

A General Assessment

Three sets of developments, then, have occurred in the Warsaw Pact since 1969: (1) Pact institutions have been modified in a manner which probably enhances the national roles of East European states; (2) vigorous consultation took place among Pact

[24] At the time this article went to press, the "Final Act" of the CSCE was not generally available in printed form, although the substance of the agreement had been published in *The New York Times*, July 30, 1975. The quoted material comes from a non-classified, typewritten copy used inside the US government.

[25] The details were reported accurately by Leslie Gelb in *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1974.

[26] See an interview with Oleg N. Khlestov, chief of the Soviet delegation in Vienna, in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Dec. 14, 1974. Also see Bernard Marguerite's analysis in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Nov. 11, 1974.

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Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states convene in Bucharest on February 18-19, 1971: from the left foreground, P. Niculescu-Mizil, Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party; I. G. Maurer, Romanian Premier; Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania and General Secretary of the RCP; E. Bodnaras, Vice-President of Romania; Corneliu Manuscu, Romanian Foreign Minister; from the right foreground, foreign ministers Ivan Bashev (Bulgaria), Stefan Jedrychowski (Poland), A. A. Gromyko (USSR), Otto Winzer (GDR), Janos Peter (Hungary), and Jan Marko (CSSR).

—EUPRA.

states on issues of détente at least until 1973, though this pattern of interaction may now be on the wane; and (3) significant quantitative and qualitative modifications have been made in WTO military capabilities. However, we are left with the question of what all these changes amount to—whether or not the fundamental character of the alliance has altered, or is in the process of altering.

Judgments on this subject depend to a large degree on the analyst's view of the purpose of the alliance, and this view needs to be differentiated according to three components—assessments of the role that the WTO plays in Soviet security calculations, of the role that the WTO has in terms of general Soviet political purposes, and of the role of the WTO from the standpoint of the East Europeans. Therefore, it is useful to approach an overall evaluation of recent developments in the Pact within the context of such a framework.

Soviet Security. As far as the role of the WTO with respect to Soviet security calculations is concerned, it is important to realize that a substantial portion of Western disagreement about détente and about East-West relations in general since. World War II has stemmed from conflicting perspectives on this very issue. One school of analysis has assumed that the primary function of the WTO/Comecon structure is to enable the Soviet Union to maintain political control in Eastern Europe, and it has stressed Moscow's use of the Warsaw Pact to suppress the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the "Prague Spring" in 1968. Such a perspective, doubtless rooted in the experience of the postwar years, has wide currency in Western societies, where many analysts, when all other explanations have seemed wanting, have fallen back on the notion that the Pact's apparent preoccupation with preserving a conventional preponderance on the central front in Europe reflects the need to keep allies in a position of political subservience. This conception posits an essentially political role for the Warsaw Pact in terms of Soviet security and does not take very seriously the military contribution made by WTO allies to the defense or achievement of Soviet interests. On the contrary, in this view the need to garrison large forces to maintain political control means that the USSR's allies constitute a military liability to it.

A second school of analysis, to which many of the revisionist historians in the United States subscribe, has emphasized "tangential security" as the key element in Soviet thinking about the military function of the Warsaw Pact. According to this school, Eastern Europe constitutes a buffer zone

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between the USSR and the "imperialist" states—West Germany in particular—and Soviet preoccupation with the Northern Triangle (*i.e.,* the territory embraced by the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and with the areas flanking it (Hungary and the Baltic approaches) results directly from Moscow's determination not to permit another invasion of the USSR by this route. Thus, the argument goes, the Warsaw Pact has military importance to the Soviet Union in two senses: it guarantees the defense of the USSR in forward positions, and it affords a means, through the maintenance of Soviet garrisons in the Pact states, of securing the "rear" of the battlefield—of insuring safe access to the reserves and materiel that the Soviet Union would provide in the event of a conventional or tactical nuclear war. Although this view upgrades the military value of Eastern Europe to the security of the USSR, it nonetheless pictures the role of East European military forces as largely neutral in terms of that security.

In some representations, the one or the other of these first two schools of analysis is combined with a sinister evaluation of Soviet intentions. If one judges Soviet intentions as aggressive, of course, the military reality can be made to fit the political judgment, for the need to station troops forward for political control of Eastern Europe or to make a forward defense does place troops nearer to West European targets. All adherents of both schools, however, downgrade the military contribution of East European forces to the achievement of Soviet purposes.

The final school of analysis, which does not crop up often in Western political writing but receives serious attention among contingency planners in the Western defense ministries and in NATO, holds that the forces of East European WTO members are far more integral to Soviet security calculations than either the "political-control" image or the "tangential-security" image would suggest. Its proponents point to the positioning of GDR, Polish, and Czech forces and their employment in Warsaw Pact military exercises as evidence that these forces would prove formidable opponents if Western forces should become involved in a conventional or tactical nuclear conflict with them.

Some subscribers to this school share the judgment of those adherents of the other schools who see the Soviet Union as aggressive. Nevertheless, all its proponents have a substantially higher regard for the potential military contribution of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces than do the proponents of the other two schools.

Some aspects of recent developments would tend to lend credence to each of these images of Soviet purpose. The quantitative and qualitative improvements that have been effected in Soviet forces in the last few years and the continued reluctance of the USSR to release the most modern equipment to its allies might be thought to reinforce the contention that political control of Eastern Europe constitutes the major factor in Soviet judgments about the military worth of the Pact. Moscow's positioning of five divisions in Czechoslovakia even after the political situation there had stabilized and continued Soviet insistence that the Pact's Joint Command and Staff be dominated by Soviet officers could be seen as support for the "tangential-security" argument. And the qualitative improvements in non-Soviet Pact forces combined with the possible trend toward more genuine sharing of command authority within the Pact might be viewed as corroborating the notion that the Pact is integral to Soviet security.

None of the images, however, is totally adequate in itself to explain the pattern of post-1969 changes within the Pact. For example, while the recent quantitative and qualitative upgrading of Soviet WTO forces and the continued reluctance of the USSR to release the most modern weapons to its allies can be said to uphold the validity of the "political-control" image, they do not compel that conclusion. One can argue that the upgrading has simply been designed to maintain the NATO/WTO balance achieved prior to the period under examination. NATO has made, and is making, improvements of its own. For instance, the reorganization of West German forces and the application of the Jackson-Nunn and Nunn amendments to US forces in Germany have considerably enhanced NATO's combat capability since 1971.[27] It is also possible to see

[27] For discussions of US efforts to improve combat capabilities in Europe during recent years, partly under the impact of the Jackson-Nunn and Nunn amendments, see Schlesinger's *Defense Posture Statement,* pp. iii-29, and General Brown's testimony in *Hearings,* Part 1, p. 193. The original text of the Jackson-Nunn Amendment, which sought to offset "any balance of payments deficit" resulting from stationing US troops in Europe by freezing the numbers of those troops unless US allies increased their contributions, may be found in the *Congressional Record* (Washington, DC), Sept. 25, 1973, p. S17621. An Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on it in February and March 1974, and these contain useful data on the general subject. See *US Military Commitments to Europe, Hearings of Ad Hoc Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, especially pp. 49-50, 126-29 (the *(Continued on p. 18)*

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WTO developments as largely the outcome of bureaucratic pressures within the Soviet defense structure. Just as each of the three images of the role that the WTO plays in Soviet security calculations has its vigorous advocates in Western circles, the same is probably true in the Soviet Union, and Soviet purposes likely constitute a composite, or mix, of all three conceptions.

Soviet Political Interests. With respect to Moscow's evaluations of the utility of the Warsaw Pact to the USSR in political terms, one finds two complementary perceptions current in most Western analysis. The first, and most prevalent, depicts the Pact as important to the Soviet Union in ideological terms. According to this view, the Pact performs a legitimization role. The Soviet political leadership derives legitimacy in international affairs and for its representation of the international environment to the Soviet people by being able to point to the largely sympathetic—cynics would say obedient—stances of other European "socialist" states. Manifestations of the existence of a "socialist commonwealth," in short, lend weight to the Soviet leadership's political positions and underline the idealistic and international claims of Communist ideology.

The second perception has received too little attention in Western scholarship. It, in turn, has interstate and intrastate dimensions. The interstate dimension stresses the value of the Warsaw Pact as a forum for communication and the exchange of views. According to this perception, the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee afford an opportunity for all parties to air their concerns and their preoccupations on a fairly regularized basis—just as the biannual meetings of NATO serve as a device for regularized communication among alliance members.

The intrastate dimension reinforces this view of the Warsaw Pact as a political organization which behaves much as political organizations do everywhere. Meetings of the WTO drive East European party and government bureaucracies. Although we know little about the mechanisms whereby the USSR and the East European states prepare for the Political Consultative Committee meetings, WTO meetings provide the calendar targets for the setting of memoranda deadlines and briefings for political leaderships in much the same way as NATO's biannual meetings do for NATO members.

Moreover, the developments in recent years tend to reinforce both perceptions. Soviet willingness to accommodate the demands of other Pact members for a larger role in decision-making within the Pact may in part reflect the worth that Moscow attaches to the Pact in legitimizing its policy. Certainly, the quantity of WTO consultation has driven the bureaucracies of all the WTO member states, and it has driven them hard. In fact, the apparent willingness to use *ad hoc* forms of consultation like the Crimea meeting may indicate a sensitivity to the demands of the post-1969 pace of consultation on party and state bureaucracies.

East European Perspective. East European attitudes toward the Warsaw Pact no doubt have similar dimensions to those discussed in connection with Soviet evaluations of the Warsaw Pact; however, the character of Eastern Europe's actual assessments of the role of the pact probably differs somewhat from that of the USSR. By far the most important security aspect of East European thinking about the WTO is that the Pact gives form to political, economic, and military reality. Whatever kind of social and political system existed in the USSR, the situation of the countries of Eastern Europe would be conditioned by their giant neighbor to the east. No real security would be possible for them without harmonization of their interests with those of the Soviet Union. In other words, the security of the USSR and the security of Eastern Europe are reciprocal—a fact which does not depend on ideological compatibility and which has long been recognized by Western statesmen. It prompted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for example, to accede to the tentative arrangements he made with Stalin in October 1944,[28] and it motivated the West's tacit acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe in the context of CSCE this last summer.

If the security of the East European countries is inseparable from that of the USSR, the political in-

testimony of Dr. William B. Pendergast), and pp. 175-78 (the communiqué of the Eurogroup after its Dec. 6, 1973, meeting in Brussels, and the testimony of General Andrew J. Goodpaster). The Nunn Amendment to the FY 1975 Department of Defense appropriation bill permitted adjustments in the number of US troops through a reduction of support personnel and an increase in combat personnel, and required the elimination of 18,000 support spaces by June 1976.

[28] These were incorporated into the "notorious blue tick" memorandum. Churchill proposed to Josef Stalin a division of Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria into spheres of influence, and Stalin marked a large tick on the paper in blue pencil. See Churchill's *Triumph and Tragedy*, New York, Bantam Books, 1953, pp. 196-97.

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terests of the Communist elites in Eastern Europe in the Warsaw Pact frequently run parallel to those of the Soviet leadership. Not only do the East European rulers, like the Soviet rulers, derive legitimacy and prestige in the eyes of their own populaces from the workings of the Warsaw Pact, but the diplomacy of intra-Pact affairs and East-West negotiations under Pact sponsorship also provides international political training for East European cadres of leadership potential. In this sense, the WTO framework performs a function which requires delicate balancing against national claims—a kind of socialization of cadres by reinforcing values already developed within them by their national political training, through exposure to an international system which affirms those same values. Bloc affairs, to be sure, "socialized" East European Communist elites in the days of the Comintern and direct Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. However, the process is more subtle now, and we will not know its exact effects until we follow the careers of junior foreign ministry and defense ministry officials who have participated in the increased intrabloc and East-West diplomatic contacts.

* * *

In conclusion, it is worth reiterating that the meaning one derives from recent developments in the Warsaw Pact depends on three interlocking sets of images one has of the purposes of the political, military, and economic institutions of the WTO/Comecon framework: one's images of the utility of that framework to the USSR in (1) security and (2) political terms and (3) of the value that the East European countries place on it. Western perceptions of the framework have consistently tended to attach little importance to its explicit purposes and greater importance to its implicit purposes. Thus, the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have been viewed as having the primary functions of (1) exercising political control over a satellite system, (2) rationalizing that control ideologically, and (3) legitimizing the exercise of domestic political power by elites thought not to enjoy adequate popular support to rule. They have been perceived as having, at best, only tangential or inconsequential significance for the USSR—in the one case, as merely a geographical buffer and line of forward defense which enables the Soviet army to achieve more tactical flexibility in defending the USSR; and, in the other case, as a mechanism for the economic domination of Eastern Europe, which could nevertheless still be accomplished (albeit by less camouflaged means) even if that particular institution did not exist.

But these perceptions may contain biases which produce a misrepresentation of present truth and emergent reality. They call for our analytical suspicion because they derive essentially from the cold war era. Whether the WTO/Comecon framework has yet acquired concrete substance closer to its explicit purposes than it had previously and whether it performs functions more integral to the political, military, and economic interests of all the participating states than it did before cannot be determined with certainty, but changes in the Warsaw Pact in the period of détente may point in that direction. Therefore, our analytical mind-set in approaching the framework should be receptive to the possibility and alert to the dangers of continuing to view it in the terms that fitted comfortably in the past.

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Generations and Politics in the USSR

By Walter D. Connor

The "collective leadership" which displaced Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, and which in its early phase evoked so much speculation about the viability of committee rule in the USSR, has endured a decade and more—an impressive record in a period of global political instability. But whether one is inclined to persist in calling it "collective" rule or chooses to refer to "Brezhnev's Politburo" (he, at least, restored its old name), the members of the ruling body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the watchdog of the Soviet state and society, have aged. Gradually but inevitably, they will leave the scene, making way for their successors.

This essay is *not* a venture in "Kremlinology." I do not propose to wade in surnames or to assess the durability of a Kirilenko succession in the face of claims by a Kulakov or by others more junior. Nor is it my intention to explore the factors militating for the inclusion or exclusion, in an emergent new leadership, of particular personalities among those eligible.[1] What the following discussion will attempt to do is to clarify some important aspects of contemporary Soviet political reality—mainly the problem (or nonproblem) of "generations" and the properties of Soviet political culture—as they relate to the politics and consequences of succession. Consideration of these matters will not enable us to predict the main personalities in the succession (at least I do not see how it can). What it may yield are some reasoned judgments, grounded in historical experience, concerning the path any new Politburo, *whatever* its composition, can be expected to follow, and how it will probably cope with both inherited problems and new ones.

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Generations and Change

One might as well, at the outset, surrender to the temptation to use the term "generation"—but not without a caveat. The temptation is especially strong for Western analysts because the tenure of the Brezhnev-Kosygin "regime," whose passing is now anticipated in the near future, coincides roughly with an epidemic of youthful alienation, student revolt, and other manifestations of generational cleavage in the industrial West—a once seemingly "endless crisis" that peaked in 1968 and has only recently shown signs of abatement.[2] The Soviet Union was *apparently* free of such tensions, although they did affect Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. But were they, perhaps, smoldering

[1] For a perceptive recent discussion of these factors and other aspects of the succession, see Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, pp. 1-21.

[2] A characteristic Western (or American) response to such problems (and one that provides evidence of a significant difference between the Western and Soviet political cultures) is to organize a widely-publicized conference, such as the one in Princeton, N.J., in December 1968, which produced *The Endless Crisis: A Confrontation on America in the Seventies* (edited by François Duchêne), New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970.

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beneath the tranquil surface? If generational chasms open wide everywhere else, why should the USSR, despite its impressive apparatus of internal control, remain untouched? And if "youth" vs. "age" is not the critical confrontation there, is it not still reasonable to surmise that the convictions and expectations of the "middle-aged"—the educated, "industrial" generation—may differ greatly from those of the "gerontocracy" in the Politburo?

In trying to assess whether generational differences exist and, if so, what their political impact is, or is likely to be, we should beware of confusing our own hopes and expectations with reality, or with evidences of what we assume to be reality. This is an easy danger to succumb to, especially when we have the convenient peg of "generations" [3] (for we know that one generation *must* succeed another) on which to hang our expectations, and the danger should be recognized as such. Perhaps, after all, it is not the seeming gap between generations, but rather the impregnable solidity of the Soviet system, the stability of the Soviet "way of life" as it involves masses, elite, and the political process, that is the datum—the reality rather than the appearance. At least, raising this possibility provides a starting point for posing questions about Soviet "generations" and their relevance to the prospects for political change in the USSR.

These generational questions involve two distinct groups. First, there is Soviet "youth," *i.e.*, the under-30 population. Does a broad gap divide it from the Brezhnev generation; and if so, what is the gap *about,* and will it make a difference to the future of Soviet politics? Second, there is the generation of presumptive Politburo "successors," those no longer "young," but younger than the current leadership. Do its members view their current rulers across some sort of chasm, and if so, is the nature of the chasm such that their succession to power can be expected to make a difference?

The question of "youth" can be handled in relatively short order. Western journalists and analysts are still inclined, on occasion, to point to the dissatisfaction of Soviet young people with the lack of consumer goods, to their desire for more rock music, miniskirts, blue jeans, etc., as evidences of a generation gap, and—more important—they view this gap as the portent of a transformed political future. It is understandable enough that they should be impressed by such manifestations of youthful discontent. One must gather impressions from *someone,* and Soviet young people are much more ready than their elders to talk freely to Westerners. However, the political implications are open to question, for such a gap—between youth who yearn for a certain life-style and their parents and political leaders who often deplore it—has demonstrably little to do with politics. (To paraphrase Andrei Amalrik, socialism with bare knees does not equal socialism with a human face.)

The fact is that Soviet youth in the mass is less differentiated from its elders along critical political lines than is its counterpart in the West. The combined machinery of tightly-controlled youth organizations and a traditional, nonpermissive educational system focused on the "adult" concern of preparation for the world of work, rather than on providing a hiatus between infancy and maturity in which one "explores" one's feelings, beliefs and needs, has had its effect. The social space in which Soviet youth might develop its own group consciousness, its own set of political orientations, has been tightly circumscribed by that machinery. Also, material affluence and a modicum of privacy, which have been essential to the development of youth cultures

Two Soviet generations are pictured in this 1972 photo from Tiflis.

—EUPRA.

[3] "Generation" is of course, an exceedingly slippery and imprecise term. People are born "all the time," not at intervals convenient for grouping under such terms. It is used here in a very loose sense, bearing in mind its deficiencies as well as its familiarity.

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Left, a group of "modern" Soviet youths sauntering along a Moscow boulevard; right, Leonid Tupichenko, member of the Komsomol Committee at Kiev University (seated right), and the secretary of the Committee discussing implementation of Committee decisions.

—Photos by Constantine Manos for Magnum and from *Soviet Life* via Sovfoto.

in the West, are still lacking in the USSR. Whatever generation gap does exist there, it does not involve a politicized "youth culture."

Even if such a culture did exist, it could have no near-term political effect since it is not from youth's ranks that the successors to today's "gerontocracy" will come. Unlike the US Congress, the mechanisms of Soviet government have not yet reached the point of welcoming those in their late twenties and early thirties to a share of the seats of power. Thus, the relevance of the current political convictions of Soviet youth, whether they be oppositional (unlikely) or conformist-apolitical (more likely), lies only in the distant future, by which time those convictions may or may not have changed but will certainly no longer be the convictions of "youth."

More relevant, surely, are questions about those who *will* succeed to power, and what we may expect from them as the iron law of the actuary works to change the composition of the Politburo in their favor. Here, if there is a "gap" which will have a marked effect on the conduct of Soviet politics, it must, in the author's view, be of a particular type. Certainly we may anticipate gaps—in styles of management, in readiness to rely on "technical" expertise, in propensity to employ Marxism-Leninism as a rationalization for actions—that arise from career differences. An older generation whose educational/professional credentials were often attained after their potential leadership ability was noted by the party and a younger one whose similar credentials were their "ticket" of admission into the lower ranks of the elite can doubtless be expected to behave differently in some cases. But these differences, however significant, are not the stuff of which political transformations are made. The gap must come in the realm of "political culture" itself—in that region where questions about the purposes and uses of politics are explicitly raised. This being the case, it is well now to turn to an examination of political culture in the contemporary USSR.

Soviet Political Culture

Years ago, one of the pioneering students of political culture argued that it was the product of "both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system. . . ." [4] Considering what those his-

[4] Lucien W. Pye, "Introduction," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Eds., *Political Culture and Political Development,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 8.

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tories have been in the USSR, it is hardly surprising that an astute analyst of Soviet affairs quite recently characterized the political culture of the Soviet Union as "almost unbelievably aberrant and deviant." [5] The Soviet political culture is clearly rooted in the extraordinary history of Russia over the last 60 years, portions of which, greater or smaller, have shaped the consciousness of both the elites and the masses. Without attempting an exhaustive inventory, I would argue that three major, historically-rooted elements characterize the current political culture: apoliticality, the conviction of impotence, and expectancy.

Apoliticality. It might seem paradoxical to assert that in a society so evidently "politicized," where such a wide range of behavior is accorded political significance by the regime, the overwhelming mass of the population is apolitical. Yet the paradox is only apparent. It is all very well to emphasize the heavily politicized content of the educational processes and the mass media, to which all Soviet citizens are exposed. It is, however, a very different thing to assert that this exposure results in a politicized population. If anything, the major effects —and probably the main purposes—of official socialization and communications efforts have been and are, on the one hand, to assure the public that there *are* no more major domestic political issues (these having all been resolved correctly and immutably in the course of Soviet history) and, on the other, to depoliticize social and economic issues, such as housing, incomes policy, environmental preservation, and access to education, in order to prevent discussions of these matters from reaching the point where any kind of political change might be entertained, even hypothetically, as a necessary step toward their resolution. If ineeded these *have* been the purposes of the regime's virtual monopoly of education, communications, and extra-familial socialization, they have been pursued with vigor—and effectiveness—for the more than 40 years since Stalin initiated the "second revolution."

To say that most Soviet citizens are apolitical is not to say that they are "'parochials," as were, no doubt, many of the inhabitants of the Russian Empire, to whom the state was little more than a tax-gatherer. Today's citizens are quite aware that they *have* a central government (they could scarcely escape such awareness); they are oriented *toward* it; indeed, in some generalized sense, they are in large measure loyal to it. But the face of that government as a political mechanism, as an arena in which conflicts at high levels are resolved, with consequences for those citizens, remains vague and blurred. Nor do most Soviet citizens, at least to the author's knowledge, find this strange. To them, "politics," insofar as its existence is perceived, is the business of the leaders, not of the common folk. Enough for them to identify with the system and to focus their grumblings about the vicissitudes of everyday life on the middle- and low-level bureaucrats (whom they see excoriated with monotonous regularity anyway on the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*).[6] Notwithstanding all the complaints of *Agitprop* about inadequate ideological training, low levels of political consciousness, etc., on the part of the masses, the Soviet leadership is probably quite satisfied, on balance, that it has such a docile population to deal with, presenting little need at the moment for the regime to resort to coercion to keep it in line. Those who view the complaints of *Agitprop* and ideological specialists about "shortcomings" as the tip of an iceberg whose submerged mass contains widespread, smoldering resentment forget that, like any bureaucratic organization, *Agitprop* must justify its continued existence, expenditures, and personnel demands. The line that, in spite of great progress to date, there is yet "more to be done" is a conventional way of doing this.

Of course, the threat of coercion also plays a role in encouraging apoliticality. If one were to paraphrase Anthony Downs' and attempt to construct an "economic theory" of Soviet "post-totalitarianism,"

[5] Robert Conquest, "A New Russia? A New World?," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1975, p. 483.

[6] Roy Medvedev, in the revised English-language version of his treatise on socialist democracy, which came to hand after the bulk of this essay was written, makes somewhat similar points about apoliticality ("the majority of the people and a large part of the intelligentsia are politically passive—indifference, or even a conscious rejection of politics, has become an ingrained habit, a form of self-protection"); about the purposes of political socialization as conceived by the "dogmatists" ("to assure us that the general development of the country is proceeding correctly, that basically it was always moving in the right direction"); and finally about the popular view of the government ("an assumption by the common people . . . that those in charge are pursuing a correct policy, that the leadership is composed of people best qualified to interpret Marxism"). (Regarding this last, however, I would scarcely agree that the common people's assumptions about their leaders' adequacy in interpreting Marxism are a major component in the legitimacy the leadership is accorded.) See Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975, pp. 172, 197, 298, respectively.

[7] See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy,* New York, Harper, 1957.

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one element would be the *costs* of political participation going beyond the permissible limits prescribed by the system. In a democracy, citizens may remain politically uninvolved because they feel the system works tolerably well; or, alternatively, because they may calculate that the costs of political action to remedy the defects that they perceive are too high—in terms of energy, time, money, and foregone opportunities for other, nonpolitical gratifications—when balanced against the potential benefits to be gained. For citizens in a polity of the Soviet type, the costs of engaging in unsponsored political activity are high, and they are clear—harassment, loss of job, imprisonment—while the potential benefits are few and doubtful. The cost-benefit calculus is thus much clearer in the East than in the West, and it is one that leads many citizens of Soviet-type policies to prefer a safe apoliticality to a risky political activism.

(It is precisely this calculus that Solzhenitsyn has in mind in his recent writings when he urges people to withdraw support from the "official lie." Addressing himself to the intelligentsia, he argues that one cannot fight for change without *costs,* on "weekends and in our spare time, without giving up our scientific research institutes." Moreover, he warns that each citizen *will* stand alone, "in chilling isolation," at least at the outset; yet he invites his countrymen to brave the punishment they will receive for even the nonviolent, "spiritual," but *open* resistance he encourages:

A society so vicious and polluted . . . can only be cured and purified by passing through a spiritual filter. And this filter is a terrible one, with holes as fine as the eye of a needle, each big enough for only one person. And people may pass . . . only one at a time, by squeezing through.

By deliberate, voluntary sacrifice.[8]

If not utopian, Solzhenitsyn's exhortation is certainly idealistic. It asks much, perhaps too much, of a people for whom the consequences of open opposition have been only too clear.)

These observations may throw the particular "heresy" of Soviet dissidents into sharper relief. It is rooted not so much in opposition as in laying claim to participation. To be a dissident is to enter politics without a license, to participate without official sponsorship. It is to attempt (as do the writings of the Solzhenitsyns, Medvedevs, and Sakharovs) to *restore* "politics" as a weighing of alternatives. This is the major crime of the dissenters; their break with the apoliticality of the mass political culture.

The Conviction of Impotence. A different matter from "apoliticality" is an individual's socially-conditioned assessment of his own political *efficacy.* Concerned he may or may not be about politics—but if he *were* concerned, could he have any effect? Were he to translate generalized feelings of support or opposition into *action,* would his acts strengthen or weaken the system in any way, or are the levers of power so far removed from reach as to make such efforts pointless?

This is a broad question, but the answer, in my view, is fairly clear. The Soviet citizen, whether comfortable or not with the feeling, experiences a sense of his own powerlessness. Though writing in the different context of the "Sovietization" of Eastern Europe, the Polish émigré writer Juliusz Miero-

Soviet dissident Alexandr Solzhenitsyn pictured in Moscow on February 3, 1974, just before his expulsion from the Soviet Union.

—Wide World.

[8] From "The Smatterers," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn *et al., From Under the Rubble,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1975, p. 272.

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szewski captures this point well when he notes that the "goal (of Sovietization) is acceptance—not of the system (the party does not depend on this) but of one's own impotence." [9] And indeed, the whole history and experience of the Soviet population could scarcely have had any other effect. They have been "mobilized" for industrial and agricultural efforts, for defense and reconstruction—and always from the top, whence their revolution emanated. Though sometimes consultative in style (for example, when discussions on public issues are conducted in the press with "broad representation" of public views), Soviet politics has been manipulative and prescriptive in substance. The great political decisions of Soviet history—ranging from Stalin's commitment to the rigors of coercive and rapid modernization, through Khrushchev's denunciation of the Stalin cult, to the current leadership's decision to pursue détente—may have been received with pain or pleasure by the masses, but they did not emanate from any structured participation *by* the masses in determining the course of policy.

No less able than other peoples to distinguish reality from appearance, the Soviet people have drawn the proper conclusions from such historical examples as to their place in the system. If we accept the view of Valery Chalidze that the regime has in any case convinced the population at large that it is the only possible regime and that, whatever flaws it may possess, "any other conceivable regime would be frightful," [10] then such conclusions may not be painful for the majority. For the minority who harbor the germs of a "participant" orientation, for the "middle class" which has much to gain from legality, predictability, and rationality, the conviction that they are powerless, that to protest is to beat one's head against a wall, is no doubt agonizing, but it is nonetheless a real conviction.[11]

What Soviet political culture *lacks,* in a sense, is a citizenry, in the normative sense of a collectivity of persons with "participant" orientations toward politics adequate to support movement toward what Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba have called the "civic culture"—*i.e.*, toward democracy. As these authors noted, democracies do not rely on "participants" alone; they require subjects and parochials as well, in a viable mix.[12] But when "participants" are in such short supply as they are today in the USSR, the prospects for democracy seem bleak indeed—even if a liberalizing regime were to plant the appropriate seeds.[13] The contemporary mass political culture may not require the type of government the USSR now possesses. It could tolerate and support a wider range of authoritarian or totalitarian, looser or tighter political structures—but hardly stable democracy. The point is not only that the older Soviet generations have been trained to the garrison disciplines of totalitarianism, but also that *no* generation has been socialized into the disciplines of democratic participation.[14]

Although the general schema formulated by Almond and Verba provided a framework for examining specifically democratic polities, one element of their characterization of a "subject-participant" culture is suggestive in the Soviet case:

Because participant orientations have spread among only a part of the population, and because their legitimacy is challenged by the persisting subject subculture and suspended during authoritarian interludes, the participant-oriented stratum of the population cannot become a competent, self-confident, experienced body of citizens.[15]

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[9] "The Political Thought of *Kultura*", in Leopold Tyrmand, Ed., *Kultura Essays,* New York, Free Press, 1970, p. 309.

[10] *To Defend These Rights: Human Rights in the Soviet Union* (Translated by Guy Daniels), New York, Random House, 1974, p. 149.

[11] See Andrei Amalrik's remarks on this in "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" in *Survey* (London), Autumn, 1969, pp. 54-55.

[12] *The Civic Culture,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press 1963, p. 20.

[13] It was evidently in the "participant" sense that the Czech writer Ludvik Vaculik understood the word "citizen" when he said (at the Czechoslovak Fourth Writers' Congress in June 1967): "I believe that there are no citizens in our country any more." Yet, a year later, the "reserves" of the Czechoslovak democratic tradition *had* reasserted themselves in the Prague Spring. There *were* citizens; they had emerged from hiding. However, the vastly different traditions and history of Soviet Russia would make the "responsiveness" of the masses there to democratic-participatory stimuli from a liberalizing regime a matter of some doubt. For a summary of Vaculik's address, see Barbara Wolfe Jancar, *Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power,* New York, Praeger, 1971, pp. 73-75.

[14] Many Soviet dissidents have characterized the mass political "mind" in their country in terms suggesting that democratic procedures, if allowed, could not flourish. Nadezhda Mandelstam sees much of the population as "mentally ill" and observes that no one coud be "normal" after fifty years of Soviet history (*Hope Abandoned,* New York, Atheneum, 1974, p. 479). Solzhenitsyn, in his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders,* New York, Harper and Row, 1974, p. 52, argues that over the last fifty years "Russia's preparedness for democracy, for a multiparty parliamentary system, could only have diminished."

[15] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Frederick Barghoorn has characterized the Soviet political culture as "subject-participatory," using these terms in a slightly different sense from their connotation in the Almond-Verba conceptualization of a "subject-participant" culture (see his *Politics in the USSR*, 2nd ed., Boston, Little Brown, 1972, pp. 20 ff; and his essay "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," in Pye and Verba, *op. cit.* pp. 450-511.

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Many of the Soviet dissidents have a full participant orientation, but they are a miniscule part of the population. Their demands meet resistance and incomprehension from the persisting "subject" culture, shared by rulers and ruled alike. And the "authoritarian interlude," I would argue, extends over the whole of Soviet history.

What is most interesting—and potentially relevant—here is the connection of Soviet elites, including the "successors," to the mass political culture. As children, young adults, and persons commencing their careers, they imbibed that mass culture with its reflections of official dogma—*i.e.,* the "demonology" of the encircling capitalist world and the roseate picture of a remote Communist future—and with its clear indications of penalties awaiting those who might aspire to political participation on any but its own terms. Their entrance into the "elite" political culture involves further socialization—into the uses and pleasures, the problems and risks, of power. The power they now possess makes them anything *but* impotent. Yet, their intermediate, pre-elite socialization—as wielders of derivative power on the lower levels of party and state bureaucracies—can scarcely have done other than impress upon them the endurance, the "immutability" of the Soviet polity and its game rules. From such material, one does not anticipate the emergence of personalities who will transform the political system in any fundamental way.

Expectancy. This term admittedly lacks precision; if anything, it is distinguished mainly by its crudity. Yet it connotes an important fact, namely, that Soviet citizens, despite their apoliticality and convictions of impotence, are strongly oriented toward their polity's "outputs." Subjects and *not* parochials, they expect things of the state. And herein lies one of the main sources of the stability of the system—but also a source of potential danger, for the edge of expectancy can cut both ways.

Delivery of expected output, or delivery of the unexpected but welcome good or service, *has* been as critical a part of the Soviet mass experience of governmental performance as the deprivations the regime has imposed. The high evaluations placed by Soviet citizens on the provision of socialized medical care and universal basic education, as well as on the career and upward mobility opportunities afforded by the expansion of higher education, were major stimuli of social support for the regime even in the Stalin years, as mass interviewing of the refugees of that era demonstrated.[16] Largesse is scarcely the rationale for governmental provision of such services and opportunities: an industrializing regime *needs* to provide them in order to develop, mobilize, and maintain a more "modern" population and labor force. But the Soviet population, with a *historically* low level of expectancy (or output-orientation), may experience them as "goods" freely allocated, to be balanced against the rigors and deprivations of a totalitarian regime. Chalidze spoke recently to this point, blaming the "ideologues" for not informing the population that "the payment of pensions or the allocation of new apartments is not something for which the government should be thanked, but rather something that should be viewed as an obligation of the government under the Soviet economic system." [17] His criticism is no doubt well-warranted, but the critical point here is that the ideologues may and probably have succeeded quite well in convincing the population that the government *is* to be thanked for such benefits.

(The relative moderation of Soviet mass expectations despite lifelong exposure to utopian rhetoric also contributes to stability. Modest but steady improvements in housing, in the availability of consumer durables, in the provision of food, have apparently been sufficient to keep the rank and file from Minsk and Omsk satisfied with their lot until that day when "communism achieved" will banish scarcity.[18] Although, by Western standards, Soviet life is still mean and shabby, one of the greatest accomplishments of the regime, as "manager" of its subjects' expectations, has been to insure that Western standards do not become a critical reference point.)

This, however, is only one side of the coin: expectancy may also prove a source of weakness. To the degree that I am correct in arguing here that public expectations are a stable and important part of the Soviet mass political culture, they can be potentially dangerous in the event that they are abruptly violated.

Recent Soviet history provides us with examples of these dangers. The violent civil disturbances in Novocherkassk in 1962, evoked by sudden rises in the cost of foodstuffs the population *expected* to

[16] See Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.

[17] *Op. cit.,* p. 19.

[18] Paul Hollander deals perceptively with the moderation of mass expectations in *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 388 ff.

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Visitors to the Permanent Town-Development Exhibition in Moscow view plans for the Soviet capital in the 1990's.

—Photo by Imre Benko, for Interfoto MTI via Photoreporters.

continue receiving at relatively stable prices, is a well-known one—and I doubt that any serious student would believe this to have been the *only* such disturbance that has occurred for such reasons. Andrei Amalrik underscored precisely these considerations in his "1984" essay. He argued that working-class irritations and discontent, though real, were neutralized to a considerable degree by material progress, but speculated that a break in that progress, "an abrupt slowdown in the growth of prosperity, a halt or a move backwards, would evoke such strong outbursts of dissatisfaction, combined with violence, as would previously have been impossible.[19]

Other evidence, of a different sort, points to the powerful effect of the socialization processes in developing a certain level of "expectancy" among Soviet citizens. Some Soviet émigré arrivals in Israel, it seems, find the adjustment to a life and economy with less structured and formalized allocative mechanisms difficult. Even professionals alienated from the Soviet system—artists, doctors, scientists, etc.—seem in retrospect to have been "well-adjusted" in the sense that their expectations with regard to a guaranteed market for their canvases and services, guaranteed facilities for their work, etc., had been met in the USSR, so that they found the absence of these advantages in Israel a source of difficulty.

Today, as Western nations face severe economic problems and domestic turmoil, the Soviet Union, as usual, seems quite stable—no doubt owing, in part, to an acceptable performance in meeting the mass expectations of the Soviet people. Yet, the USSR has no guarantee that it can manage to do so indefinitely. If circumstances should reduce its output capacity, the expectancies built into the political culture, which now *support* the regime, could well turn against it. The risks inherent in building stability on capacity to "deliver" reflect the fact that virtually *all* the socialist regimes in the Soviet orbit—albeit in varying degrees—have moved "from utopia to pragmatism" as a central legitimating principle. Their claim on mass loyalties is rooted, now more than ever before, in their ability to "deliver the goods" within a demand structure that they can seek to moderate but cannot transform substantially or suppress.[20]

The Soviet political culture has been fashioned by history—by the history of the system (the blueprint of which is still so much the product of Stalin), by the life histories of Soviet citizens, and indeed by the history of pre-Soviet Tsarist Russia as well. There is thus the force of *inertia* behind it, a tremendous inertia which must be taken into account in any attempt to anticipate political change in the USSR, and which should make us wary of speculations that rely too heavily on an inexorable "logic" of development of the Soviet system or on the "necessity" of change due to the difficulty of carrying out coordinating and integrative tasks in an increasingly complex USSR. The impact of history, as we see it in the political culture it has formed, should not be slighted in answering the questions raised at the start about "generation gaps." Some of the answers that relate to the short-term prospects for change are implied in this section. Explicit answers may be deferred until after we have examined some forces which

[19] Amalrik, *loc. cit.*, p. 61.

[20] For a discussion of such "secularization" in a related context, see this author's "From 'Utopia' to the 'Pragmatic' Society: Social Consequences of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe," *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-ouest* (Paris), March 1975, pp. 107-41 (paper originally presented at the International Slavic Conference in Banff, Canada, September 1974).

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may militate for long-term change—in particular, the various currents of dissent that have emerged in the last ten years and seem to point toward a differentiation of the political culture.

Dissent: Alternative Subcultures

When the history of the Soviet Union of the 1960's and 1970's is written, dissent will figure as a major phenomenon. On the other hand, the system's phenomenal stability, its failure to crack or to change in character under the assaults of the politically alienated, will provide an equal amount of grist for the historian's mill.

Despite the stability of the system, dissent has nonetheless demonstrated the rise of differentiated political "subcultures" in the USSR, or at least shown that the seeds of such subcultures do exist. If the concrete manifestations of dissent might have been unpredictable, the emergence of the underlying attitudes could have been foreseen. The manifold problems arising from a policy of coordinating the relations between the polity and the specialized functional sectors of an increasingly complex system—*i.e.*, between *apparat* and "functional elites"—in accordance with predominantly command rather than exchange criteria[21] have worked to alienate *some* of those elites and even to cause them to deny the legitimacy of the system. However, a complementary phenomenon, pinpointed by Rudolf Tökés in a recent essay,[22] complicates any projections one might make on the basis of this alienation: while the regime since the mid-1960's has lost legitimacy in the eyes of many members of functional elites, its legitimacy has probably *grown* for the masses as a whole. As suggested above, the main reason for this is very likely that the regime has "delivered the goods" in material terms, thereby responding to the "secularized" criteria of legitimacy by which the masses measure governmental performance.

Dissent, then, has been generally—though not totally—an enterprise of the elite. Occupational status, education, and the remnants of a critical tradition among the intelligentsia have made the elites—scientific, technical, and creative—the logical carriers of "pure" political dissent, that is, of dissent which challenges the system as a whole. This kind of dissent requires the ability to construct and manipulate abstract ideas, to conceptualize political alternatives, to ask *basic* questions about the goals of the policy as well as its methods, whether in a "moral absolutist" or an "instrumental-pragmatic" framework.[23] The dissenters' prescriptions for change are diverse—ranging from Sakharov's advocacy of liberal democracy, through Solzhenitsyn's appeal for a benevolent and depoliticized authoritarianism (the furthest he deems the current leadership capable of going), to Medvedev's return to "true" Leninism—but all represent alternative systems, not simply "adjustments" in the polity of today. This may even be the case with some of the neonationalist, "Russite" dissent, which supports new forms of authoritarian politics as desirable in themselves.

Two points are worth making with regard to the potential of this variety of dissent. First, it involves only a small minority of those who belong to functional elites. The majority are presumably willing to accept the micro-level "exchange" relationship which exists between themselves and their political superiors and which assures them of relative affluence and security in return for competent service and political quiescence, though it denies them a role in setting goals. Second, the issues raised by the minority of dissenters seem to have little root in, and little resonance with, the concerns of the

A Muscovite couple proudly carrying home a newly-purchased "Rekord-33" black-and-white television set.

—Wide World.

[21] An earlier piece by the author in this journal dealt with the relevance of different modes of integration to the potential for political dissent. See "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1973, pp. 40-52.

[22] See Rudolf L. Tökés, "Dissent: The Politics for Change in the USSR," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökés, Eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's*, New York, Free Press, 1974, p. 8.

[23] These are Tökés's terms, *op. cit.*

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masses. Indeed, the absence of a link between the elite and the masses is one of the weaknesses of the "democratic movement" that have enabled the regime to contain it and to be flexible in coping with it. The specter of dissident members of the elite helping to generate, and then articulating, active resentments among the masses is one which must at times haunt Soviet leaders, but at present the latter have little reason to worry about so improbable a development.[24]

Very different from "programmatic" political dissent, with its alternatives to the current system, are the national-ethnic and religious forms of dissent. The issues that these kinds of dissent raise *do* concern members of the Soviet masses. At the mass level, "rights" such as the right to worship, to speak a given language, to keep one's identification with a given group, to live in one's own "home" *within* Soviet borders, mean more than the right to choose between electoral candidates; they are more than "abstractions" that concern the intelligentsia alone. Here, there is a commonality of concern that links dissident elites and the masses in a common enterprise—the protection and advancement of national and religious identity. But such demands differ from those of the primarily "political" dissenters in that they *could* for the most part be accommodated without major change in Soviet political structures, although they *would* imply changes in the substance of politics. In the ethnic and religious spheres, what the dissenters are demanding, essentially, are *immunities,* not from Soviet law as it is written, but from the systematic violation of legal guarantees that has been an operative principle of the system in action.

It is an interesting irony that the rise of dissident political subcultures around issues of ethnicity and religion is, to a significant degree, the product of Soviet mobilizational *successes* over the past fifty years. Soviet modernization, as manifested particularly in economic development, in the extension of universal basic education and literacy, even in the development of the state administrative network itself, has moved the non-Russian nationalities far from their predominantly "parochial" political culture of Tsarist times. Among the ethnic masses, there has developed a subject culture in which they *are* concerned with government "outputs," and at the same time at least the germs of a participant culture have been planted among the ethnic elites. Could peasant illiterates "mobilize" in the way the Crimean Tatars have done? Similarly, could traditional agrarian populations, Russian or non-Russian, organize the networks of communication and action in defense of religious identity that groups ranging from the Evangelical-Baptists to the Lithuanian Catholics have? The answer is clearly negative. But the process of modernization has distributed to national and religious groups, elite and mass alike, a modicum of *resources* for initiating unconventional political action. These resources, diffused and limited as they are, can hardly be compared to the centralized coercive resources at the disposal of the regime, but they are more than nothing. They have enabled mixed populations of elite and masses to develop a shared political language and consciousness around certain issues of joint interest; to break, at least partially, with the apoliticality and feelings of impotence of the dominant political culture; and to assert expectations not officially "legitimized." They, like the dissidents whose focus is on the broader issues of political structure, have contributed to the restoration of "politics" in the USSR.

Present and Future

The past decade has witnessed change in the internal landscape of Soviet political life, change that has emerged, not because of, but despite the regime's preferences. Manifested in ways ranging from nonviolent demonstrations on Pushkin Square to the creation of the now rich literature of dissent, it amounts to an open assumption by a small but committed stratum of people of a "participant" orientation toward politics. In *no* sense, however, has this change been legitimized and incorporated into the system. The boundaries of the system have remained stable despite the change in the landscape; dissent has been contained, though not rooted out.[25]

[24] Barghoorn (*Politics . . .*, pp. 60-61) sees such potential dissident elite-mass linkage as a matter of concern, albeit remote, for the regime. And indeed, such "unorthodox" tactics as stuffing Moscow mailboxes with *samizdat* appeals to "workers" to consider their distinctly underprivileged economic situation may be conducive to Politburo nightmares. But, as Chalidze (*op. cit.*, p. 170) indicates, people have learned their lesson well and are as likely as not to turn over such unauthorized material to the KGB.

[25] Despite the "tightening of the screws" on dissidents over the past two years, the outflow of *samizdat* has apparently not abated, nor has the earlier suppression of the "Chronicle of Current Events" proved permanent. See Albert Boiter, "Samizdat Review: Summer 1974," Radio Liberty, *Dispatch* (Munich), 342/74, Oct. 25, 1974; and "Samizdat Review for Autumn 1974," Radio Liberty, *Research* (Munich), 49/75, Jan. 30, 1975.

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Various analyses during the same decade have offered differing diagnoses of the Soviet system's health. These have ranged from prescriptions that the system must change its ways or die[26] to conclusions that, afflicted though it undoubtedly is by various maladies to which any complex system may be subject, it still "works" effectively enough to rule out any diagnosis of terminal illness.[27] Certainly, there have been grounds for both kinds of diagnoses, but more, it seems, for the latter. On balance, the Soviet Union has weathered the past decade rather well. Economic reform has been *very* modest by East European standards, and economic problems persist; but the economy has survived, even with a much smaller influx of Western technology and investment than the regime has eagerly sought. The relationship between the polity and the specialized functional sectors of society has changed little, if at all, but no evidence of consequent instability has yet emerged. In the international arena, the USSR has been the beneficiary of a certain amount of luck, but it has also drawn on its own resources to maximize its advantages. Almost a decade has now passed since some Western analysts saw the alternatives the system faced as transformation or degeneration. It *has* faced them and has done neither—and it has survived.

Thus, it would appear that those who expect striking changes from the inevitable succession process will be disappointed. Yet it is often hard to temper rhetoric and expectations with recognition of current realities: one analyst suggests that changes to come in the Politburo will be "sweeping and important," but several lines later, in discussing differences in the "formative political experiences" of the current leaders and their presumptive successors, he finds "no strong grounds for believing that they are of major significance." [28] In my own view, any likely newcomers to the Politburo in the next few years have already been sufficiently exposed to the mass and elite variants of the political culture to guarantee that they will resemble their seniors. It is, after all, the only political culture they *know,* and given their ages, they began learning it in the Stalin era, have witnessed its durability in the Khrushchev years, and seen it support the regime since 1964.

The extreme centralization of *power* in the Soviet system—a fact inexplicably overlooked by many whose reading of "popular" moods leads them to expect change—provides an additional guarantee of continuity. Even if we had strong evidence of "generational" fissures in the mass political culture, there is no reason to assume that Politburo (and Central Committee) recruitment policies must reflect them. The regime does not engage in random sampling to seek its successors. Those successors are the survivors of a process spanning their prior party-state careers, during which those noted by their seniors for incompetence, failures, or manifestations of heterodox ideas and "instability" have gradually been sifted out. The survivors are consequently all the more likely to lack such "negative" characteristics and to be more like their superiors than not. Moreover, until those superiors themselves move on, they can still demote and remove their presumptive successors. They retain the power to do so, and they will use that power.

There is still a further reason for being chary of placing undue importance on generational differences in the context of the political succession. "Leaders" are by definition atypical, unrepresentative of the age groups from which they are drawn. This is so in the Soviet Union as well as elsewhere, and there is no reason to assume that it will change. (Many Western scholars have by now spent substantial periods in the USSR, especially in universities. Possibly one can read the Soviet future there, but it is not written on the faces of the "typical" students with whom one may have a good deal of contact, but rather on those of the Komsomol activists, with whom one has rather less contact overall.)

On balance, then, the Politburo of 1980 or thereabouts should resemble in its dynamics—both in the "united" face it presents to the world and in the bureaucratic log-rolling, interest brokerage, and infighting it hides—the Politburo of 1975. This is not to say that a "1980-model" Politburo will not introduce important changes in various policies, but only to suggest that it will "operate" in much the same manner as its predecessor has, combining incrementalism and sudden changes in unequal proportions. "Liberalization" or "tightening" in domestic life are

[26] This was the general thrust of many of the pieces on the Soviet future published in this journal from 1966 through 1968 and collected in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

[27] The writings of Jerry Hough, especially, point up the adaptiveness and stability of the system. See "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism* March-April, 1972, pp. 25-45; and *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

[28] See Terry McNeill, "Some Reflections on the Soviet Political Leadership," Radio Liberty, *Dispatch,* 299/74, Sept. 20, 1974, p. 17.

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alternative possibilities, as are movements "backward" or "forward" on a number of economic issues; yet, whatever turn decisions on policy issues may take, there seems little warrant to expect that they will be reached more openly, or be based on broader "consultative" practices, than has been the case in the last few years.

A new Politburo will inherit the advantage of a mass political culture which has found regime demands tolerable, and output satisfactory, in the post-1953 period. Whoever the main "personalities" may be (a matter of speculation, which I leave to others), they will likely maintain a firm grip on the monopoly of power in the face of potential domestic challengers. If events on the global scale do not disturb military security and economic performance, the successors should manage to continue "delivering" in accord with mass expectancies as in the recent past, and their legitimacy, secularized as it may be, will remain secure. If, on the other hand, a military conflict with China should develop and be prolonged to the point of excessive strain on economic and human resources (despite the popular support such a "defensive" war would initially engender), or if a change in the Middle East situation should lead to a large-scale involvement of troops and materiel abroad, "history" is likely to reassert itself, posing critical questions about the viability of the system under stress.

Then, aspects of the political culture which have been sources of stability could work instead to weaken the system. A regime which rests on the apolitically of the masses in "good" times cannot be sure of the continuing support of apolitical masses in bad times. A regime secure by virtue of convictions of political impotence on the part of the masses cannot be confident of security if its coercive resources, which in the final anlysis insure that impotence, are overstretched to deal with foreign enemies. And a regime which has, for all its ideological rhetoric, gained support largely through a thoroughly "secular" satisfaction of the everyday expectations of most of its subjects, can lose such support should the expectations grow to the point where they could no longer be met.

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The Problem of Nationality

EDITORS' NOTE: A number of Communist parties have come to power in states with ethnically diverse populations and substantial histories of nationality conflicts. While the intensity and dimensions of the problems that this situation has presented have varied from country to country, the situation's very existence has created a complex of issues and concerns common to all the states involved.

The following articles address themselves to two different aspects of the nationality question in two distinct cultural contexts. Mr. Vardys examines the impact of economic development and the social changes accompanying it on national identification and nationalism in the Baltic republics of the USSR. Ms. Dreyer looks at the changing character of governmental policy toward the minorities in the People's Republic of China since 1949, with an eye to assessing Communist claims that the socialist system affords a better framework for solving nationality problems than does a non-Communist system.

Modernization and Baltic Nationalism

By V. Stanley Vardys

Socialists and liberals, both children of the early industrial revolution, have traditionally believed that the emergence of modern industrial societies would serve to soften national differences and antagonisms.* In *The Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels further predicted that the eventual achievement of supremacy by the proletariat would cause these differences to "vanish still faster" until presumably they would disappear altogether. However, this has not happened. Even in the Communist-ruled Soviet Union, as Richard Pipes recently noted, nationalism failed "to dissolve in the acid bath of modernity." [1] Instead, socialist systems, like their capitalist counterparts, are now experiencing difficulties caused by a new upsurge of nationalist tendencies.

Nevertheless, the belief that modern industrial development reduces the importance of nationality and undermines nationalism persists in both East and West. Some Western scholars hold that modernization, broadly understood as complex social change triggered off by industrialization and largely determined by its effects, not only diminishes the verve of nationalist convictions but even furthers the

* Owing to the unavailability of types with certain diacritical marks, these marks have been omitted from names and transliterations of foreign words in this article.—Eds.

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[1] Richard Pipes, "Introduction: The Nationality Problem," in Zev Katz *et al.*, Eds., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities,* Riverside, N.Y., The Free Press, 1975 p. 3.

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assimilation of nationalities with one another.[2] Soviet theorists, of course, interpret modernization in Marxist-Leninist terms, seeing it as a process of social change guided by the Communist party[3]; for them—to paraphrase Lenin—social change itself *means modernization plus Soviet power*. This view tends to make them even more strongly committed to the proposition that modernization undermines nationalism.

The purpose of this essay is to examine developments in the Baltic Republics of the USSR to determine whether Soviet modernization has in fact diminished the sense of national identification and manifestations of nationalist attitudes among the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians living in their respective republics and, furthermore, whether or not it has tended to promote assimilation of these national groups with other Soviet nationalities, particularly the Russians, who constitute the dominant and ruling majority of the country.

Preliminary Considerations

Before tackling these questions, however, it is necessary, for reasons of conceptual clarity to define certain terms as used in this paper. "Nationality" or "national identity" means both an awareness of ethnic particularity and communication in an ethnic community. Basically, the essence of nationhood must be sought in communication: a nation emerges when conscious communication in an ethnic collectivity develops, and the key to determining the nature and extent of changes in national identification is to be found in changes in national communication. Since the native language is the primary and most perfect medium of this communication, it is the single most important determinant of nationality. While other instrumentalities of communication play a part, none affects the mode of life of a community as does the language. "Nationalism," on the other hand, connotes a conscious or instinctive defense and promotion of the interests of ethnic collectivity, the most visceral of which is the interest in self-preservation.

Something further also needs to be said about Soviet perceptions of social change, primarily as they relate to the impact of modernization on the development and interaction of the USSR's diverse nationalities. Soviet theorists hold that any social change is governed by "objective" conditions and influenced by "subjective" actions. In the Soviet Union, they maintain, the "objective" conditions for change are created by the centrally-planned development of an integrated economy which stresses industrialization, urbanization, interdependence, and a demographic mingling of nationalities, and which, in the Soviet view, has eliminated social classes and created political equality and economic welfare. "Subjective" actions consist of the concrete nationality policies of the Soviet rulers. Since the phenomenon of nationality is considered primarily social in nature, *i.e.,* is determined by social forces and the social environment in general, it is expected that the objective conditions, in conjunction with proper Communist guidance and manipulation, will transform nationalities and nationality relations. Or, as the Soviet author of a sociological study of "internationalism" in the Baltic republics expressed it, economic life determines "the mental lives" of nations.[4]

Soviet theory further holds that nationalities change through a dialectical process of flourishing (*rastsvet*) on the one hand and rapprochement (*sblizhenie*) on the other. Since "flourishing" is not considered possible without the inputs of the various nationalities, the flourishing itself leads to rapprochement. Therefore, notwithstanding the progress made by nationalities in developing their own specific cultures, these nationalities become more alike—they "internationalize" and develop "common features of culture." As a result, "a new historic entity of men—the Soviet people" emerges, and a greater unity and homogenity of nations develops, producing what I. M. Kislytsin has called "a gradual ethnic merger."[5] In other words, the process of

[2] See, *e.g.*, Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha), September 1961, p. 494; also the same author's *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1966, pp. 156-63.

[3] See, e.g., A. I. Kholmogorov, *Internatsionalnye cherty sovetskikh natsii—na materialakh konkretnosotsiologicheskikh issledovanii v Pribaltike* (International Aspects of Soviet Nations—[Based] on Materials of Concrete Sociological Research in the Baltic Area), Moscow, Mysl, 1970, tr. in *Soviet Sociology* (White Plains, N.Y.), Winter-Spring 1972-73, Summer 1973, and Fall 1973.

[4] Kholmogorov, *loc. cit.*, Winter-Spring 1972-73, p. 230.

[5] See his *Voprosy teorii i praktiki federativnovo stroitelstva soiuza SSR* (Questions of the Theory and Practice of the Federative Structure of the USSR), Perm, Permskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1969, p. 172. On the concept of a "new historical entity of men," see General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Party Congress, *Pravda* (Moscow), March 31, 1971, p. 8, and M. I. Kulichenko, *Natsionalnye otnosheniia v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiia* (National Relations in the USSR and Tendencies of Their Development), Moscow, Mysl, 1972, esp. pp. 458 ff.

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flourishing is viewed as ultimately resulting in assimilation. In 1972 Mikhail Kulichenko, a collaborator (*sotrudnik*) of the authoritative Academy of Social Sciences of the Communist Party's Central Committee, argued that the historical tendency of national development in the Soviet Union as well as in the world is not one of national diversification, but its exact opposite, assimilation.[6] Soviet nationality policy rests on this interpretation of social and historical development. If this interpretation is incorrect, the process of "national consolidation," as many Soviet writers refer to assimilation,[7] is bound to be a failure, and with it the practice of Soviet nation-building itself.

The assimilation that the Soviet leadership currently promotes is gradual and partial, and it is now in the stage of rapprochement, which in the view of some precedes, and in the view of others overlaps with, merger. Rapprochement is promoted through "internationalization." As A. I. Kholmogorov defines it, internationalization involves the ethnic mixing of the population; the development of bilingualism and the adoption by members of non-Russian nationalities of Russian as their native language; the formation of ethnically mixed marriages, personal friendships, and work forces in enterprises; the development among non-Russian nationalities of an identification with Russian culture and even a rejection of religion in favor of atheism.[8] As currently pursued, however, assimilation is not identical with Russification. It is expected that members of nationalities living away from their native territory or of smaller nationalities will merge with the dominant local nationality, which may be not Russian but possibly Baltic or Caucasian. Once the smaller national groups disappear, however, the larger nationalities are expected ultimately to assimilate with the Russians through the approved common linguistic medium, namely, the Russian language. While all Soviet theorists agree on this ultimate result, they differ concerning the timetable and the type of "subjective" actions needed to further the merging of nationalities. Some consider that assimilation has already progressed sufficiently to enable the Soviet Union to scrap federalism.[9] Others, characteristically coming from a smaller nationality, would like to put off assimilation indefinitely. In Estonia, for example, one author predicted that the assimilation of Estonians would take 300 years.[10]

Historical Perspective

As we turn from these preliminary theoretical considerations to an examination of the development of the Baltic nationalities under Soviet rule, it is essential to place that development in proper perspective by summarizing briefly the economic and social history of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nations prior to their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940. This is particularly important because, as Leonid Brezhnev himself pointed out in a speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of Soviet federalism, the Baltic republics were hardly "backward provinces" when they became part of the USSR.[11]

The experiences of the three Baltic nations converged only in our century, primarily after 1918, when they successfully fought off Soviet Russia and became independent states. Prior to 1918, their individual courses of development had differed considerably despite the fact that all three had been parts of the Tsarist Empire. Estonia and Latvia had been won by Tsar Peter in 1710, and Lithuania had been annexed by Russia in 1795 (the year of the last partition of Poland, with which the medieval Lithuanian state had been in union since the end of the 14th century). Although under Russian rule for the longest time, the Estonians and Latvians had actually been governed by the Baltic Germans, who had conquered and settled in those provinces in the 13th

[6] Kulichenko, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

[7] See D. L. Zlatopolsky, *SSSR—federativnoe gosudarstvo* (The USSR—a Federative State), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Moskovskovo universiteta, 1967, pp. 305 ff.

[8] Kholmogorov, *loc. cit.*, Winter-Spring 1972-73, pp. 270 ff.

[9] See Kislytsin, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-20; P. G. Semenov, "The Program of the CPSU for the Development of Soviet National-State Relations," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 12, 1961, p. 25, and "Nations and National Statehood in the USSR," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 7, 1966, p. 81; also, A. I. Lepeshkin, "Some Problems of the Leninist Theory of Soviet Federalism in the Light of the New CPSU Program," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 5, 1963, pp. 60-70.

[10] *Sovetskaia Estoniia* (Tallinn), Feb. 26, 1971.

[11] L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1972, p. 25. On the development of the Baltic states during independence, see Georg von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, 1917-40*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974, and Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Baltic States*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938. On individual countries, see V. Raud, *Estonia: A Reference Book*, New York, The Nordic Press, 1953; J. Rutkis, Ed., *Latvia: Country and People*, Stockholm, Latvian National Foundation, 1967; and Anicetas Simutis, *The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania After 1918*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942. Soviet authors have not yet published a comprehensive treatment of the period of Baltic independence.

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century and had brought with them Germanic cultural influences and Protestantism. On the eve of independence, Estonia and Latvia (then divided into three *gubernias*) constituted the most progressive and economically developed parts of the Tsarist Empire. Already in 1897, Latvia had 150,000 industrial workers,[12] and by 1913 about 38 percent of the population lived in cities,[13] giving the Latvian provinces the highest level of urbanization in Russia. While only 19 percent of the Estonian population was urban in 1913,[14] this area, too, was already experiencing sustained industrial growth. Industries constructed between the 1880's and World War I in the Baltic provinces included textiles, paper, pulp, glass, shipbuilding, electric motors, metallurgy, machine construction, and railroad cars and equipment. Two well-known university-level schools established by the ruling Swedes and Germans trained professionals for the provinces and beyond, and the overall rate of literacy in 1897 was 95 percent for Estonia and 92 percent for Latvia—both far above St. Petersburg's 62 percent level.[15]

World War I and revolution left the fledgling Estonian and Latvian states with half-ruined or dismantled industries, and the Russian markets which these industries had served before 1913 were now closed to Baltic producers altogether. The successor states thus had to rebuild and reorganize their industrial plants, and in doing so they successfully diversified production, dropped enterprises that had served the Russian hinterlands, and developed new branches of industry, agriculture, and food processing.[16] In Estonia, industrial production steadily increased until, by 1940, it exceeded 1913 output by 30 percent—an increase reflected in the parallel growth of the urban proportion of total population over the same period to 34 percent. Latvia's performance was less impressive. According to Soviet data, Latvian production over the same period recovered only to a level approximating prewar output.[17]

Lithuania's developmental experience was different. Having been dominated for centuries by Poland and having retained Catholicism, Lithuania was considered disloyal and intentionally kept backward by the Tsars, who even denied it its proper name.[18] In 1913, the industrial labor force in the territory inherited by the independent Lithuanian state after World War I consisted of only some 7,000 workers—one-third of that number in the two existing metal and machine-tool factories and the rest divided among small enterprises, of which leather processing was the most important.[19] Starting from this abysmally low base, Lithuanian industrial production registered sharp percentage gains in the interwar period, even though the growth in absolute terms was modest. Industrialization in independent Lithuania was hampered by the world depression, but even so, the rate of growth of industrial output for the years 1934-38 was almost the same as that of the Soviet Union.[20] By Soviet estimate, Lithuania's industrial production in 1940 was 260 percent of 1913 output. This increase in industrial activity as well as the related expansion of trade and commerce slowly moved population to the cities, the urban proportion of the population increasing from 13 percent in 1913 to 23 percent in 1939.[21] However, with only a limited capacity to industrialize, Lithuania concentrated more on agriculture and developed important dairy, livestock, and food-processing industries. The primary market for exports of such products was Germany, but when relations between Hitler's Third Reich and Lithuania became strained, Great Britain became the main importer of Lithuania's agricultural products.[22]

Lithuania's educational development had been especially neglected under the Tsars. Following the insurrection of 1863 in Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia, the Tsarist government outlawed Lithuanian-language schools and all Lithuanian publications in Latin print. However, clandestine educational efforts, first organized by Catholic Bishop Motiejus

[12] Arnolds Spekke, *History of Latvia*, Stockholm, M. Goppers, 1975, p. 308.

[13] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970—henceforth cited as *Nar. khoz. 1970)*, Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 11.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] I. M. Bogdanov, *Gramotnost i obrazovanie v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii i v SSSR* (Literacy and Education in Prerevolutionary Russia and in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1964, pp. 61 and 59.

[16] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[17] *Nar. khoz. 1970*, pp. 138, 10-11.

[18] See, "Who Are Our Enemies" in S. Sholkovich, Ed., *Polskoe delo po otnosheniiu k Zapadnoi Rossii* (The Polish Question in Relation to Western Russia), Vilna, Tipografiia A. G. Syrkina, 1887, Vol. 2, pp. 367 ff.

[19] *Statistines zinios apie Lietuva ligi karui 1914 m.* (Statistics on Lithuania Until the War in 1914), Kaunas, "M. Sokolauskio" Spaustuve, 1920, pp. 105-06.

[20] League of Nations, *World Production and Prices*, Geneva, 1940, and Alfred Bilmanis, *Baltic Essays*, Washington, DC, Latvian Legation, 1945, p. 216.

[21] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1958), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatelstvo, 1959, p. 10.

[22] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 105, and Simutis, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-96.

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Table 1: Some Indicators of Modernization in the Baltic Republics

	Growth of industrial production (1913 = 100)			Urban population (percent of total)			Industrial workers (percent of gainfully employed pop.)		Students in higher education (no. per 10,000 pop.)	
	1913	1940	1973	1913	1940	1974	Prewar[a]	1970[b]	1940	1973
Estonia	100	130	4300	19	34	67	17.8	41.9	45	153
Latvia	100	90	3100	38	35	65	13.5	40.6	52	175
Lithuania	100	260	10200	13	23	55	6.4	35.9	20	182
USSR average	100	770	11300	18	33	60	n.a.	32.0	41	186

[a] 1934 data for Latvia and Estonia; 1936 for Lithuania.
[b] For comparability, data include both "industry" and "construction" categories in 1970 census.

n.a. indicates data not available.

SOURCES: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 10-11, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1973 g.*, 1974, pp. 10-11, 212, 717; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Population Census), Vol. 6, Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 8-9, 14, 93, 111, 156, 245-50, 358-62, 382-87, 436-41. Prewar industrial labor force figures are from Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Baltic States*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 190. Slightly differing figures are provided for Latvia and Estonia in Alfred Bilmanis, *Latvia as an Independent State*, Washington, DC, Latvian Legation, 1947, pp. 218, 389.

Valancius (1801-1875) and continued by the nationally conscious part of the clergy and liberal middle-class intelligentsia, fostered a rise in literacy that by 1897 brought Lithuania's literacy rate up to 54 percent as compared to the 49-percent rate registered in the Moscow *gubernia*.[23] It was only after achievement of independence in 1918, that Lithuania could set itself to the task of establishing a comprehensive system of public education, almost literally from the ground up. As of the school year 1939-40, Lithuania had in operation a university, six academic colleges, 102 secondary schools, scores of special schools, and over 2,700 primary schools—no mean achievement.[24]

Although generalizations are frequently risky, the record outlined above suggests that the Baltic states had achieved moderate levels of economic and social development prior to 1940. While the Soviet Union after 1928 industrialized at a greater speed (and at an incomparably greater human cost), the Baltic republics on their own managed to attain a fair degree of industrial development. Moreover, Baltic agriculture, invigorated by progressive land reforms of the 1920's, performed much better than Soviet agriculture, and the standard of living was higher than in Stalin's Russia. In 1938, the average worker in each of the three Baltic states received considerably higher real wages than his counterpart in the USSR.[25] The figure for Lithuania—as would continue to be the case under Soviet rule—was a notch below that for that nation's northern neighbors.

In part because of these pre-1940 achievements, popular memories of the independence period have not only survived in the Baltic republics but also have been glamorized and romanticized, especially by a younger generation which never actually experienced that independence. These memories exert a strong influence on current Baltic attitudes for a variety of reasons, but primarily because they recall the historically-proven viability of an alternative non-Soviet and self-determined national existence.

Soviet Industrialization and Its Effects

Stalin took over the Baltic states in the summer of 1940, but Soviet rule was interrupted by the German attack of June 1941. Baltic industrial plant suffered considerable destruction during the hostilities; however, by the end of the postwar decade it had been reconstructed, and industrial production had already surpassed prewar levels.

[23] Bogdanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.

[24] *Lietuvos statistikos metrastis 1939 m.* (Lithuanian Statistical Yearbook, 1939), Vilnius, Centralinis Statistikos Biuras, [1940], Vol. 12, pp. 72-77.

[25] Based on data compiled by Alfred Bilmanis (*op. cit.*, pp. 217-18) from Leonard E. Hubbard, *Soviet Trade and Distribution*, London, Macmillan & Co., 1938, from yearbooks of labor statistics and comparisons of food costs by the International Labor Organization, and from statistical publications of individual countries. According to Bilmanis, in 1938 the Soviet worker needed to labor for 10.63 weeks to buy a man's suit, while the Estonian worker needed 1.75 weeks, the Latvian 1.82, and the Lithuanian 3.01 (in Poland the figure was 2.38 weeks, and in Finland 2.08). A week's work earned the average worker in the USSR 4.34 kg. of meat, in Lithuania 30.00 kg., in Latvia 27.00 kg., in Estonia 31.00 kg, in Poland 18.90 kg., and in Finland 34.57 kg.

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At first, Moscow vigorously pushed industrial development in Estonia and Latvia, which even in Tsarist times had accounted for a substantial part of the Russian Empire's industrial capacity. After Stalin's death, Lithuania, too, received attention, and in the 1960's Lithuania's industrial growth rate exceeded those of Estonia and Latvia (at least in part because the republic's take-off level was lower to begin with). Soviet statistics (see Table 1) show that by 1973, Estonian and Latvian industrial production had increased to some 33 times 1940 levels, while that of Lithuania had grown to 39 times the level of 1940. Generally, the rate of industrial growth in the Baltic republics was higher than the Soviet average during most of the postwar period. In 1972, the share of industry (more specifically, "industry" plus "construction") in gross social product was 73.1 percent for Estonia, 73.4 percent for Latvia, and 65.6 percent for Lithuania. The share of agriculture, by contrast, had fallen to 17.3 percent for Estonia, 16.9 percent for Latvia and 25.9 percent for Lithuania.[26]

This rapid industrial development had profound social and economic consequences. First, as Table 1 indicates, there was a rapid acceleration of urbanization. The share of urban population in the total population of Estonia rose an average of 0.97 percent a year from 1940 to 1974; in Latvia, the annual rise was 0.88 percent; and in Lithuania, 0.94 percent. Estonia and Latvia now have the highest proportions of urban population of any of the republics comprising the USSR, and there are only a very few special regions of the country which have a greater urban density. Lithuania still trails behind the proportion of urban population for the whole USSR, but its urban share has been growing at slightly over 1 percent a year since 1959.

A second important result of industrial development in the Baltic republics has been a steady rise in the proportion of industrial workers in the total labor force and a concomitant decrease in the proportion of farming population. As Table 1 indicates, the industrial labor force in 1970 (*i.e.*, the total number of workers in "industry" and in "construction," as counted in the 1970 census) represented a larger share of the total number of gainfully employed people in each of the Baltic republics than in the USSR as a whole. In the meantime, agricultural employment has recorded heavy losses. In Estonia, the share of agricultural labor in the total labor force dropped from a prewar 60.2 percent to 16.9 percent in 1970; in Latvia, the drop was from 66.2 to 19.0 percent; and in Lithuania, from 76.7 to 31.0 percent.[27]

Such quick and massive shifts of population, changes of occupation, and altered conditions and modes of life have had far-reaching social consequences. They have transformed Estonia and Latvia from mixed agricultural-industrial societies into overwhelmingly industrial ones and Lithuania from

[26] *Lietuvos TSR ekonomika ir kultura 1973 metais* (The Economy and Culture of the Lithuanian SSR in 1973), Vilnius, Statistika, 1974, p. 40.

[27] See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 190, and Bilmanis, *op. cit.*, pp. 218, 389.



The Lenin Oil-Shale Refining Works in Kohtla-Yarva, one evidence of the industrialization of Estonia.

—Photo by V. Mastiukov for TASS via Sovfoto.

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A 1972 photo of the road leading into the new Lazdinai residential district of Vilnius, capital of Soviet Lithuania.

—Photo by V. Sobolev for TASS via Sovfoto.

a farming country into a largely industrial nation. These transformations brought with them many other changes, such as an expansion of educational and training facilities to produce skilled workers and new managers for the industries, an increase in the numbers of college students (see Table 1), improvement and extension of medical services, and expansion of communications facilities. With all this, per capita income levels, which had taken a steep dive after World War II, rebounded under Khrushchev and made steady progress between the censuses of 1959 and 1970, with the result that all three Baltic republics, as of 1970, boasted the highest per capita income levels in the Soviet Union. Compared to the overall USSR per capita income of 1194 rubles in 1970, Estonia showed a corresponding figure of 1587 rubles; Latvia, 1574 rubles; and Lithuania, 1336 rubles.[28]

It should be borne in mind that these changes occurred within the framework of a collectivist economic system which had an especially sharp impact on village life. In each of the Baltic republics, private farming was eliminated, and with it that stratum of the population which through the centuries had clung most assiduously to national identity. It was this stratum that had provided the matrix for the intelligentsias which sparked the national awakening of the Baltic peoples in the 19th century and eventually won them independent statehood in 1918. With this social stratum eliminated, it was conceivable that the new city culture might produce educated groups quite differently disposed toward the whole issue of preserving national identity and autonomy.

In addition to industrialization, urbanization, and the collectivization of farm life, Soviet development policies have had other effects with a more direct bearing on the ethnic structure and characteristics of the Baltic societies. These effects can be grouped together under two subheadings: (1) declining majorities for the native ethnic groups in their own respective republics, both in the overall republic populations and, more especially, in the local ruling elites; and (2) Russification of communications in public institutions and in private life. As we shall see, Estonia and Latvia have been most radically affected in both areas.

The Decline of Ethnic Majorities

The years of Soviet industrialization have seen a significant "internationalization" of the Estonian and Latvian republics in the form of a decline in the share of the native ethnic groups in the total populations of the respective republics (see Table 2). This has resulted both from traditionally low birth rates among the native ethnic groups and from the flood of non-Baltic, especially Russian immigration that accompanied the sustained industrialization drive in these republics. Birth rates in both areas have been very low since the end of the 19th century. The rate of natural growth of the population for the two republics peaked in 1960, with 6.1 per 1,000 for Estonia and 6.7 per 1,000 for Latvia, after which it suffered a decline, dropping in 1972 to 4.5 and 3.2 per 1,000, respectively.[29] Moreover, even the peak in 1960 was probably not as promising for the growth of the indigenous population as it might have appeared, for the improved rate of natural increase could possibly have been caused by trends among recent immigrants to these two republics not yet socialized into the Baltic environment.

[28] *Narodnoe khoziastvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1972 godu* (The National Economy of the Latvian SSR in 1972), Riga, Statistika, 1973, p. 56.

[29] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 godu* (The USSR National Economy in 1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 48-49.

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It has, in fact, been immigration which has accounted for a major and growing part of the population increases in Estonia and Latvia. This form of growth accounted for 51 percent of the increase in Latvia's population over the whole period 1951-70, and the percentage was even higher—*i.e.*, 64 percent—for the years 1966-70,[30] even though by then Latvia's industrial development had largely stabilized. A similar pattern has emerged in Estonia. Between 1951 and 1960, "mechanistic" growth (*i.e., immigration*) accounted for 47.8 percent of the republic's population increase, and for the 1959-70 period, it accounted for 61 percent.[31]

The impact of these developments on the ethnic composition of the respective republic populations can readily be seen in Table 2. In the case of Estonia, the proportion of the titular nationality decreased from 88.2 percent (or 92.4 percent if one includes territories excluded from the republic in the postwar period) in the year 1935 to 74.6 percent in 1959 and 68.2 percent in 1970. According to one Western estimate, if the current rate of immigration continues, the ethnic Estonian majority in the republic will sink to a mere 60 percent by 1980.[32] In Latvia, the impact of immigration was even greater, with the ethnic Latvian majority dropping from 75.5 percent (or 77 percent if one includes prewar territories separated from Latvia after the war) in 1935 to a mere 56.8 percent in 1970. At this rate, the Latvians might well become a minority in their own land by 1980.

As Table 2 shows, Lithuania's demographic experience has been different. In 1970, Lithuanians continued to account for four out of every five inhabitants of the republic just as they did in 1938. Several factors account for this phenomenon. In the first place, Lithuania has continued to enjoy a higher rate of natural population increase than the other two Baltic republics. Although this rate fell to 8.7 per 1,000 in 1970, it had run at 10 or higher as late as 1967, exceeding the corresponding rates for the three major Slavic nations (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian). Second, Lithuania's industrial

[30] P. Mezgailis and P. Zvidrins, *Padomju Latvijas iedzivotaji* (Soviet Latvia's Population), Riga Liesma, 1973, p. 86.

[31] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Estonskoi SSR v 1972 g.* (The National Economy of the Estonian SSR in 1972), Tallinn, Eesti Raamat, 1973, p. 20.

[32] Tönu Parming, "The Social Consequences of Population Changes in Estonia Since 1939," *Acta Baltica* (Königstein i Taunus), Vol. XI (1971), p. 29.

Table 2: The Changing Ethnic Composition of the Baltic Republics

	Estonia			Latvia			Lithuania		
	1934	1959	1970	1935	1959	1970	1938	1959	1970
In percent									
Title population	88.2(92.4)[a]	74.6	68.2	75.5(77)[a]	62.0	56.8	80.6	79.3	80.1
Russians	8.2(3.9)[a]	20.1	24.7	10.6(10.1)[a]	26.6	29.8	2.3	8.5	8.6
Belorussians	—	0.9	1.4	1.4	2.9	4.0	0.2	1.1	1.5
Ukrainians	—	1.3	2.1	0.1	1.4	2.3	—	0.7	0.8
Jews	0.4	0.5	0.4	4.8	1.7	1.6	7.2	0.9	0.8
Germans	1.5	—	—	3.2	—	—	4.1	—	—
Poles	0.1	—	—	2.5	2.9	2.7	3.0	8.5	7.7
Others	1.6	2.6	3.2	1.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	1.0	0.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
In millions									
Total population	1.126	1.197	1.356	1.951	2.093	2.364	2.575[b]	2.711	3.128

[a] For Estonia and Latvia, figures in parentheses show percentages as recalculated on the basis of postwar boundaries. After World War II, small districts of eastern Estonia and Latvia, inhabited primarily by Russians, were detached.

[b] The Lithuanian total for 1938 includes the Klaipeda-Memel district but excludes the Vilnius-Wilno district. A retrospective approximation such as those for Estonia and Latvia is impossible because at no time between 1918 and 1940 were both the Klaipeda and Vilnius districts part of Lithuanian territory. With Vilnius, but without Klaipeda, Lithuanian population amounted to 2,925,271 on January 1, 1940. See *Lietuvos statistikos metrastis 1939 m.* (Lithuanian Statistical Yearbook, 1939), Vilnius, Centralinis Statistikos Biuras [1940], Vol. 12, p. 16.

Dashes (—) indicate data not available or negligible; calculated into "Others."

SOURCES: Tönu Parming, "The Social Consequences of Population Changes in Estonia since 1939," *Acta Baltica* (Königstein in Taunus), Vol. 11, 1972, p. 24; J. Rutkis, Ed., *Latvia: Country and People*, Stockholm, Latvian National Foundation, 1967, pp. 292, 302; Anicetas Simutis, *The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania after 1918*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Population Census), Vol. 4, pp. 14-15; B. Mezgailis and P. Zvidrins, *Padomju Latvijas iedzivotaji* (Soviet Latvia's Population), Riga, Liesma, 1973, p. 151.

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growth began later and from a lower point than that of its neighbors, thus promising less services and affluence to prospective immigrants. Moreover, the republic had a surplus of farm labor which competed with potential immigrants for urban industrial jobs. As a result, immigration accounted for only 12 percent of Lithuania's population growth in the period 1959-70.[33] However, the republic's turn for increased immigration will come up at the end of the 1970's, as the supply of surplus rural labor of ethnic Lithuanian origin dwindles and the republic's industrial growth keeps up.

The bulk of immigrants into each of the Baltic republics has consisted of Russians. As a consequence, since the establishment of Soviet rule in 1940, the proportion of ethnic Russians in the population of each of the three republics has tripled (see Table 2). By 1970, Russians accounted for a quarter of Estonia's population, almost 30 percent of Latvia's, but only 8.6 percent of Lithuania's. Other Slavic minorities—Belorussians and Ukrainians—have accounted for smaller though significant increases of nonindigenous population. At no time in the past have there been such large Slavic (primarily Russian) minorities in the Baltic regions. What is important about the Russian numbers (particularly in Estonia and Latvia) is that they are large enough to allow not only separate but competing community life. Moreover, the Russians and Ukrainians who have immigrated to the Baltic republics are not average Slavs. Better educated than their counterparts in the Russian and Ukrainian republics, they also have more formal education than the average person among the indigenous Baltic nationalities[34]—a fact which in practice has meant that the immigrants could compete not only for manual work but especially for better industrial jobs requiring technical skills as well as for managerial and political positions.



Russian-language signs outside a modern supermarket in Riga, the capital of Soviet Latvia.

—Photo by CTK via EUPRA.

Some indication of the failure of the local majority nationalities to command their proportional share of authority in the ruling republic bureaucracies can be garnered from the data on Communist Party membership. As of 1970, merely 52.3 percent of the membership of the Estonian Communist Party was Estonian; in 1968, only 66.3 percent of the Lithuanian party was Lithuanian.[35] The ethnic composition of the Latvian CP has never been published, but figures on total Latvian membership in the Soviet Communist Party in 1973 allow the deduction that Latvians could have constituted no more than 43 percent of their republic's party membership.[36] Thus, in each republic, the local ethnic group's share in the party membership was below its share of total population.

Implicit in these data is the emergence of a disproportionately large percentage of Russians in the Baltic CP's. This can be documented in the case of Estonia and Lithuania and reasonably imputed in the case of Latvia. In 1970, the Russians constituted 36.9 percent of Estonian party membership, and in 1968 they constituted 20.7 percent of the Lithuanian party membership.[37] While in the Lithuanian case this proportion may have dropped slightly since then, the Russians' share of party membership is more than twice that nationality's share in the

[33] A. Stanaitis, P. Adlys, *Lietuvos TSR gyventojai* (Population of the Lithuanian SSR), Vilnius, Mintis, 1973, p. 135.

[34] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 Population Census), Vol. 4, Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 509-10, 518-19, 545-46.

[35] See A. Pankseev, "Changes in the Quantitative and Qualitative Composition of the Estonian Communist Party After the 23rd Congress of the CPSU," in Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Estonii, *Nekotorye voprosy organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty* (Some Questions of Party Organizational Work), Tallinn, Eesti Raamat, 1971, p. 74; and *Mazoji lietuviskoji tarybine enciklopedija* (The Small Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopedia), Vilnius, Mintis, 1968, Vol. 2, p. 386.

[36] *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 14, 1973, pp. 11, 18 (percentage calculated).

[37] See fn. 35.

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republic's population. In Latvia, the issue of Russian membership in the local party is too sensitive to permit publication of ethnic breakdowns. However, based on the 43-percent maximum possible Latvian component, one can make an educated guess that the share of the Russians in the Latvian CP falls somewhere slightly above 40 percent.

This state of affairs has important implications. Since a party card is a prerequisite for appointment to most positions of authority in government, and since non-native nationalities (predominantly Russians) have a disproportionately large share of party cards, it is reasonable to assume that the latter groups hold a disproportionate number of positions of influence. Under Soviet rule, then, it turns out that the Baltic political elites have been not only sovietized but also, to a considerable extent, Russified.

Communications and Social Institutions

Beyond these changes in relative numerical strength and influence of the native ethnic groups in the Baltic republics, there has been a sharp Russification of communications and an "internationalization" (often Russification) of social institutions. We shall look briefly here at some indicators: the growth in Russian-native bilingualism, the decline of the native tongues in printed communications, and the spread of mixed marriages.

There is evidence in the Baltic republics of substantial levels of bilingualism, which has been promoted as a stimulant to rapprochement among the various nationalities of the USSR. According to the 1970 Soviet census, 27.5 percent of Estonians, 34.8 percent of Lithuanians, and 45.3 percent of Latvians in the respective republics were fluent in the Russian language.[38] In Lithuania there was some reciprocity, with 30.7 percent of the Republic's Russians recorded as fluent in Lithuanian. By contrast, only 15.6 percent of the Russians in Latvia and 12.5 percent of Russians in Estonia were fluent in the local language.[39] One can assume that this low level of fluency in the local languages on the part of the

Russian- and Estonian-language signs mark the various varieties of goods offered in a supermarket in Tallinn, capital of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

—Photo by S. Migdal for Novosti via Sovfoto.

Russians combines with the high representation of this group in the ruling elites of these two republics to reduce the use of the native language in managerial and administrative meetings and in communications among the various local bureaucracies. In Lithuania, the local language presumably remains more in use at such managerial levels.

Concomitant with the growth of bilingualism, there has been a decrease in the percentage of book titles, journals, and newspapers published in the native languages of the three republics, as shown in Table 3. While a decrease in the number of titles published in the native languages does not automatically mean a corresponding increase in the number of titles published in Russian, it is a fair assumption that the shift has been to the latter tongue rather than to some other minority language in the given republic.

Finally, there has apparently been a rise in the number of ethnically mixed marriages in the Baltic republics—a development which Soviet writers generally regard as furthering "internationalization" and assimilation.[40] While statistical information in this area is extremely spotty, there are data for Latvia

[38] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, Vol. 4, pp. 273, 281, 317. (Kholmogorov claims that 70 percent of Latvians fluently speak Russian, a figure which deviates so much from the census data as to cast a shadow on his sample, and thus, indirectly, on his other findings. See *loc. cit.*, p. 251.)

[39] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, Vol. 4, pp. 273, 281, 317.

[40] See e.g., Kulichenko, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

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Table 3: Trends in Publishing in Native Baltic Tongues
(in percent)

	Books				Journals				Newspapers			
	Titles		Copies		Titles		Copies		Titles		Copies	
	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970
Estonia	84	74	67	86	86	74	96	74	76	72	89	88
Latvia	74	53	66	81	76	52	84	90	77	65	81	74
Lithuania	85	65	81	82	77	70	91	96	80	81	81	89

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 680-85.

which show that in 1959 mixed marriages constituted 15.8 percent of all newly registered marriages, the highest of any republic in the USSR, and that the percentage more than doubled to 32 percent in 1964. For Estonia and Lithuania, unfortunately, we have only data for 1959, when the incidence of mixed marriages among new marriages was 10.0 percent in Estonia and 5.9 percent in Lithuania,[41] and no comparable figures for 1964. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the trend was also upward in these two republics, since we have data for 1970 showing that as of that year 21 percent of all existing families in Latvia were ethnically mixed, while the corresponding figures for Estonia and Lithuania were 13.6 and 9.6 percent, respectively (the 1970 average for the Soviet Union as a whole was 13.5 percent).[42] We also know that the increase in mixed marriages has tended to be relatively high in the capital cities of the republics. According to statistics collected by Soviet anthropologist L. N. Terenteva, the proportion of mixed marriages rose in Riga (Latvia) from 29.5 percent in 1948 to 35.5 percent in 1963, and in Vilnius (Lithuania) from 34.4 percent in 1948 to 37.6 percent in 1963; while the smallest increase occurred in Tallinn (Estonia), from 21.2 percent in 1948 to 22.0 percent in 1963.[43]

The bulk of the statistics cited thus far seem to favor the Soviet thesis that modernization leads to "internationalization," which in turn promotes assimilation. To put it more bluntly, the main tendency of national development in the Baltic republics has been toward Russification. In Latvia, "objective" conditions have been so radically altered that a typical Russian professional in Riga could get the impression in 1968 that the national problem no longer existed there because "the Latvians are merging with us." [44] Much the same is true of Estonia. And while Lithuania has been somewhat less affected, that republic, too, has experienced considerable demographic and institutional Russification. But important as these social changes have been, the question remains whether and to what extent they have affected Baltic national identity and nationhood itself? To find answers to these questions, one has to examine the other side of the statistical coin—that is, indices measuring the degrees of national self-identification and communication within the ethnic community.

Social Change and National Identity

Early in this discussion, linguistic identification was postulated as the most reliable criterion of national identity. By this standard, there has been no erosion of Baltic nationality, and even in the Latvian case the Russian engineer was mistaken. In 1970, 99.23 percent of Estonians living in their own republic reported Estonian as their native language, and the corresponding figure for Latvia was 98.08 percent. In both cases there had been only an inconsequential drop (0.1 and 0.27 percent, respectively) since 1959, when such data first became available. Meanwhile, the data for Lithuania showed no linguistic erosion at all but instead a very slight gain, from 99.21 percent in 1959 to 99.50 percent in 1970. At the same time, the 1969 and 1970

[41] See A. A. Isupov, *Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (The National Composition of the USSR Population), Moscow, Statistika, 1961, p. 38; and Kholmogorov, *loc. cit.*, p. 282.

[42] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, Vol. 7, Moscow, Statistika, 1974, pp. 272, 292, 294, 302.

[43] "Determination of Their Nationality by Teenagers in Nationally Mixed Families," *Sovetskaia etnografiia* (Moscow), No. 3, 1969, p. 23.

[44] Comment of a Russian engineer, as reported in the Czechoslovak newspaper, *Zemedelske noviny* (Brno), August 25, 1968.

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censuses revealed that linguistic Russification had made extremely slight headway. In Lithuania in 1959 only 0.11 percent of Lithuanians reported Russian as their native language, while the corresponding figures for Estonia and Latvia were 0.66 and 1.47 percent respectively. In 1970, the figure for Lithuania was 0.18, for Estonia 0.75, and for Latvia 1.84.[45] (As usual, the Latvian percentage was the highest, but this may have reflected the presence of a special group of people, namely, the descendents of Latvians who left Latvia with the Latvian Riflemen to join in the 1917 Revolution and, after assimilating in Russia, returned to Latvia after the establishment of Soviet rule. A similar group exists in Estonia, and a very high percentage of the ethnic Latvian and Estonian members of the respective republic elites stems from this background.) Finally, any accounting of the linguistic situation would be incomplete without considering assimilation in reverse—that is, Russians who have opted for a Baltic native language. According to the 1970 census data, the percentages of Russian inhabitants of the Baltic republics declaring the local language, rather than Russian, as their native tongue were 1.50 percent in Estonia, 1.18 percent in Latvia, and 1.97 percent in Lithuania.[46] Thus, on balance, the Baltic languages appear to have held their own, in contrast, say, to the trend in the Ukrainian republic, where the native language has been losing ground. On the basis of the linguistic criterion, Baltic national identification has remained stable.

There is also some very impressive (though partial) evidence that mixed marriages, too, have not caused a weakening of national identification among the Baltic peoples. Soviet anthropologist L. N. Terenteva has reported that teenagers in ethnically mixed families where a member of a Baltic nationality is one of the partners overwhelmingly prefer the nationality of the Baltic parent, and that this applies even to Russian-Baltic families, though to somewhat lesser and varying degrees in the individual republics. Thus, in the 1960's, 62 percent of the 16-year-olds in mixed Estonian-Russian families in the Estonian capital of Tallinn chose Estonian as their nationality; in Riga, 57 percent of teenagers in Russian-Latvian families opted for Latvian nationality; and in Vilnius, the percentage was 52 percent.[47] In other words, mixed marriages produced a small net gain in national identification for the three respective indigenous nationalities. If this is true of the cities with large Russian populations, it is reasonable to assume that data from cities with smaller numbers of Russian inhabitants would show results even more favorable to the Balts.

Finally, trends in native-language publishing likewise tend to confirm that there has been no dilution of Baltic national identification. Although, as shown earlier in Table 3, there has been a drop in the per-

A 50-meter spire is erected on the tower of the Niguliste church in the Estonian SSR. Destroyed during World War II, the 700-year-old historic monument has been restored for use as a museum of the medieval art and culture of Estonia.

—Photo by V. Kunov for TASS via Sovfoto.

[45] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda,* Vol. 4, pp. 273, 280, 317; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1959 goda: Estonskaia SSR* (Results of the 1959 Census: the Estonian SSR), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 94; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1959 goda: Latviiskaia SSR* (Results of the 1959 Census: the Latvian SSR), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 92; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1959 goda: Litovskaia SSR* (Results of the 1959 Census: the Lithuanian SSR), Vilnius, Gosstatizdat, 1963, p. 160.

[46] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda,* Vol. 4, pp. 272-317.

[47] Terenteva, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

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centage of titles published in native languages, the same table indicates that the percentage of total circulation accounted for by native-language books has increased in all three republics. Circulation of journals in native tongues has increased in Latvia and Lithuania but dropped in Estonia. The percentage share of native-language newspapers in total newspaper circulation also increased in Lithuania, but it registered a slight drop in Estonia and a decline of almost 10 percent in Latvia. These data suggest that the use of Russian in print has probably spread for selective purposes—for example, in scientific and bureaucratic literature and communications and in popular publications designed for readership throughout the USSR—but that the native languages have not lost ground as a medium of general mass communication among the titular national populations. Thus the opportunity for continued native-language communication within the respective national groups remains virtually unchanged.

August Voss, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, who expressed concern over nationalism in the Baltic area at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971.

—Camera Press.

Baltic Nationalism Today

Not only have the Baltic peoples succeeded in maintaining their national identity, but they have continued to protect and promote their own national interests. Between the two world wars, nationalism was the dominant Baltic ideology and political force. The Soviet authorities claim to have crushed it by abolishing the capitalist system and those social classes that sustained it, namely the "bourgeoisie" and the independent farmer. However, this claim is highly exaggerated; Baltic nationalism has not been destroyed but merely subdued.[48] The first secretaries of the Communist parties of the three Baltic republics—Ivan Käbin of Estonia, August Voss of Latvia, and the late Antanas Snieckus of Lithuania—publicly recognized this fact at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971, some 30 years after the Communists had assumed power in Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius. These leaders blamed "imperialist propaganda," "American imperialists," and the activities of Baltic diasporas in the West for the survival and resurgence of nationalism in their republics.[49]

The strength of Baltic nationalism was also acknowledged by Genrikas Zimanas, editor of the Lithuanian Communist Party's journal *Komunistas,* in a 1972 article complaining of the tenacity of the "single stream" (*edinyi potok*) theory. He pointed out that this theory, which holds that ties of nationhood are stronger than class or revolutionary ties, had been denounced in 1949 at the Sixth Congress of the Lithuanian CP; yet, even 22 years later, the party's 16th Congress had found it necessary to call the struggle against this theory a "continuing and urgent task." [50]

[48] For a good account of Baltic nationalism in recent years, see the articles by Rein Taagepera and Frederick Harned in Zev Katz, *op. cit.* For a list of references and information about purges in the Baltic republics, see V. Stanley Vardys, "The Baltic Peoples," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1967, pp. 55-64.

[49] See their speeches in *Pravda* (Moscow), April 3 and 4, 1971.

[50] See Zimanas, "The Struggle Against Bourgeois Nationalism is a Most Important Condition For the Consolidation of Proletarian Internationalism," in M.S. Dzhunnsov *et al.*, Eds., *Teoreticheskie voprosy proletarskovo internatsionalizma* (Theoretical Problems of Proletarian Internationalism), Moscow, Mysl, 1972, pp. 261-62.

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Even while attempting to minimize the problem, Soviet officials continue to recognize and discuss it. They seem to distinguish between three types of nationalism. The mildest form consists of "remnants" of the past, *i.e.*, localism, national narrow-mindedness, provincial pride, etc. Such attitudes were singled out for attack in a speech by Antanas Barkauskas, Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda, at the July 1972 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party. He noted that nationalism "wears many make-ups and dresses in varied clothing," playing the protector of national traditions or the village, flirting with religion, or taking "provincial pride" in local achievements.[51] Such phenomena, while undesirable, are not considered a threat to the system. A second form is "national communism," which challenges the necessity for the consolidated multinational Soviet state under Moscow's overlordship and would establish independent socialist states in its place. Existence of this tendency in the Soviet Union was acknowledged recently by Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, member of the CPSU Politburo and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, who rejected it as economically and politically unworkable.[52] Earlier, in 1972, Artur Vader, Chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, also indirectly acknowledged the existence in Estonia of a view that "socialist" Estonia should separate itself from the Soviet Union, which he derided as a ridiculous idea originating among Estonian émigrés in the West.[53] The "national communist" attitude is regarded as related to the third type *i.e.*, "bourgeois nationalism," which not only rejects Soviet power but also questions the fundamentals of the Communist economic and social system.[54] This last tendency is regarded by the Communist authorities as the most dangerous of all. In a 1974 meeting, the Central Committee of the Latvian Community Party upbraided the party organization in Kuldiga District for neglecting ideological work aimed at combating bourgeois nationalism and other varieties of nationalism.[55]

We can get a better picture of the scope of nationalist attitudes in the Baltic republics if we reject the propagandistic aspects of the Soviet classification and judge those attitudes in terms of two elements that are generally recognized as major ingredients of nationalist ideologies: (1) the view of national sovereignty; and (2) the political philosophy associated with that view. On this basis, three dominant varieties of nationalism seem to have crystallized in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The first may be labeled "autonomist," the second "national Communist," and the third "traditional-liberal."

The "autonomist" variety of nationalism represents the attitude of loyalists who seek neither separation from the Soviet state nor the elimination of socialism, but who do take seriously Lenin's teachings on the nationality question and use what they consider legitimate means to advance the interests of their particular nationality as well as of their own national republic within the Soviet system. Most people of the Baltic republics, including many of the native Communist leaders, have been protective of their respective republics' rights and of their national languages and cultures. Baltic Communist leaders, for example, strongly supported Khrushchev's creation of regional economic councils *(sovnarkhozy)* in 1957 because they thought the councils promised greater local economic autonomy, and they reacted unfavorably when these bodies were later abolished by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership.[56] A more recent illustration of Baltic nationalist sensitivity was evoked by a December 1972 article in the Moscow economic journal *Voprosy ekonomiki* in which the author, Professor V. Kistanov, proposed that in the future economic rationality rather than national territory should be the basis of economic and state organization. Barely had Kistanov's article appeared in print when the Lithuanian party journal *Komunistas* responded to its implied threat to republic interests with an equally well-reasoned article by Algimantas Lebedinskas, a Lithuanian economic research manager in a Moscow institute, who refuted Kistanov's arguments without naming him.[57]

As still other examples, one can cite the efforts made in 1949-51 by Estonian Communist Party First

[51] See *Tiesa* (Vilnius), July 6, 1972.

[52] See V. V. Shcherbitsky, "The International Significance of the Experience of National Relations in the USSR," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1974, p. 22.

[53] See A. Vader, "The Estonian Socialist Nation as an Organic Part of the New Historical Community of People," *Kommunist Estonii* (Tallinn), No. 5, 1972, p. 12.

[54] See, for example, V. Radaitis, "Internationalist Feelings Are Inculcated in Conditions of Struggle," *Komunistas* (Vilnius), No. 9, 1966, p. 17.

[55] *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* (Riga), No. 6, 1974, p. 50.

[56] See A. Müürisepp in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Sept. 22, 1956; V. I. Klauson in *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1965; A. A. Drobnys in *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1965; and *Tiesa*, Feb. 28, 1967.

[57] See V. Kistanov, "Leninist National Policy and the Division of the USSR into Economic Regions," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow) December 1972, pp. 56-65; and A. Lebedinskas, "Economy of the Soviet Union: An Integrated Multinational Complex of the National Economy," *Komunistas*, December 1972, pp. 8-13.

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Secretary Nikolai Karotamm to protect Estonian traditions and in 1958-59 by Eduards Berklavs, a deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, to secure limits on immigration into his republic, to conserve republic production for local consumption, and to require that immigrant cadres learn the native language.[58] Similarly, protection of native-language education was a major consideration that led Baltic leaders, at the time of Khrushchev's 1958 school reform shortening the term of compulsory education by one year, to press for retention of the extra year of secondary schooling in the Baltic republics.[59] (Even today the educational system of the three republics provides for eleven years of compulsory schooling instead of ten as in the rest of the USSR.) Safeguarding national linguistic rights and limiting Russian influence also inspired reforms instituted at the University of Vilnius before 1958.

In these and many other similar undertakings, the Baltic leaders have trod on dangerous ground, laying themselves open to charges of localism and national narrowmindedness, if not of outright "national communism." In each of the republics, the "sinning" leaders—including Karotamm and Berklavs—have found themselves purged for nationalist "deviations." The plight of these loyalists, who have been disillusioned by Moscow's policies vis-à-vis the USSR's national minorities, is perhaps best expressed in the 1972 letter of 17 Latvian Communists to the Western Communist parties appealing for help in halting the Russification of Latvian life.[60]

Our knowledge of the extent to which the second type of nationalism—*i.e.,* "national communism"—has gained adherents in the Baltic republics is admittedly meager. Generally speaking, however, "national communism" would appear to be more popular in Lithuania and Estonia than in Latvia, and its advocates seem to be found especially among members of the younger generation who feel that it was through the efforts of the Balts themselves, rather than through Russian aid, that their republics have made economic and cultural progress, and who believe that their present connection with Moscow hinders rather than helps national development.[61] Consequently, they seek to gain national sovereignty, *i.e.,* to assume leadership in their own national territories so that they themselves, and not Moscow, would make the decisions affecting their national life. In this sense they are indeed "national" Communists. As for their "communism," it would appear that the preponderance of Baltic "national Communists" are not like Roy Medvedev—*i.e.,* dissenting Marxist-Leninists—but rather are drawn to a more humane or liberal variety of communism (hence Moscow's branding of such views as "revisionist"). Moreover, they tend to be realists who recognize that the international situation does not permit their homelands to be anything but "socialist" (as defined by hegemonistic Moscow). Hence, the model of Yugoslavia or even of Poland, which is seen as a "socialist but sovereign" state, holds great attraction for many Balts.

This brings us to the third type of nationalism, which we have labeled "traditional-liberal." This attitude opposes Soviet rule, advocates non-Communist national statehood, and seeks to establish a genuinely democratic political order. It is ironic that Moscow denounces such views as "bourgeois nationalism," for Soviet authorities claim that the bourgeoisie has been destroyed as a class in the Baltic republics as everywhere else in the Soviet Union. Moreover, as we know from sifting the available evidence, the "traditional-liberal" brand of nationalism in the Baltic has quite possibly been strongest among working people in the cities and on the farms and among low-level employees in government, economic, and educational establishments, rather than among the new Soviet "middle" class of intellectuals and technicians. Nor, it should be stressed, do the Baltic nationalists appear to lean toward the "capitalism" normally associated with traditional bourgeois nation-states; instead, they seem to be strongly attracted toward socialism as we know it in the West. As might be expected, our knowledge of this form of nationalism in the Baltic countries comes mainly from *samizdat* publications. In 1972, for example, the Russian-language *Chronicle of Current Events*[62] reported the year-old existence of an Estonian "National Front" advocating self-determination for Estonia and also noted the

[58] For documentation, see the present author's "The Baltic Peoples," *loc. cit.,* p. 62. The most comprehensive examination of the Berklavs affair may be found in Michael J. Widmer, *Nationalism and Communism in Latvia: The Latvian Communist Party under Soviet Rule,* an unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1969.

[59] See Jaan Pennar, Ivan I. Bakalo, and George Z. F. Bereday, *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education,* New York, Praeger, 1971, pp. 240-41.

[60] *The New York Times* (New York), Feb. 27, 1972, p. 11. For the full text, see George Saunders, Ed., *Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition,* New York, Monad Press, 1974, pp. 427-40.

[61] See V. Radaitis, *loc. cit.,* pp. 17 ff.

[62] *A Chronicle of Current Events* (Moscow—republished in translation by Amnesty International, London), No. 25, May 20, 1972, p. 217.

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Children spell out the name of their kindergarten—"Saulute" (Sun)—in the new residential district of Zhirmunai in Vilnius, capital of Lithuania, in 1968.

—Photo by A. Brazaitis for TASS via Sovfoto.

appearance of an Estonian *samizdat* publication entitled *Estonian Democrat*. In 1974, a group signing itself as the Estonian National Front and Estonian Democratic Movement addressed an appeal to Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, demanding the "restoration of independence and basic human rights to the Estonian nation," the evacuation of Soviet troops, and free elections.[63]

In Lithuania, similar demands were voiced in 1971 by Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian sailor who deserted from a Soviet ship at sea and was rescued by a US Coast Guard vessel, only to be denied asylum and returned to his ship. Put on trial before a Lithuanian court after his return, Kudirka courageously rejected Soviet sovereignty over Lithuania and was sentenced to a labor camp, though he was eventually released in 1974.[64] There is reason to surmise that his nationalist views may be shared by many of his countrymen, especially among the younger generation, not only of students but also of workers like Kudirka himself. Thus, in May of 1972, another young Lithuanian, Romas Kalanta, reportediy a member of the Communist Youth League and from a Communist family, immolated himself in the town square of Kaunas in protest against Soviet suppression of national and religious freedom.[65] His death was followed by more self-immolations in other Lithuanian towns, by attempts to highjack planes in order to escape to Sweden or Turkey, and by public demonstrations in Kaunas in which thousands chanted "freedom for Lithuania," overturned police cars, and broke windows, making it necessary for the authorities to call out special troops to subdue them.[66] In the Lithuanian case, it should be noted, religious protest has converged with nationalist dissent. Moreover, this religious protest clearly has a mass following and support, as evidenced by the fact that 17,059 Lithuanian citizens signed a petition to UN Secretary General Waldheim appealing for a condemnation of Soviet suppression of religion.[67]

(An important manifestation of the development and merging of religious and nationalist dissent is *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, which, despite KGB efforts to stop it, has published 18 issues since it first appeared on March 19, 1972.[68] While its efforts doubtless fuel "traditional-liberal" nationalism, the basic orientation of this clandestine journal and of the numerous petitions and personal statements reprinted in it has been "autonomist." By exposing Soviet violations of "socialist legality," this publication apparently seeks to move the Kremlin toward making a meaningful reinterpretation and liberalization of constitutional rights affecting religious observance, instruction, and publication.)

* * *

What we have seen in our examination of post-war Baltic development is a radical social transformation and extensive modernization but hardly any erosion of nationality identification or reduction of

[63] For the text, see *Baltic Events* (Irvine, Cal.) No. 1-2, February-April 1974. For commentary about these Estonian organizations and their documents, see *Soviet Analyst* (London), Vol. 3, No. 21, October 1974. Suspected authors of the 1974 appeal were subsequently arrested (see *ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 9, April, 1975).

[64] For Kudirka's story see Algis Ruksenas, *Day of Shame*, New York, David McKay Co., 1973. The text of his speech in court was reprinted in, among others, *The Boston Globe* (Boston), Aug. 7, 1971, and *The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Aug. 7-8, 1971.

[65] See *The New York Times*, May 22, 26, and June 14, 1972.

[66] V. Stanley Vardys, "Protests in Lithuania Not Isolated," *The Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles), July 4, 1972.

[67] *A Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 24, March 5, 1972, p. 130; also *The New York Times*, July 23, 1972.

[68] The first seven issues of the *Chronicle* have been published in a single volume in Lithuanian by the Lithuanian Religious Aid Society of Chicago, which also publishes individual issues in English translation. For a scholarly study of the *Chronicle* see Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Reigious Dissent in the USSR: Lithuanian Catholics," a paper presented at the International Slavic Conference at Banff, September 5, 1974. English sources on Lithuanian *samizdat* include Radio Liberty releases; the annual surveys by the Lithuanian American Community, entitled *The Violation of Human Rights in Soviet Occupied Lithuania*, since 1971; and *Religion in Communist Lands*, a journal published by Keston College, England.

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nationalist commitment. Modernization, it would appear, has been ineffective, for the most part, as a force for assimilation, although there are differences of degree from republic to republic.

As we survey the three Baltic republics, it is Latvia which appears to have been most affected by Soviet Russian encroachment and to have manifested the least resistence to assimilation. However, the explanation for this lies not so much in modernization as in political factors. After the purges of 1959-62, the influence of the native Latvian leadership was largely emasculated, and the republic was placed under a regimen of very strict cultural controls. The result has been that a feeling of impotence has penetrated deeply into the Latvian intelligentsia. Moreover, the Latvian experience, when compared with that of the other Baltic republics, suggests a strong correlation between the percentage of Russian population in a given republic and the ability of the native population to protect its ethnic values.

The basic reason why industrialization and modernization have failed to produce real assimilation appears to be the fact that the Baltic people have continued to constitute majorities in their respective republics and to enjoy the status of union republics, which has allowed the local governments to function as systems capable of satisfying the regular human needs of their citizens. (It may be noted that Balts have been much less successful in preserving their ethnic identity when they have moved to the dominant Russian republic.) Moreover, the interwar experience of independent statehood has helped to sustain nationalist commitment. Finally, the Baltic nationalities all have non-Slavic linguistic backgrounds and traditional national cultures that have never been dominated by or drawn their strength from the Russian heritage.[69]

While the Baltic nationalities do not seem to be voluntarily assimilating to the extent observed in the Slavic republics[70] and among smaller nationalities and members of ethnic groups living away from their native territory (particularly in urban settings),[71] students of nationality affairs in the Soviet Union should not close their eyes to the high degree of Russification that has already occurred in the Baltic republics. Given the Kremlin's assimilationist goals, the crucial question for the Baltic region is whether Moscow will find it economically and politically possible to pursue its obvious course of managing economic and social processes in the Baltic republics to the point of reducing the local nationalities to urban minorities. Such a policy would doubtless lead to a further intensification of the ethnic conflict that already seems to characterize the current Baltic scene.

[69] On Baltic cultural peculiarities, see V. Stanley Vardys, "The Role of the Baltic Republics in the Soviet Union," originally prepared for a conference at the University of Michigan and shortly appearing in a volume on nationalism in the USSR, edited by Professor Roman Szporluk.

[70] Yaroslav Bilinsky shows that in comparison to the Baltic area, assimilationist processes in the Ukraine are more advanced and resistance to assimilation lower. See his "The Background of Contemporary Politics in the Baltic Republics and the Ukraine: Comparisons and Contrasts," in Arvids Ziedonis, Jr., Rein Taagepera, and Mardi Valgemae, Eds., *Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives*, San Jose, California, Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, Inc., p. 112.

[71] On the influence of the urban setting on assimilation, see, for example, Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 1974, pp. 54 ff.

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China's Quest for a Socialist Solution

By June Teufel Dreyer

According to Karl Marx, the ethnic tensions which have rent or threatened to rend many states asunder should not occur in socialist states. National consciousness, as Marx saw it, was a manifestation of bourgeois society, and nationalism and ethnicity were tools which the bourgeoisie utilized to mask the true cause of tension—class differences—and thereby perpetuate its own rule. In a socialist state, on the other hand, ethnic antagonisms should not become a problem because the adoption of a tolerant, nonrepressive attitude toward all ethnic groups would lead the workers of different nationalities to identify their interests in class terms. The socialist state would encourage the unforced growing together of these groups, and a common proletarian culture would eventually emerge. In other words, ethnic differences, like the state itself, would simply wither out of existence.

Marx, however, was ambiguous as to both the length of time necessary for this attrition of ethnicity to take place and the degree of homogeneity required for the common proletarian culture to emerge. It is possible to imagine a spectrum of opinion ranging from the belief that the socialist state can eradicate all ethnic differences quickly and thoroughly to the view that the process of blunting the more severe of these differences will require a long period of time. The former point of view may be characterized as radical assimilationist; the latter as gradualist and pluralistic. Within these parameters are a wide variety of intermediate positions concerning the degree of accommodation that should be shown toward different minority groups on such issues as language, dress, work habits, allocation of resources, and life style in general. At least in theory, the proponents of these different positions all have an equal claim to Marxist orthodoxy.

As a socialist state, and one where the issue of Marxist orthodoxy is accorded a high degree of importance, the People's Republic of China has been at pains to "solve" its nationalities problem in an appropriately socialist manner. The concrete measures advocated by Chinese policymakers to achieve this goal have spanned the entire spectrum described above, and there has been considerable tension between proponents of differing views. The following article will outline the shifts that have taken place in the Chinese Communists' minorities policy over the past 25 years and attempt to assess the respective merits of the different approaches in achieving the classless, non-nationalistic society envisioned by Marx.

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The Early Period

The circumstances in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949 counseled a gradual, pluralistic approach to the problem of dealing with China's ethnic minorities. Victory had come much more quickly than anticipated, and the party consequently had available only a relatively small group of cadres equipped to serve in minority areas. Moreover, certain ethnic groups bitterly opposed some aspects of the party's program: the Hui, or Chinese Muslims, for example, were militantly against its atheism and quite prepared to die

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in defense of their religious beliefs.[1] In other minority areas, the party lacked basic information on the indigenous inhabitants and was simply ignorant of what might offend them. Finally, as most of China's minority groups inhabit strategic border areas, the CCP was well aware that harsh policies toward them might invite external intervention.

All these factors were conducive to an initial policy of tolerance toward what were termed the "special characteristics" of minorities. The approach, however, differed from group to group. Where a minority had indigenous Communist leaders and a level of social and technological development approaching that of the dominant Han Chinese (94 percent of the population), there was relatively less compromise with minority traditions and culture and greater emphasis on early social reform. On the other hand, where these conditions were not present or where special considerations dictated caution and moderation, there was a greater degree of tolerance.

The most conspicuous examples of "advanced" minorities were the Mongols, the Koreans, and the Chuang. All had produced native Communist leaders: Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia, Chu Te-hai in Kirin Province, and Wei Kuo-ch'ing in Kwangsi Province had proven themselves politically astute and talented organizers. The agricultural (though not the pastoral) Mongols, the Koreans, and the Chuang, moreover, had had more sustained contacts with the Han Chinese over a longer period of time than most other minorities, and they had attained a standard of living roughly comparable to that of the Han. In fact, members of the Korean minority in Northeast China (formerly Japanese-occupied Manchuria) may even have had a higher standard of living than their Han compatriots. In these areas, land reform was carried out at approximately the same time as in the Han areas, and there were relatively few concessions to the traditional local elite.

In the other minority areas, the early Communist approach was generally characterized by compromise. The Hui, for example, not only were allowed to continue the practice of their Muslim religion, but a number of *ahron,* or prayer leaders, were absorbed into governing bodies at various levels.[2] Many minority groups were promised that no social reforms would be undertaken except at the behest of the masses, and at least one slave-owning nobleman of a minority group in Southwest China was elected to the National People's Congress.[3] A similarly relaxed policy was evident in the Western frontier province of Sinkiang, where the only prominent indigenous Communist, Saifudin, was a product of the province's earlier connections with the Soviet Union, and where the Communists were anxious to avoid giving cause for a possible separatist movement among the Uighur minority.[4] Policy toward minorities in the Southwest, as well as in Tibet following the Chinese military takeover in 1950, was still more tolerant. In Yunnan, the former warlord of the province, a Yi, was named to the Central People's Government Council, the forerunner of the State Council, and also served in the National People's Congress. In Tibet, an agreement was signed in May

[1] Before the CCP's accession to power, Hui rebellions were frequent and fierce. Renowned for their martial skills, the Hui were especially formidable when engaged in holy war against non-Muslims—which most of their grievances seem to have escalated into. Outnumbered and armed only with swords, they were known to charge head-on into machine-gun barrages and emerge victorious. (On these matters, see Robert Ekvall, *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939, p. 17, and Harrison Forman, "China's Moslems," *Canadian Geographic Journal* [Ottawa] Vol. 27, No. 9, p. 140.) A Chinese Communist administrator, writing shortly after the Communists' advent to power, recalled the Han proverb "every ten years a small rebellion, every thirty years a large one" in urging a tolerant attitude toward the Hui (Sun Tso-pin, "Some Opinions on Minority Nationalities Work," *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* [Peking], Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 876).

[2] Two examples were Ma Sung-t'ing and Ma Chen-wu. However, they and a number of other Hui religious leaders were subsequently removed from office during the anti-rightist campaign of 1958 on the ground that they had been using religion as a "cloak" to disguise their anti-socialist activities (see Chen Kuang, "Oppose the Reactionary Religious Elements, Help the Shantung Hui into a New World," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* [henceforth, *MTTC*—Peking], No. 7, 1957, p. 16).

[3] Alan Winnington, *The Slaves of the Cool Mountains,* London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1959, p. 85. During the Cultural Revolution, the head of the CCP's Southwest China Bureau was accused of having named more than 80 percent of the upper-class members of Szechwan Province's minorities to governing bodies of some sort. All 11 Szechwan minority delegates to the First National People's Congress were said to have been from the upper classes, without a single member from the working class. On these accusations, see T'ien Pao, "The Counterrevolutionary Revisionist Li Ching-ch'uan's Towering Crimes in Nationality Work in Szechwan," speech broadcast by Kweiyang Radio, Oct. 7, 1967.

[4] Because Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the warlord and nominal Kuomintang governor of Sinkiang, had established close ties with the Soviet Union during the 1930's, Sinkiang's Communist movement was Soviet- rather than Chinese-influenced. Certain activities of the Sinkiang Communists led both the Kuomintang and the CCP to suspect that the Communists might be planning to separate the province from China and join with their fellow ethnics living across the Soviet border. These suspicions were reinforced after the CCP's assumption of power by Soviet propaganda aimed at Sinkiang's minorities—a subject of frequent criticism by the Chinese media since the public acknowledgement of the Sino-Soviet rift. See Alan Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1958, *passim;* and Wang En-mao, "The Great Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Sinkiang," Peking Radio, Oct. 7, 1965.

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

CHINA'S MINORITY NATIONALITIES

International boundary
Boundary of province or autonomous region
Boundary of autonomous district

0 500 Miles
0 500 Kilometers

Source: Adapted for *Problems of Communism* by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin, from a map in *China Reconstructs* (Peking), November 1971, p. 23.

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Saifudin (2nd from the left) during May Day celebrations in Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang, in 1974.

—Wide World.

1951 with the theocratic government of the Dalai Lama promising, among other things, not to alter the existing political system, and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, leader of the Tibetan army which had yielded to the occupation forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), was made a deputy commander of the PLA's Tibet Military Region.

In this early period, Peking rationalized its concessions to the minority nationalities by declaring officially that social stratification among the minorities had not progressed to the point where class struggle was necessary—a position that dovetailed nicely with the initial policy of a united front embracing even religious figures and nobles. A system of autonomous areas, ranging from the equivalent of a province down to that of a township, was instituted, and in these areas minor concessions were made to minority languages and cultural forms. This compromise arrangement was intended to be the first stage in an unforced growing together of nationalities. Meanwhile, party representatives sought to acquire knowledge of the country's minority groups and their customs with a view to making their minority propaganda more effective. It was determined that the country had 54 different minority nationalities totaling approximately 40 million persons.[5] According to the information collected about them, these ethnic groups were classified into categories ranging from primitive communist to semi-feudal bourgeois, with most groups falling into a large intermediate category designated as feudal. Reforms were scheduled with these differences in social structure in mind, and the training of a socialist proletariat among the minorities began.[6]

In the mid-1950's, however, there were indications that the moderate, gradualist approach was not having the desired effect. In connection with a routine 1956 investigation of minorities policy and again in 1957 as part of the "hundred flowers" campaign in which people were encouraged to voice their complaints against party and government, minority leaders and intellectuals were asked to speak their views frankly, and the results seemed to startle the CCP leadership, which had considered its policies toward the minority ethnic groups a model of tolerance and accommodation. The responses ranged from suggestions that minorities be given more power within the system to demands for separate independent states. If one were to cite a single phrase summing up the gist of the minorities' complaints, it would be one that appeared in a *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Canton) editorial of May 5, 1957: "many rights in theory, few in practice." Though the party made efforts to rectify certain specific minority grievances, the main effect of these revelations seems to have been to convince many party leaders that gradualism and tolerance were not achieving the results that the regime had hoped for —that, rather than encouraging the attrition of ethnic differences, these policies were reinforcing existing minority separateness.

Swings in Policy

The regime's dissatisfaction with the results of the gradualist approach fed into a general mood of impatience with the rate of progress toward Communist goals in China as a whole and culminated in the sweeping reforms of the Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap spelled a sharp turnabout in minorities policy: it brought together groups with widely differing customs, languages, and levels of technol-

[5] *Gendai Chugoku Jiten* (Encyclopedia of Contemporary China) Tokyo, Chugoku Kenkyujo, 1969, p. 13.

[6] For example, the relatively advanced Koreans and agricultural Mongols carried out land reform at approximately the same time as the Han (see "Inner Mongolia: Model Region for Autonomy," *Ta-kung pao* [Hong Kong], Feb. 13, 1954), whereas the collectivization of Mongol herdsmen did not begin until several years later (see Ulanfu, "Quickly Develop the Livestock Industry," *Hung-ch'i* [Peking], No. 5, 1959, p. 18). Among the more primitive Yi of Southwest China, democratic reforms did not begin until 1957 (Wa-cha-mu-chi, "The Yi," *MTTC*, No. 7, 1959, pp. 37-38).

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ogy into large communes, discouraged the use of any but the Han language, and in the name of efficiency dictated a negative attitude toward even the more trivial manifestations of ethnic differences such as hairstyle and details of costume.[7] At the same time, class struggle, heretofore muted, was introduced in an extreme form. The gradualist, pluralistic policy which had characterized the early years of Communist rule was replaced by one of radical assimilationism.

The economic shortages and social disruption unleashed by the Great Leap Forward were much the same in the minority and the Han areas of China, but there was a salient difference. In the minority areas, the Great Leap policies and their consequences were perceived as having been imposed by a nonindigenous group bent on assimilation and acting in direct contravention of its own past promises. Minor revolts occurred in Hui and Yi areas, while major ones erupted in Tibet and Sinkiang. The latter two were particularly serious in that they resulted in the emigration of thousands of persons, including the Dalai Lama himself, out of China. Many of these refugees relocated to the border regions of an increasingly anti-Chinese India and of the Soviet Union, creating a threat of potentially dangerous proportions.[8]

The upper echelons of the party soon realized the serious consequences of the abrupt change in policy, and many aspects of the Great Leap which minorities had found most objectionable were rescinded. It was decided, for example, that "mechanical application of the methods used in other parts of China, neglect of nationalities' special characteristics, and neglect of historical nationality barriers will all lead to disputes among the nationalities," and that "exclusive emphasis on class struggle" was to cease.[9] Minority customs were not to be reformed except by the minorities themselves, and the upper strata of the minority nationalities were promised "a bright future."[10] The reorganization of the com-

[7] See, for example, Wang Kuo-hsuan, "Fraternal Nationalities of Hunan Province and Elsewhere Vigorously Abolish Decadent Customs," *MTTC*, No. 7, 1958, pp. 8-10.

[8] According to some sources, the US Cental Intelligence Agency had contacts with the Tibetan émigré community in India and provided aid that enabled the refugees to carry out guerrilla raids into Tibet (see Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, New York, Dell, 1973, pp. 130-31). The Soviet Union has employed Uighur and Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang in its propaganda denunciations of China (see e.g., "Interview with Balkhash Bafin" in *Sotsialistik Kazakhstan* [Alma Ata] Sept. 27, 1963, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service [JPRS], Communist China Series, No. 21,735; and "Interview with Former Sinkiang Culture Minister," *Kurier* [Vienna] May 8, 1967, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], *Daily Report*, Far East, May 12, 1967). It has also been alleged, quite plausibly, that the Soviet Union has used some of these refugees in more covert anti-Chinese activities.

[9] Yuan Po, "Seriously Carry Out Socialist-Communist Propaganda Education in Cultural Work Among the Nationalities," *Yunnan Jih-pao* (Kunming), Dec. 24, 1958, trans. in *Survey of Mainland China Press* (*SCMP*—Hong Kong), No. 1982, p. 22.

[10] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), June 14, 1959.

The signing of the agreement for the "Peaceful Liberation" of Tibet on May 23, 1951, in Peking: from left, Chief Delegate Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme, Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung Thupten Lekmuun, and Rimshi Samposey Tenzin Thundup.

—Wide World.

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munes in 1959 permitted the reseparation of ethnic groups which had been merged together with others in some communal units, and in some areas, such as Szechwan and Yunnan, certain communes were disbanded completely, with the inhabitants returning to lower-level cooperative agricultural units.

While the concessions did not amount to a complete return to the minority policy of the early 1950's, the resultant policy was closer to the gradual, pluralistic approach of that period than it was to the radical assimilationist position of the Great Leap interlude. Apparently the party leadership was divided over the policy shift, with some opposing it as a regressive step holding up China's progress toward a common proletarian culture, but at least in 1959 a majority of the leadership seems to have agreed that the pace of reform in minority areas would have to be slowed down.[11]

That those who opposed retreat acquiesced in the decision to progress more slowly toward homogeneity did not at all mean that they had surrendered to the status quo. This became evident during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution when the radical assimilationists leveled charges of backsliding against party leaders who had been associated with undoing the Great Leap reforms. Many of the latter were now purged. Prominent among the allegations made against Li Ching-ch'uan, formerly First Secretary of the Southwest Party Bureau, and Yen Hung-yen, previously First Secretary of the Yunnan province party organization, was the charge that they had actively sought the disbandment of communes in minority areas and had cooperated with the traditional upper strata of minority groups.[12] Ulanfu, First Secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and himself a Mongol, was accused of similar offenses and also of having encouraged study of the Mongolian language and cultural heritage, thus promoting "national splittism" and impeding the development of unity among all nationalities.[13] In the Yenpien Korean Autonomous *Chou*,[14] Chu Te-hai was also purged as a "national splittist." As a result of the charges and purge action against him, Yen Hung-yen committed suicide, and many other heretofore prestigious persons associated with minority

Ulanfu, prominent leader of Mongolian nationality, in the mid-1960's, when he was Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission of the People's Republic of China. Purged in the Cultural Revolution, he has since been rehabilitated and frequently appears at state ceremonies.

—Camera Press.

[11] The split within the party elite over policy in the aftermath of the Great Leap did not become public knowledge until the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. According to revelations made then, the First Secretary of the CCP's Southwest Bureau, for example, had refused in 1959 to transmit a letter of instruction from Mao Tse-tung intended for minority areas because he was afraid it might "create side-effects." Later, when obliged to forward the letter, he appended the comment that "people should treat Chairman Mao's instructions from an objective point of view." This official was said to have complained that setting up communes in minority areas amounted to allowing babies to play with fire, and when the deficiencies of the Great Leap became apparent, he allegedly took it upon himself to compensate upper-class persons for property confiscated from them during communization, even in cases where they had participated in rebellious action (see Tien Pao, *loc. cit.*). Similarly, Ulanfu was accused of having opposed Mao's views on class struggle by "arbitrarily quoting" the Chairman as saying that "the heart of the nationalities problem is unity as well as the development of production" (see Inner Mongolian Red Guard newspaper *Kung-jen chan-pao* [Huhehot], n.d., trans. in JPRS, Communist China Series, No. 42,933, Oct. 12, 1967.

[12] T'ien Pao, *loc. cit.*

[13] JPRS, Communist China Series, No. 42, 933.

[14] A *chou* is the administrative level intermediate between county and province. In the present context, it is usually translated as "district."

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policy underwent humilitating public accusation sessions and physical abuse.

In fact, what was involved in all this was far more than a disagreement over the conduct of ethnic minority policies. The entire concept of the united front came under attack, with the radicals criticizing even the 1956 party constitution on the ground that it undermined ethnic unity. In particular, they objected to the clauses that called for respect of the special characteristics of minority nationalities and for the implementation of social reforms in accordance with the wishes of the minority groups themselves, even when those wishes ran counter to the intentions of the party leadership and the requirements of socialist revolution. By emphasizing ethnic nationalism to the exclusion of national patriotism and internationalism, the party constitution had promoted national schism, the radicals charged, and they advocated a new party constitution based on Mao Tse-tung's statement that "national struggle is in the final analysis a question of class struggle." [15] Because he had defended the united front concept, even CCP Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing was accused of "capitulationism" and of "consistently filling the role of faithful representative within the party of the imperialists and their running dogs, the feudal serf-owners." [16] Red Guard groups vigorously advocated destruction of the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits) and the reintroduction of class struggle in the minority areas.

But while the Cultural Revolution, insofar as it bore on policy toward ethnic minorities, clearly represented an attack by radical assimilationists on gradualist, pluralistic positions, its outcome fell far short of the assimilationists' desires. Whether this was because Lin Piao, who emerged as the apparent chief victor in the Cultural Revolution, was less radical than some of his followers, or because Lin's own radical views were restrained by circumstances or by countervailing forces, is unclear. In any case, factional struggle was halted several times when it threatened to jeopardize security in border areas,[17] and attacks on prominent minority leaders were also stopped on several occasions. Chou En-lai's role in curbing such attacks lends credence to his image as a moderate.[18]

In fact, the Cultural Revolution produced a mixed bag of results as far as the confrontation between the radical and gradualist viewpoints was concerned. Many persons associated with gradualist policies and many of the minority leaders who had been coopted into the united front many years before were purged, but others such as Chang Kuo-hua, who as both military commander and top party leader in Tibet had been associated with moderate reforms and cooperation with the native Tibetan upper strata, survived in good standing. So did Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the Tibetan noble whose army had been defeated by the PLA in 1950, and there were similar examples in other minority areas. Moreover, the united front soon reappeared, albeit in truncated form.

The new party constitution passed by the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969 mentioned minorities only once, declaring that the party must lead all China's nationalities in carrying out class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experimentation, and the struggle to consolidate and strengthen proletarian dictatorship.[19] Though some of the minority figures who were newly elevated to Central Committee membership wore traditional costumes, they were carefully portrayed as having adopted Han-Chinese Communist norms: Paojihletai, for example, was described as a Mongol herdswoman who had dared to refute the class enemies' slander that grain could not be planted in grazing areas, and Ta Lo, a Ch'inghai Tibetan, was pictured as a former serf who had welcomed the opportunity the party had given him to attend veterinary school. While the exact processes of political decision-making in the People's Republic continue to elude outside analysts, it seems probable that these minority newcomers are token representatives rather than possessors of genuine political influence.

During the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the minorities' presence in China was low-key, and in general they were treated as Han by any other name. Where problems existed,

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[15] *Wen-ko feng-yun* (Canton), No. 2 (February 1968, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 4151, p. 3.

[16] *Chih-tien chiang-shan* (Canton), Oct. 27, 1967, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 4086, pp. 6, 10.

[17] Tibet was a case in point. See "Important Instructions of Premier Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Other Leaders on the Question of Tibet," June 6, 1968, as reprinted in Canton Red Guard newspaper *San-szu Chan-chi;* trans. in *Survey of China Mainland Magazines* (*SCMM*—Hong Kong), No. 622, p. 2.

[18] After Red Guards had ransacked the home of Saifudin, Uighur governor of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Chou reportedly issued a directive on May 2, 1968, forbidding further acts of this nature. See *Hung-ch'i t'ung-hsun* (Chiangmen), No. 14, May 26, 1968, trans in *SCMP*, No. 4201, p. 16.

[19] For an English translation of the party constitution, see *Peking Review*, April 30, 1969, pp. 36-39.

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In the aftermath of the Tibetan rebellion, the Panchen Lama, left, who was promoted to Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is pictured with Chang Kuo-hua, Vice-Chairman of the Committee and commander of Chinese forces in Tibet.

—Camera Press.

collective study of the Thought of Mao was perceived as the solution; Lin Piao was much praised. Communes were reinstituted in minority areas where they had been disbanded, and they were established for the first time in Tibet. On the rare occasions when ethnic characteristics were mentioned at all, it was in the context of denouncing Liu Shao-ch'i for allegedly having encouraged the preservation of these characteristics.

Radio broadcasts in minority languages amounted to only a fraction of what had been offered prior to the Cultural Revolution, and even the broadcasts in Mandarin contained little information explicitly about ethnic groups and their members. With regard to the general attitude expected of minorities, a story published in the central party daily in February 1970 was revealing. It told of Aunty Jenchin, an elderly Mongol who had been a beggar prior to liberation. She was sent to Peking for medical treatment, and while she was en route through the city to the hospital, she had Chairman Mao's residence pointed out to her. After completing her treatment, she refused to take a car and "doggedly walked" the several miles to Mao's home. There she seated herself reverentially in front of the gate and, chanting *in Chinese,* repeatedly wished Chairman Mao a long, long life.[20]

Weighing all these sometimes conflicting evidences, one is led to conclude that the results of the Cultural Revolution did, on balance, represent a victory for the radical assimilationist position with respect to minority policy. However, this was not to be the last swing of the policy pendulum.

Back Toward Gradualism

Indications of still another shift in policy vis-à-vis China's ethnic minorities began to appear in mid-1971 and became especially strong after the purge of Lin Piao and many of those who had been associated with him. Eventually this new shift encompassed encouragement of the use of minority languages, a more positive view of the minorities' special characteristics, including their religious beliefs, and a drive to recruit more members of minority groups into party and government institutions. Changes in leadership preceded these changes in policy, with three of the five autonomous regions—Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang—being placed under new party heads. Two of the three party first secretaries who were replaced had had close connections with Lin Piao.[21] The Ninghsia Hui and Kwangsi Chuang autonomous regions retained their previous leaders.

Though the precise linkages between leadership changes and changes in minority policy cannot be clearly documented, it is a fact that evidences of a distinct shift in policy followed in the wake of the personnel changes in minority areas during the latter half of 1971 and in 1972. In Tibet, for example, a vigorous purge which had been under way in the spring of 1971 to eliminate those accused of "sabotaging the unity of nationalities and using religious superstitions in a vain attempt to restore the feudal serf system" [22] was brought to an abrupt end.

[20] *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Feb. 8, 1970. Emphasis added.

[21] Those replaced were Lung Shu-chin in Sinkiang and Tseng Yung-ya in Tibet. *Current Scene,* (Hong Kong), Sept. 7, 1971, p. 14.

[22] Lhasa Radio report, April 20, 1971.

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The trend back toward moderation continued in 1972, with the party undertaking repairs to monasteries and other historic buildings and easing restrictions on Tibetan religious practices and cultural activities. In July 1972, Lhasa Radio began referring to the party's policy of "four basic freedoms": freedom to practice religion, to trade, to lend money at interest, and to keep servants. Shortly thereafter, a series of mass meetings was reportedly held in several districts of Tibet, with higher-level cadres telling the people not to be "unduly excited or to show any abnormality if the Dalai Lama chose to return to Tibet" and blaming past Chinese policies of repression against the Tibetans on "anti-Mao revisionists." [23] Rumors began to circulate that the Chinese were negotiating with the Dalai Lama concerning the exact terms on which he might be persuaded to return to Tibet. For his part, the Tibetan leader was reported to have praised the Chinese for some of their recent modifications of policy in Tibet and to have stated publicly that he had "developed respect" for his former enemies, that he liked and admired Chairman Mao, and that he was hopeful of returning to his country soon.[24]

Other changes were evident in the content of the Chinese mass media. In May 1971, Peking Radio inaugurated broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh, and on October 1 the Kwangsi regional service resumed Chuang-language broadcasting, which had been interrupted several years before. A few weeks later, local broadcasts in Mongolian began in two Mongol areas which had been detached from the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in 1969 and added onto adjacent provinces. On November 1, the central party daily began a drive to recruit more cadres of minority ethnic groups into leadership positions and suggested instituting remedial study classes as a means of raising their skills to the requisite level.[25] (The fact that the proportion of leadership positions held by members of the indigenous ethnic groups in the individual minority areas closely approximates the ratio of the minority to the total population of the area strongly suggests the institution of a quota system.) Similar efforts were launched in the media to draw more members of minority groups into the party, and there was also a new emphasis on training such persons for technical jobs.

[23] *Tibetan Review* (Dharmsala), Vol. 8, No. 9-10, p. 21, reprinting a report originally published in the Calcutta newspaper *Hindustan Standard*, Oct. 25, 1972.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[25] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 1, 1971.

At the same time, it again became respectable to refer to the special characteristics of minorities. A New China News Agency release noted that factories in one northwestern province had altered their production to supply goods suited to the "special needs" of the province's ethnic groups. The long list of examples given included, in addition to staple items, such nonessentials as ceremonial caps, sashes, and ornaments. In order to assure that their

Kayich Ati, a member of the Kazakh minority and secretary of the Tungfeng Commune Party Committee, explains to a 1974 gathering of commune members the CCP's interpretation of the struggle between the Legalist and Confucian schools in Chinese history.

—Wide World.

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products would conform to traditional ethnic characteristics, factory personnel were said to be making regular trips to minority areas to solicit their customers' opinions.[26] There were similar reports from minority areas in southern China. Department stores were said to have set up special counters to sell the brocade, lace, and special embroidery needles needed for making the elaborate costumes traditionally favored by various minority groups, and trade fairs, which had been frowned upon as "revisionist" only a few years before, were reportedly being revived to help facilitate the purchase of these products. The fairs also gave renewed attention to minority art forms, often featuring programs of folk music and dancing.[27]

In the field of education, increased efforts were made to expand the school system in minority areas, and schools in these areas were told to adapt their curricula to local conditions. While the schools certainly endeavored to inculcate socialist norms and to teach the Chinese language, there was also greater tolerance and even encouragement of the use of local minority languages. *Peking Review* boasted that in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region more books in Mongolian had been published in 1972-73 than had been issued in the five years preceding the Cultural Revolution, and that thanks to state subsidies the prices of Mongolian-language books were lower than those of the same books printed in Chinese. It was also stated that a Mongolian Language Research Institute had been established, that all government organs and state enterprises were required to use both Mongolian and Han as working languages, and that all radio broadcasts were now bilingual. The journal credited the Communist Party with having saved the Mongolian language from the extinction that had threatened it prior to 1949.[28] When one recalls that one of the charges brought against Ulanfu during the Cultural Revolution was that he had overemphasized study of the Mongolian language, the magnitude of the changes in minority policy after 1971 becomes apparent.

A Mongolian-language class at a school in the Kiringele People's Commune, in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, in July 1975.

—Photo by Ross Munro for the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto).

The same trend was evident in other minority areas. In Tibet, socialism was claimed to be offering "bright prospects for the development of the Tibetan language," and a modern printing house was reportedly set up in 1972 specifically to publish books in Tibetan. In addition to providing translated versions of the Marxist classics, this enterprise turned out traditional Tibetan works, including almanacs and catalogues of indigenous medicinal herbs.[29] In Sinkiang, publicity was focused on the advances being made in teaching the local minorities to use *p'in-yin* script in place of the traditional Arabic,[30] but new script or old, the language being taught was indisputably non-Han.

The return to the principle of "nationalist in form, socialist in content" which had characterized official policy toward minorities prior to 1958 and again during the interval between the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution was also evident in other fields of cultural activity. In 1972, *Jen-min Jih-pao* invited cultural workers to "transplant" revolutionary operas and express their ideas through the art forms of minority nationalities, and troupes in Sinkiang subsequently staged such operas as "The Red Lantern," "On the Docks," and "White Haired Girl" using the languages and folk songs of the Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Sibo nationalities.[31] In the south, "Red

[26] New China News Agency (NCNA) report from Sining, Nov. 21, 1971, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 5026, p. 201.

[27] NCNA report from Kunming, May 18, 1972, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 5143, p. 20.

[28] *Peking Review*, Sept. 20, 1974, p. 22.

[29] Peking Radio, Aug. 3, 1974.

[30] Urumchi Radio, Dec. 14, 1974.

[31] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1974.

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Lantern" was performed in Pai style.[32] In June 1972, *Peking Review* began listing "national minorities" as a separate category in its semi-annual indexes for the first time since the start of the Cultural Revolution.[33] Hitherto stories about minorities had been included in more general categories: for example, an item entitled "Mao Tse-tung Thought Lights Up the Hearts of the People of All China's Nationalities" was listed under the category of "Living Study and Application of Chairman Mao's Works."[34]

Recent Developments

Given such clear indications of a return to gradualist and pluralistic attitudes toward ethnic groups, it is hardly surprising that the Tenth Party Congress, which met during the summer of 1973, rehabilitated some of the high-ranking party figures who had been criticized for their handling of minority policy. Most prominent among them were Ulanfu, Li Ching-ch'uan, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Because of his position, Ulanfu had, necessarily, been more directly concerned with minority policy than either Teng or Li. However, while Teng reassumed a role of importance in national decision-making almost immediately, this does not appear to have happened in the cases of Li and Ulanfu. Though both were appointed full members of the Tenth Central Committee, their duties, if any, remain unclear. Both have stayed in Peking rather than returning to Szechwan and Inner Mongolia, respectively, and they appear frequently in ceremonial capacities. In this respect, they resemble another perennial figure in Chinese nationality affairs, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. Ngapo has not been in Tibet since the onset of the Cultural Revolution, but he escaped being purged and now appears frequently in ceremonial capacities in the capital. He was, for example, ranked fourth—after Chou En-lai, Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao) and Politburo member Li Hsien-nien—in a delegation that welcomed the Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago to Peking in late 1974,[35] and he has also been prominently featured in television broadcasts on such occasions as National Day. Ngapo, of course, serves as a tangible symbol of the regime's readiness to cooperate with persons who are of different class and ethnic backgrounds and who are willing to cooperate with it.

With respect to national minorities, the party constitution adopted by the Tenth Central Committee in 1973 is similar to its predecessor, declaring that the party must lead the people of all nationalities in the three great struggles.[36] However, the first of these—class struggle—does not appear to be receiving any significant degree of attention in current minority affairs.

No obvious efforts were made at the time of the Tenth Congress to justify the political rehabilitation of many officials who had been vilified during the Cultural Revolution or to explain the changes in minority policy that had taken place during the preceding two years. During the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius which followed the Congress, however, the minorities were told that Lin had sabotaged the party's policy on nationalities, thereby splitting the unity of the ancestral land.[37] It will be recalled that during the Cultural Revolution the very same charge of splittism had been leveled against those associated with gradualist, pluralistic views, and still earlier against those responsible for the radical assimilationist policies of the Great Leap period.

The changes that had become evident in China's minority policy after mid-1971 continued to be manifest in the deliberations of the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. The phrase "people of all nationalities" appeared so often in the official communiqué and other documents of the Congress as to seem ostentatiously redundant, and affirmations of the "great unity" of all China's nationalities were almost as numerous. The new PRC Constitution passed by the Congress reaffirms the equality of all nationalities and grants ethnic minorities freedom to use their own spoken and written languages as well as the right to "exercise autonomy" through local organs of self-government in national autonomous areas. At the same time, the preamble recognizes the need to consolidate the unity of all nationalities and to develop a revolutionary united front.

One striking difference in the new Constitution is that its provisions pertaining to minority rights are much briefer than those in the 1954 Constitution.

[32] Kunming Radio, Feb. 11, 1975.
[33] See issue of June 30, 1972, p. 23.
[34] *Ibid.*, June 20, 1969, p. 28.
[35] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 6, 1974.
[36] For the English text of the party constitution, see *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 26-29.
[37] *E.g.*, Nanning Radio, Jan., 10, 1974, and Huhehot Radio, Nov. 23, 1974.

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On the subject of minority linguistic rights, Article 77 of the 1954 Constitution stipulated:

Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The people's courts are required to provide interpreters for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality. In an area entirely or largely inhabited by a minority or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in the people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices, and all other documents of the people's courts are promulgated in that language.[38]

In contrast, Article 4 of the 1975 Constitution simply states:

All the nationalities have the freedom to use their own spoken and written languages.[39]

This abridgment of the old constitutional provision is open to various interpretations. Since the new Constitution as a whole is but a fraction of the length of its predecessor, it is not inconceivable that the abridgment may have been motivated simply by a desire for overall brevity. However, two other alternative explanations are possible. One is that the change may indicate the belief of the framers of the 1975 Constitution that whereas the rights provided in the 1954 document had to be spelled out in some detail because they were new, such detailed enumeration was no longer necessary 21 years later since those rights had become accepted as a matter of course. The other alternative interpretation is that the removal of specific guidelines governing minority linguistic rights might be intended to open the way for a shift to a more assimilationist linguistic policy. Present practice argues for acceptance of the former interpretation, but there is no question that the new Constitution does allow for a turn toward a more restrictive posture on minority language rights. A great deal will depend on how the shortened provision of the 1975 Constitution is implemented in practice.

There is another difference between the two documents that should be noted. Whereas Article 68 of the 1954 Constitution guaranteed each nationality appropriate representation in the local governmental organs of its own particular area, the 1975 Constitution nowhere contains such a guarantee. Thus, it is conceivable that the PRC leadership could at some future time decide that proportional representation for minorities has become no longer necessary because ethnic differences will have been reduced to the point of irrelevancy. For the present, however, the regime appears to be making scrupulous efforts to observe the rule of proportionality. An indication of this is the fact that the newly-elected Presidium of the Fourth National People's Congress includes among its 218 members 13 persons whose names definitely show them to be of minority nationalities[40]—a six-percent share of representation almost exactly equal to the minorities' share of total population. (Moreover, since many persons of minority nationalities use Han-style names, the minorities' actual share of Presidium representation may well be larger than six percent.)

Despite the ambiguities in the 1975 Constitution, there is no question that the period since the demise of Lin Piao has witnessed a clear-cut shift in minority policy. Yet it is necessary to guard against exaggerating the significance of the changes that have taken place. For one thing, those associated with the gradualist, pluralist viewpoint were not totally excluded from positions of power during Lin Piao's ascendancy, nor was the pressure toward assimilation total and unremitting. The evidence presented above suggests that there was a radical faction which would have liked to enforce stringent assimilationist standards, insisting, for example, on the destruction of the "four olds" and on eliminating all concessions to the minorities' special characteristics. However, since such an extremist policy was not fully implemented even at the zenith of Lin's power, one must conclude either that it was not entirely typical of Lin's thinking, or that the actions of Lin and his group were constrained by a more moderate group within the leadership.

Moreover, while many of the changes in official attitudes toward minorities after Lin's fall have been startlingly abrupt, the changes do not add up to the adoption of a uniformly pluralistic policy. The emphasis on learning Chinese continues, and one cannot escape the feeling that the recent expansion of the use of minority languages has been aimed in

[38] *Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic,* Peking, People's Publishing House, 1954.

[39] For the English text of the 1975 Constitution, see *Peking Review,* Jan. 24, 1975, pp. 12-17.

[40] For a name list of the Presidium members, see *ibid.,* Jan. 24, 1975, pp. 8 and 10.

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

Left, signs reading "Not open to visitors" and "No admittance" posted on the closed gates of an old lamasery in the Inner Mongolian town of Silinhot, now being used principally as a storehouse and bird roost; right, Chinese Muslims praying in the main mosque in Peking.

—Photos by Ross Munro for the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto) and by Keystone.

large part at publicizing the party line more thoroughly. For example, the only use thus far reported to have been made of the recently founded Nationalities School of the Kannan Tibetan Autonomous *Chou* was to train translators so that the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius could be brought to non-Han speaking minorities in Tibetan rural areas.[41] The transplanting of revolutionary model operas into minority languages and settings probably falls in the same category. Moreover, the unleashing by Peking of a campaign of vilification against the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile following the collapse of negotiations for his return to Tibet,[42] together with the recent intensification of efforts to develop Tibet on the socialist model,[43] suggests that there are limits to the present leadership's willingness to accede to minority wishes. This is not to minimize the changes in minority policy since mid-1971. Indeed, these changes have been substantial enough to cause obvious dissatisfaction on the part of a segment of the Chinese leadership, and the existence of this dissatisfaction suggests the possibility of another eventual swing of the policy pendulum. Clearly, much will depend upon the personalities who emerge as successors to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

* * *

In spite of the twists and turns of its minority policy over the past quarter century, the PRC's efforts to "solve" its nationalities problem have not been without a measure of success. The futility of minority revolt has been effectively driven home on the relatively few occasions when it has been attempted. A knowledge of the Han-Chinese spoken and written language, though not universalized, now seems to be recognized by most members of minority groups as an important factor in social advancement. Similarly, there seems to be minority recognition that the CCP and the governmental structure the party has created constitutes the only promising channel of social mobility.

On the other hand, the party and government clearly continue to entertain doubts regarding the loyalty of many minorities. A suspicious note of bravado is detectable in the frequent rallies held at archaeological digs in Sinkiang to proclaim that the latest excavation of Han dynasty coins "conclusively proves" that Sinkiang has always been part of the ancestral land,[44] as well as in Peking's constant reaffirmations of the "unbreakable unity" between the People's Liberation Army and the border peoples in their determination to protect China's

[41] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 25, 1974.

[42] Lhasa Radio, June 6, 1974; and *Peking Review*, July 7, 1974, pp. 9-11.

[43] These efforts were exemplified by the visit of Ch'en Yung-kuei, the hero of China's model agricultural unit, the Tachai brigade, to Tibet in November 1974 (Lhasa Radio, Nov. 20, 1974). There has been a sharp increase in the amount of freight entering Tibet in the past two years, much of it tractors, seed and other materials to aid in the development of agriculture there (Peking Radio, Aug. 9, 1974).

[44] Urumchi Radio, March 7, 1975.

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sacred soil.[45] It is noteworthy that those minorities, such as the Chuang and Pai, whose loyalties are apparently not in doubt are precisely those which had already become well integrated into Han-Chinese society before 1949. This would seem to suggest that the minority policies pursued by the Communist regime have made little difference so far as solving the national question is concerned.

It would be unwise, moreover, to assume that either time or improving standards of living will facilitate an eventual solution. Those whom the official press from time to time accuses of participating in "imperialist plots to undermine the unity of nationalities" are often so young that they can have no memory of what life in pre-Communist China was like. Indeed, it seems altogether possible that minority problems may become more rather than less severe with the passage of time. As for rising living standards, the experience of the Soviet Union has shown that this may actually encourage the growth of nationalist tendencies, presumably because increased affluence tends to enable ethnic minorities to devote greater attention to such cultural-psychological concerns as the protection of their national identity and heritage. Even the "flooding" of minority areas with Han-Chinese immigrants, which is said to be taking place under the regime's current large-scale "rustication" program, may have the effect of exacerbating tensions between nationalities rather than diluting ethnic cohesiveness. In such circumstances, the very techniques of social mobilization that the CCP has employed to solidify the minorities could work against the party and governmental system. Whereas formerly the minorities were scattered, poorly organized, and perhaps only dimly aware of other ethnic groups, the party's mobilization efforts have generally resulted in their becoming more tightly organized into cooperative production groups, factory work teams, and the like. These entities might well serve as focal points for channeling and intensifying resentments that might otherwise have remained diffuse and minor grievances.

It may be argued that the PRC's present policy, which is in essence similar to the Soviet policy capsulized in Stalin's phrase, "national in form, socialist in content," will eventually bring a satisfactory resolution of the difficult choice facing China's minorities—the choice between retention of their ethnic ties and participation in the larger society. There is, however, the serious question of whether the Soviet formula does not contain an inherent contradiction. That is, might not national forms embody a political culture of their own that is antithetical to socialism? Can, for example, what remains of native Tibetan theocratic rule and Lamaist religious practices be accommodated without setting in motion trends inimical to the attainment of ethnic unity in a socialist framework? Even the retention of more superficial manifestations of national identity, such as clothing, hairstyle, and language, have been criticized by the party as wasteful of scarce resources or as manifestations of parochialism.

Clearly there still remains a segment within the Chinese leadership which does not consider the state of accommodation thus far achieved in internationality relations to represent an acceptable fusion of minority characteristics or an adequately homogeneous proletarian culture. The nature of the steps necessary to attain these goals is not obvious, and it appears doubtful whether the policies advocated by either the radical assimilationists or the advocates of gradualist pluralism will achieve the desired ends. The reader cannot fail to have noticed that each side has accused the policy of the other of having undermined the unity of nationalities, and indeed both sides appear to be correct. Putting pressure on ethnic minorities to abandon their languages, customs, and life-styles has often created animosity toward the party and government and intensified the desire to retain traditional ways. On the other hand, tolerance and encouragement of minority customs and habits have tended to legitimize ethnic ties and perpetuate a sense of differentness.

In other words, China's policymakers find themselves in a fundamental dilemma where both tolerance and repression of the special characteristics of minorities tend to reinforce their continued existence. In theory, there could conceivably be a middle-ground policy that would erode minority characteristics slowly enough to avoid arousing antagonism, yet quickly enough to prevent the accretion of vested interests strong enough to halt or reverse the process of erosion in mid-course. At least up to the present, however, it would appear that Chinese policymakers —like those of most other nations, socialist or otherwise—have not succeeded in finding the key to the perennial "national question."

[45] *E.g.*, "Strengthen the Unity of the Masses of Nationalities and Consolidate the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Sept. 6, 1969; and "If Army and People are United as One, Who in the World Can Match Them?" NCNA, July 30, 1969, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 4470, p. 18.

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Books
Windows on the Soviet Military

By John Erickson

EDITORS' NOTE: The volumes reviewed are the first four works in an open-ended series entitled *Soviet Military Thought,* a selection of Soviet military writings translated (in most cases) and published under the auspices of the US Air Force. The Russian titles below are reprinted as transliterated by the publishers. *Problems of Communism* hopes to carry reviews of further volumes in the series (two of which have recently appeared, with more in production).

A. A. SIDORENKO: *The Offensive (A Soviet View).* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973. A translation of *Nastupleniye,* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970.
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (A Soviet View). Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974. A reprint of *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army,* revised edition, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972 (in turn a Soviet translation of *Marksizm-Leninizm o voyne i armii,* 5th edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968).
N. A. LOMOV, Ed.: *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet View).* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974. A translation of *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i revolyutsiya v voyennom dele,* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973.
V. YE. SAVKIN: *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View).* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974. A translation of *Osnovnye printsipy operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki,* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972.

IF, PERCHANCE, some bibliophilic Martian should stroll through our bookstores, he could be forgiven for concluding that the most pressing preoccupation of Western students of the military remains the grim *Wehrmacht* and the terrifying knights of *Bushido.* His confusion would be compounded upon learning that these military organizations were long ago crushed to bits, while there is still in existence a massive, formidably organized and inimical force, the Soviet military machine. It is strange, he might muse, that there are reams of paper on *SS Leibstandarte* and the like, yet not a Soviet divisional history in sight; or that there is minute discussion of each nut and bolt of the *Panzerkampfwagen III (Pz Kw III)* and its variants, yet little or nothing about Moscow's armored force, with its stockpile of 40,000 tanks. Surely there should be compelling interest in Soviet armor designed for CBR (Chemical-Biological-Radiological) warfare in general and for tactical nuclear warfare in particular — tanks designed with minimum cross-section and low silhouette, tanks equipped with radiation attenuation liners of lead and plastic for gaseous and neutron shielding, tanks with special ventilation systems and with automatic control units to provide sealing against blast effects. Yet in simple statistical terms there is more avid and exact discussion of the long-defunct *Jagdpanzer Elefant,* with rear drive but with both sprocket and idler cogged, or the *Pz Kw III Ausf N* with its 7.5 cm L/24 gun.

The point here is not to belittle the many fine and sometimes superb historical enquiries conducted by specialists into the foreign armies of the past; the problem—and the pity—is that there is nothing comparable in the field of Soviet military studies, at least in open publications. That we know more about *Wehrkreise* than about Soviet military districts—the military anatomy of the Soviet Union—is a reflection of the poor state of current research into the Soviet military. Few if any writers

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on the subject ever seem to turn to the materials amassed by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) of the US Government, to cite just one source, on subjects ranging from the latest tank features to military pensions. From time to time, treatises appear on "strategy" or such themes as "the nature of Soviet military power/organization," but discussions of this sort are all too often hampered by a lack of basic knowledge about the Soviet system: not infrequently, they also betray a lamentable ignorance of Soviet military history, not to mention Imperial Russian precedents. (Fortunately, there are exceptions. The relevance and enormous value of broad background perspective is well demonstrated in US Army Colonel William E. Odom's brilliant 1973 study, *The Soviet Volunteers.)*

THE DEARTH of published Western research on the Soviet military underscores the great importance of the volumes under review and the US Air Force project of which they are a part—an informational venture aimed at making available to English-speaking specialists and the public at large the cream of recent Soviet writing on military subjects. The first four volumes in the series seem to have been chosen in conformance (at least in principle) with the logic that in investigating Soviet military theory and practice, we should study what the Soviet armed forces are themselves studying. The pedigree of authors and books alike is not just impressive but impeccable. The books so far translated have been itemized as "recommended reading" in *Kalendar voina* (a basic handbook for recruits and service personnel), or are part of the useful series *Biblioteka ofitsera* (texts for officer use and study), or have been recommended for Frunze Prizes (honorary awards in the name of the early Soviet military leader, Mikhail Frunze). The authors, contributors and editors—including Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, Major-General M. I. Cherednichenko, Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, and (most famous of all) Colonel V. Ye. Savkin—are in many cases established authorities in their own right.*

Though by no means unrepresentative as a general sample, these four volumes break down—quite fortuitously for the purposes of this review—into two basic categories, one comprising tactical-technical disquisitions (the Sidorenko and Savkin works) and the other, broader politico-philosophical treatises (*Marxism-Leninism on War . . ., Scientific-Technical progress . . .).* For obvious reasons, the works in the latter category are the more durable—if the duller—for they are expositions of general principles and are less tied to the immediate tactical and operational environment. Since they are a significant part of the pabulum of Soviet soldiers, officers and their men-

* Of interest, the more recent volumes of the US Air Force series translate the Soviet ranks of *"general-maior," "general-leitenant,"* and *"general-polkovnik"* as "general-major," "general-lieutenant," and "general-colonel," respectively—*i.e.*, in reverse order from the more customary designations, "major-general," etc. This decision is explained as an effort to achieve a more exact terminology for Soviet general officer ranks and thereby to avoid certain ambiguities that could raise problems of protocol.—Eds.

Reviewers in This Issue

JOHN ERICKSON—Professor and Director of Defense Studies at the University of Edinburgh (Scotland); presently at work on a two-part history, *Stalin's War with Germany, 1941-45,* the first volume of which has just been published under the title, *The Road to Stalingrad* (the second will appear in 1976).

SIR FRANK K. ROBERTS—Senior British diplomat whose many posts of distinction included two tours of duty in the USSR, as Minister in 1945-47 and as Ambassador in 1960-62; currently Vice-President of the Great Britain/USSR Association.

JIRI VALENTA—Research Associate Professor, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami (Coral Gables, Fla.); currently engaged in preparing studies of Soviet foreign policymaking; contributor to this and other scholarly journals specializing in Communist studies.

JANE P. SHAPIRO—Associate Professor of Political Science at Manhattanville College (Purchase, N.Y.); co-editor of *Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective,* 1974; also co-editor of *Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics* and *From the Cold War to Détente,* both forthcoming in spring 1976.

MICHAEL Y. M. KAU—Associate Professor of Political Science at Brown University (Providence, R.I.); editor of *Chinese Law and Government* (White Plains, N.Y.); author of *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building,* 1972, and *The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup,* 1974.

CHRISTOPHER HOWE—Reader in Economics and head of the Contemporary China Institute at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; author of *Employment and Urban Growth in Urban China, 1949-1957,* 1971, and *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972,* 1973.

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tors, they must be read with some attention, if only to catch a glimpse of what goes into the making of the *mirovozzrenie,* the ideological outlook (Frunze called it *politicheskoe nastroenie)* of the Soviet officer and soldier. If they have to sweat through it, so should we—even as an act of silent sympathy.

As instruments of indoctrination and tools of political education, these two works must be regarded as received doctrine, if in a rather formalistic sense. They are part of the "moral-political preparation" of the Soviet soldier, a process of preparation that has shown no signs of any concession to the notion of détente. In these volumes and other recent Soviet military writings (samples of which are available, *inter alia,* in *Soviet Press Selected Translations* issued by the aforementioned JPRS), the same ideological building-blocks have been repeatedly elaborated and reinforced. Yet while it seems clear that such works represent official thinking and constitute a sustained ideological thrust, it is harder to determine what real validity they have within the military system. In short, how much attention do Soviet soldiers pay to them (and, thus, what heed should we pay)? The reviewer has found it instructive in this respect to visit a Soviet military bookstore in the company of a Soviet officer and to see what he bought, even more to listen to his sardonic injunction about what *not* to buy. Does *Marxism-Leninism on War* . . . appreciably improve the Soviet soldier's perception of contemporary war? The answer is probably not, though it gets him through his course work. *Scientific-Technical Progress . . .* might be of limited use in promoting an understanding of and interest in armed forces management, which is an increasingly important theme in Soviet military education but produces a kind of "politico-technical" analysis that is not always easily digested.

NO SUCH obfuscation pertains to the works of the two colonels, who deal with the sharp specifics of the battlefield encounter. Colonel Sidorenko's study, *The Offensive,* first appeared in the Soviet Union in 1970 (in an edition of 13,000 copies almost certainly representing a set distribution for military academies and military schools). It essentially embodies the credo and practice of the all-out, high-speed nuclear *Blitzkrieg,* attempting to collate the operational experience of the Great Patriotic War (and the Second World War at large) with the implications of tactical nuclear weapons and the consequences of the technological "revolution in military affairs." Sidorenko's volume was avowedly designed to contribute to "broadening the officer's tactical horizons" in the conduct of operations "with and without nuclear weapons"—but the nuclear impress was pronounced indeed. In appraising Sidorenko, therefore, it is necessary to note the date of publication, 1970, and to look at subsequent (and contemporary) developments within Soviet theater forces in Europe.

While maintaining its tactical nuclear war-fighting capability, the Soviet command has latterly evinced growing interest in the conventional mode of military operations, *even with respect to the initial phase of engagement and for some sustained period thereafter.* Organization (changes in tank and motor-rifle divisions), equipment (new self-propelled guns), as well as logistics and tactical training, all suggest this shift of emphasis toward interest not only in the nuclear *Blitzkrieg* but also in the conventional breakthrough operation in its own right, with many features derived (or revived) from the latter days of the Great Patriotic War. It is not by accident that a new series of handbooks—also designed to "broaden operational-tactical horizons"—has recently begun to appear, detailing tactical handling at regimental, battalion, company and section levels in terms of wartime (1941-45) experience. Thus, there is a case for being ultra-cautious in relying on Sidorenko or citing him too extravagantly as *fons et origo* of the current Soviet operational outlook.

Colonel Savkin's work is a prize gem; the specialist and non-specialist alike must be grateful to the US Air Force for making this volume available. Two things about it are of immediate interest: the title and the publisher's nervous disclaimer (the Soviet publisher, that is). As the title suggests, Savkin's work restores to current operational-tactical thinking a very interesting Soviet (and Imperial Russian) concept—"operational art," *operativnoe iskusstvo,* the connecting link between strategy and tactics—an approach that impelled Voenizdat to apprise the readership, officially prescribed as "officers and generals of the Soviet Army," of the controversial nature of the book. The Colonel's reputation for controversy and originality both precedes and follows upon this work: his basic thesis—advanced first in a 1965 monograph, *Temoy nastuoleniya* (the Pace of the Offensive), then in a highly controversial article on "maneuver" in *Voennyi vestnik* in April 1972, and

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again in an analysis of the characteristics of modern warfare in *Voennyi vestnik* in March 1974—centers on the principle of mobility. Savkin's lesson for his fellows is plain: gentlemen, please study and properly understand military doctrine, as opposed to paying mere lip service to accepted terms. What *is* mobility and how does effective maneuver differ from simple movement? True mobility is essentially accomplishing "the assigned task with maximum effect": to take one example, executing all the involved stages of an encirclement operation is a negation of true mobility when the final elimination of the enemy can be accomplished more effectively with tactical nuclear weapons. In short, mobility (including maneuver and movement) augments fire, or it should, rather than fire simply supporting movement.

Colonel Savkin argues *inter alia* for the surprise employment of massed tactical nuclear strikes on a narrow front, followed by high-speed penetration in depth by armored forces in conjunction with large-scale airborne landings in the rear. The third chapter of Savkin's book is disingenuously labeled "According to views prevailing 1953-59" but really hammers home his arguments that are relevant to contemporary conditions. This emphasis on mobility and maneuver—on battlefield effectiveness in the strictest terms—could become even more pertinent as the Soviet command reappraises conventional operations, and here Savkin's theorems in relation to the tactical breakthrough may have some unexpected consequences. In a word, events and the pressure of superiors may force the redoubtable colonel to eat a few—if just a very few—of his own words.

THE US AIR FORCE deserves the plaudits and the gratitude of many, whatever specialist interest is involved, for launching this major enterprise, which is long overdue. Even those uninterested in the tactical niceties and technical operation of the Soviet military can—and should—pay heed to the ideological throbbing that pervades the broader politico-philosophical works. Perhaps the US Air Force editors might now consider enlarging their introductory note to each volume, presently models of scrupulousness and restraint, in order to delineate context in greater detail: it would be a woeful outcome if this vital educational mission were to lead in the end to further confusion and consequently to a reciprocal dogmatism among some people in the Western military specialist community.

In any event, with these volumes now so auspiciously on the shelves, that Martian can now take himself to his own leader and report that at last the *Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf N* has real competition in the battle of the books.

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The Soviet Colossus under Scrutiny

By Frank K. Roberts

FOY D. KOHLER and
MOSE L. HARVEY, Eds.:
The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow.
Coral Gables, Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami, 1975.

AS A BRITISH "Long Timer in Moscow," I read this colloquy with increasing fascination, absorption, and admiration. The timing of publication is fortunate, in view of the guidelines adopted in July at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which are now to be put to the test. The sage caution of the dozen participants—all distinguished names in the American community of specialists on Soviet affairs—should help to reduce any overoptimistic expectations in the West based on misunderstanding of fundamental Soviet positions.

In my own career, I have known and worked with a number of these men. I owe a debt of gratitude to George Kennan, from whom I learned much about Russia and the Soviet Union when I was still an amateur in the field in 1945 and 1946. Foy Kohler was a trusted friend and colleague in Moscow, as was Loy Henderson in India. The other participants in the colloquy were Mose Harvey (co-editor of the printed report), Frederick Barghoorn, Jacob Beam, Elbridge Durbrow, Robert Kelley, Earl Packer, John Scott, Henry Shapiro, and Thomas Whitney. Needless to add, I join them all in regretting that those two outstanding operators in the Soviet field, the late US Ambassadors Llewelyn E. Thompson and Charles E. Bohlen, were no longer available to contribute their wealth of wisdom and practical experience to the discussions. (I never had the pleasure of working closely with "Chip" Bohlen but met him in Moscow before the war and at many wartime and postwar conferences. "Tommy" Thompson I first met in Moscow in December 1941, with the Germans just outside the city, and I highly valued my association with him when we were dealing with Khrushchev in the early 1960's.)

Because of my past concern with the problem of developing Soviet expertise in the British Diplomatic Service, one of my first reactions on reading this volume was gratitude to the veteran specialist Robert Kelley for having conceived and successfully executed a plan to establish a fund of Soviet expertise in the American Foreign Service some 50 years ago, long before the United States assumed its present responsibilities as one of the two superpowers and leader of the Atlantic Alliance and of the whole free world. It is fashionable nowadays in and outside the US to criticize this or that aspect of American international behavior. But it would be hard to fault the overall American handling of the key postwar issue for all of us, Western relations with the Soviet Union, or to exaggerate the contribution of the American experts on Soviet affairs in the Department of State and elsewhere.

TO TURN FROM the participants to the substance of the talks, I was delighted to find that the emphasis was not on the past, except in the sense of interpreting its lessons for the present and immediate future. Nor was there an attempt to engage in guessing games about the succession, presumably in recognition that even short-term speculation on the Soviet leadership after Brezhnev and Kosygin is of little value (few people, after all, would have forecast the rise of either Khrushchev or Brezhnev to the top). There was, however, a valuable and stimulating discussion on the likely mood of the rising middle generation from whom the new leadership will come. The consensus seemed to be that while the members of this group are much less international and intellectual in their outlook than the early Soviet leaders around Lenin, they are better-educated, tech-

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nically better-equipped, and probably more self-confident than the present elderly leaders, who have lived through much harder times both personally and nationally. The younger men have grown up in an era when the Soviet Union came to be acknowledged as one of the two superpowers and gained worldwide prestige and influence. Their greater self-confidence may, however, pose problems for the Western world. Their reactions at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 were not encouraging, and there is no evidence that they will be easier to deal with than their predecessors.

In a related context, I found the exchanges on dissent realistic. It is an advance that Andrei Sakharov should be able to voice and publish his critical views on the Soviet system and that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and others should be exiled instead of shot or sent to labor camps. *Samizdat* is a phenomenon inconceivable under Stalin or even for some years after his death. But I go along with what seems to have been the majority view in the colloquy that the dissenters, for all their admirable courage, are few in number, unable to organize effectively, and unlikely to change the nature of the regime in the foreseeable future. For the most part, even they are advocating change from within the present system. The KGB, operating with much greater sophistication than in the past, seems to have the problem of dissent well under control. In many respects, the relative cultural and intellectual relaxation under Khrushchev has been reversed under Brezhnev.

I found in the general discussion of the internal Soviet scene confirmation of my experience 15 years ago that the Soviet population is mainly concerned with the material conditions of existence. While the people expect that they, the third and even the fourth generations since the Revolution, should now increasingly enjoy the fruits of success, they are not making any dangerous or extreme demands, still less questioning the Communist fabric of the Soviet system. If they think of change, it is again change from within, and they seem reasonably satisfied with the undoubted gradual improvements — measured from a low starting level— which the party and the leadership have been able to provide. I accept the conclusion that there is very little interest in Marxist ideology as such, but with the corollary that there is even less interest in alternative ideologies or political systems. (This decline in ideological motivation could, incidentally, have a weakening effect on the Communist Party, transforming it increasingly into a ladder to power for ambitious opportunists with little of the sense of purpose—however misguided—of the older party members.) In general, the population takes an understandable pride in the achievements and growing international importance of the Soviet Union, and such sentiment is a source of internal stability. In many respects, Soviet pride and self-confidence in 1975 have much in common with the mood in Britain (my country, right or wrong!) or Germany at the end of the 19th century, or in the United States earlier in this century, and offer a marked contrast to the present self-questioning mood throughout the Western world.

Yet it also rains in the Soviet Union; as the colloquy shows, the leaders in the Kremlin have plenty of problems to cope with. The main problem areas, to my mind, are: (1) how to improve Soviet agriculture, still the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy (it is scandalous, in a world threatened by inadequate food production for the increasing populations of the Third World, that a country which was a grain exporter in Tsarist days should now so frequently have to draw upon US and Canadian harvests or stocks); (2) how to keep up with the Western Joneses in the build-up of increasingly complex and expensive modern technologies, military and civilian, requiring—*inter alia*—the development of natural resources in Siberia and the Arctic and a concomitant improvement in the range and distribution of consumer goods; (3) how to enhance or at least maintain a degree of efficiency in the cumbersome party and government bureaucracies in the conduct of a vast range of nonpriority business (as well as in such priority areas as defense, police, and space); and (4) how to keep in check nationalist and separatist tendencies in the non-Russian republics in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic States, and—most important, if perhaps less immediately pressing—the Ukraine.

FASCINATING though the internal scene is to all who have lived in the Soviet Union, the outside world is more concerned with the international position and behavior of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Here the lesson of the colloquy is very clear. Since we are concerned with an "adversary" relationship, we must think in terms both of capabilities and of intentions and clearly distinguish the two. The first can be assessed with cer-

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tainty; the second are more open to speculation. There can be no possible doubt about the phenomenal increase in Soviet military strength since the Cuban crisis of 1962 (which I experienced during my last weeks in Moscow). The Soviet Union then had—and still has—very powerful modern land and air forces. But it knew, and knew we knew, that in the nuclear and naval arms fields it was far inferior. So it retreated, as it had in earlier Berlin crises. However, it has since built up its nuclear strength to effective parity with the US and its naval forces to a level that allows them to operate in all the oceans of the world, with particular strength in the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. This represents a major change in the world "correlation of forces," the standard by which the Soviet rulers decide how far they can push their current policies. In the past, according to some experts, the Soviet leadership has tended to act with a traditional, instinctive caution that has marked Russian foreign policy for centuries and that has sometimes been so defensive as to suggest a state-level inferiority complex. But now there are signs of a shift in the Soviet psyche away from the traditional outlook and toward a sense of superiority —a change which seems the more apparent at a time when the West is in some disarray, and when its economic problems of combined inflation and recession have already encouraged a revival of Marxist notions about the inevitable collapse of capitalism.

When we turn to Soviet intentions, the situation is less clear-cut. Unquestionably, the Soviet Union's objective is to become the most powerful state in the world; it will use such opportunities as arise to weaken its main rivals, the US and the NATO countries, and to spread Soviet influence throughout the Third World and more especially at present in the Middle East. Some members of the colloquy point to the possible existence of a deep-laid Soviet ideological plot which could be held directly responsible for such situations now rocking NATO as that in Portugal and even in Cyprus. Others, with whom I find myself in closer agreement, tend to the view that these are basically self-inflicted Western wounds or crises, which the Russians no doubt are exploiting (perhaps most significantly at the moment in Angola) but which they might be manipulating in a much more active and dangerous way than they in fact are. They have certainly exploited Western mistakes in the Middle East, an area which is of course near the Soviet Union and one where Tsarist Russia had traditional interests. But they have not had things their own way there (for example, in Egypt), and they have seemingly felt constrained to operate with their customary caution. The Soviet Union has not been very successful either in exploiting national liberation movements in Africa, and in the Far East it has suffered a major setback in the break with China, a break skillfully exploited by the US. While I accept George Kennan's comment that the Soviet Union has in fact freed itself from the menace of German and Japanese military might and established its own glacis in Eastern Europe, my own experience was that the Soviets' respect for—and even fear of—the Germans remained a major psychological factor in their thinking. I would suggest that, as seen from Moscow, the advantages cited by Kennan are more than outweighed by the perceived threat of the military strength of the US and its NATO allies, including the greater part of the old Germany; by the hostility of the new China; and by the continued presence of Japan in the adversary camp, this time as an ally of the US.

What, however, must surely matter most to us is the ever-increasing military strength of the Soviet Union, which is more likely to be used for diplomatic blackmail than for actual war, in the pursuit of national ends and/or for ideological motives. State interest and ideology were both invoked in the Soviet defense of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; they could be invoked again over China or, more probably and perhaps quite soon, over Yugoslavia. While the Soviet Union's military might is generally accepted as an accomplished fact, the full implications of its power tend to be ignored by a Western public opinion reluctant to make the necessary defense and financial sacrifices to deter Soviet expansion or possible aggression, direct or indirect. Here the fashionable concept of "détente" plays a dangerous part. Very few people in the West give it its secondary French meaning of a "trigger" or "detonator," and fewer grasp what lies behind the Soviet interpretation of détente as peaceful coexistence. The latter is a concept which enables the Soviets to push their interests by all means, fair or foul, short of war. Tsarist Russia and the modern Soviet Union have usually been patient enough to wait for the fruit to fall from the tree into their laps, although prepared to move in and shake the tree if in a particular moment it was not properly pro-

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tected. The future leadership could well be tempted by the enhanced global position of the Soviet Union to a more active and less patient policy. The colloquy deals very effectively with this issue and should be prescribed reading for those in the West who tend to interpret Soviet peaceful coexistence in terms of their own concept of a genuine relaxation of tension.

WE COME to the main question posed in the colloquy—the degree of change in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1975. In reading the relevant commentary, I was reminded of my return in 1960 to a Russia under Khrushchev, my previous experience there having been in 1945-48 when Stalin was in power. Our British diplomatic practice is, or was, to set down initial impressions, especially upon returning to a post where one has previously served. I started to prepare a draft account highlighting the many changes for the better, but was soon confronted with experiences only too reminiscent of the Stalinist past. I prepared another draft emphasizing the regretable elements of continuity, again to be counterimpressed by some favorable trends. In the end, my dispatch, I hope balancing the good with the bad, was sent off only shortly before my departure two years later. I suspect that I would be faced with much the same problem if I returned to Moscow today.

The colloquy has to my mind brought out the essential fact for countries dealing with this totalitarian superpower: the Soviet regime continues to use what is still an effective if somewhat outdated ideology in the pursuit of traditional state interests—in a word, *"plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."* Surely, we should welcome the improvement in material conditions and in human relationships inside Russia since Stalin's excesses and also the more sophisticated and agreeable conduct of diplomatic exchanges by the Soviet Union since Khrushchev's rumbustious behavior. But this should not blind us to the far more significant and disturbing changes in Soviet military, economic, and political strength or to the continuity in traditional national and Soviet long-term objectives. These elements of both change and continuity are not designed to produce a world of "live and let live." Nor are they likely to lead to a convergence of the Communist and free-enterprise systems, with each settling on some middle ground akin to social democracy and the German market economy.

In the last analysis, however, Soviet policy remains cautious rather than aggressive; it is we in the West and not the Soviet planners who can decide the issue. In Voltaire's words, *"il faut cultiver notre jardin."* If we retain our unity and defensive strength within the Free World and more especially within the Atlantic Alliance, if we overcome our current economic and social problems, if we work out a satisfactory relationship with the Third and other Worlds, the Western fruit will not fall from the tree into the Soviet lap, and the leaders in the Kremlin will probably hold back from aggressive actions and overly dangerous probing. A correct understanding of Soviet strengths and weaknesses will help us to achieve these goals, and the more people who benefit from the insights in this colloquy the better.

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Bureaucrat in the Kremlin

By Jiri Valenta

JOHN DORNBERG: *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power.* London, André Deutsch, 1974.
MICHAEL MOROZOW: *Leonid Breschnew.* Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1973.

WHAT SORT OF person is Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev? What motivates him? And what has been his role in Soviet decision-making?

These are not easy questions to answer. A major problem is the existence of a sharp discrepancy between the image of Brezhnev that took shape in the 1960's and the one that prevails today. In the late 1960's, most Soviet-watchers saw Brezhnev as an unprepossessing, mediocre caretaker, a faceless *apparatchik,* a champion of the military lobby, and a hard-liner. A similar estimate was also prevalent among well-informed Communist party bureaucrats in Eastern Europe. However, after the successful Soviet diplomatic campaign vis-à-vis the West in 1972-73, this image was supplanted by quite a different one—the image of a sophisticated *apparatchik*-turned-stateman and foremost proponent within the Soviet leadership of the policy of East-West détente. It would seem in retrospect that the rather superficial image of the 1960's unjustifiably underestimated and downgraded Brezhnev, while the recent one appears perhaps to overexaggerate his importance and role in Soviet decision-making.

It is much to the credit of the two authors whose works are under review that they try to avoid as far as possible oversimplified generalizations and clichés and attempt instead to provide the reader with well-documented insights into the make-up and character of the mysterious man in the Kremlin. Both Dornberg and Morozow depict, with great richness of detail, Brezhnev's private life and his professional career, especially the ten years of his tenure as First Secretary and then General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). Their descriptions of this latest phase of the Soviet leader's career are of special value to students of recent Soviet politics as documentation of facts and chronology for a period of Brezhnev's life on which little else has yet been published.

The two books differ slightly in focus and thus complement each other in providing a remarkably rounded and convincing portrayal of the Soviet leader. Morozow, with a careful eye for Kremlinological details, pays more attention to the substance of Brezhnev's views and policies, particularly his stand with respect to Soviet *Westpolitik,* while Dornberg is more interested—and more successful—in probing the motivations behind the substantive positions that Brezhnev has taken.

As is probably true in the case of other participants in the Soviet decision-making process, Brezhnev's stand on many political issues is probably to be explained largely in terms of bureaucratic politics—particularly his past experience in various bureaucracies such as the party apparatus and the army and his present bureaucratic position as General Secretary of the CPSU. He does not play the Stalinist role of *Vozhd* (supreme leader) but rather that of *primus inter pares.* Even though the office of party General Secretary constitutes a potential base for enormous personal authority and power, the emergence of collective leadership as the normal pattern of Soviet decision-making in the post-Stalin era has constrained Brezhnev from becoming a personal ruler.

In sharp contrast to an American President's capacity to accept or reject the views of the National Security Council, or the similar capacity of a British Prime Minister vis-à-vis his cabinet, the General Secretary of the CPSU functions under the constant constraint that all his decisions must have the support of his colleagues

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in the party Politburo. Thus, maintenance of a broad consensus among the leadership group, cautious exercise of power, and constant efforts to avert the creation of "anti-primus" coalitions are necessary for the political survival of the General Secretary. As both Dornberg and Morozow perceptively argue, even though Brezhnev has expanded his power since 1964, he is not an unchallenged leader, and his power is not unlimited. He is the most prominent but not a dominating figure in the Soviet leadership. In short, he is a consensus politician: as Dornberg notes, Brezhnev has been called "the Kremlin's great compromiser" (p. 19).

The constraints under which Brezhnev has to operate were well illustrated on two particular occasions. First, when the Czechoslovak crisis erupted in 1968 on the eve of a planned US-Soviet summit meeting, Brezhnev—as depicted by Dornberg—was very hesitant, vacillating between a coalition of advocates of military intervention and a group opposed to intervention. Only in the final Politburo debate (the time, often disputed, is persuasively argued by Morozow to have been August 17-18) did Brezhnev join with the coalition of senior Soviet decision-makers, led by top Ukrainian Party leader Piotr Shelest, in arguing, and probably voting, for intervention.[1]

The second occasion came in May 1972, just before US President Nixon's scheduled visit to Moscow, when the United States mined Haiphong harbor to bring pressure on North Veitnam to end the Vietnam war. With another US-Soviet summit meeting at stake, the Soviet leadership had to decide what course to take. This time Brezhnev sided with a Politburo coalition of moderates in voting, over the opposition of Shelest and others, to proceed with the summit in spite of the development in Vietnam.

These quite different Brezhnev moves clearly demonstrate that pinning an ideological label on him or, for that matter, on other Soviet leaders can be very misleading. A shift in position does not necessarily signify a permanent reorientation of Brezhnev's ideological thinking. As Dornberg and Morozow show in several cases—though unfortunately without adequate emphasis, primarily because their studies are biographies rather than political analyses—the key to an understanding of Brezhnev's position on any particular issue is to be sought in the requirements of his office at the moment much more than in ideological factors. Brezhnev's primary concern is what he must do to remain *primus inter pares* in the Politburo; his primary ideology is political survival. It may be noted in this connection that the planned Soviet-US summit of 1968 was to star Premier Kosygin and not, as in 1972, General Secretary Brezhnev.

The Soviet leader's conduct during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, as described above, shows beyond any doubt that the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" was merely an *ex post facto* ideological justification of the decision actually taken by the collective leadership. As Frederick Barghoorn has argued, Brezhnev has been above all a "consensus leader" whose "position thus far seems to rest in large part upon his ability to avoid alarming or antagonizing other members of what has been perhaps the most genuinely collective leadership in the history of the CPSU."[2]

CONSEQUENTLY, this reviewer finds it misleading to portray Brezhnev—as Dornberg does in the last chapter of his otherwise perceptive biography—as a conservative in contrast to a progressive Khrushchev. True, Brezhnev's political style is very different from that of his predecessor: as Paul Smith, Jr., has observed, "Khrushchev's Bolskevik voluntarism and flamboyant populism are obviously not his [Brezhnev's] style."[3] Rather than the emotionalism and dynamism of Khrushchev, caution is a dominant Brezhnev trait. Yet, no less than his predecessor, he is a skillful manipulator and bureaucrat. Since the political position of the First Secretary/General Secretary in the post-Stalin era depends above all on the precarious balance of power in the Politburo, Brezhnev strives to be always on the side of the winning coalition and to be identified with successful policies.

There is no question that Khrushchev was a great innovator and that the credit for initiating the destalinization of Soviet society belongs rightfully to him. Yet it should not be forgotten that many of his policies were no less aimed at preserving the status

[1] For a fuller treatment of Brezhnev's performance during the Czechoslovak crisis, see the author's article, "Soviet Decision-making and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968," *Studies on Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Spring-Summer 1975.

[2] Frederick Barghoorn, "Trends in Top Leadership in the USSR," in R. Barry Farrell, Ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1970, p. 67.

[3] Paul Smith, Jr., "Brezhnev: Ascent to Power," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1971, p. 68.

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quo than those of Brezhnev. Dornberg seems to forget that while the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia and the oppression of Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet dissidents have occurred under Brezhnev's leadership, the suppression of the 1956 revolt in Hungary, the Pasternak affair, and the persecution of many Soviet Jews for so-called economic crimes occurred under the rule of his predecessor. Indeed, under the Brezhnev regime, some Soviet Jews have at least been given the opportunity to emigrate, whereas Khrushchev would never have tolerated this—let alone the current public demonstrations by Soviet Jews and other dissidents. Hence, the Chinese characterization of Brezhnev's regime as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" seems closer to the truth. The fact is that, notwithstanding his different political style, the present General Secretary is, no less than Khrushchev, a regular Soviet-type bureaucrat, a member and a mainstay of the ruling oligarchy.

For the same reason, it is equally misleading in the reviewer's opinion to represent Brezhnev in simplistic fashion as the chief proponent of East-West détente in the Soviet leadership in contrast to the so-called "anti-détentist" Politburo members such as Mikhail Suslov or Marshal Andrei Grechko. Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev during his first years of office as General Secretary was not an enthusiastic supporter of détente. Khrushchev, in the mid-1950's, manipulated the issue of détente to his advantage in his struggle with Malenkov, and Brezhnev did much the same thing in his competition with Kosygin in the late 1960's.

Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev began to identify themselves with a Soviet *Westpolitik* only after each had consolidated his position in the leadership and had come to believe that such a change of policy would work to his political advantage. In this respect, Brezhnev so far seems more successful in forging a winning consensus within the Soviet decision-making collectivity than was his predecessor, whose style in the last years of his leadership antagonized his colleagues and ultimately led them to combine to oust him. In the last years of Khrushchev's tenure, there was a *primus* but no longer any *pares;* today, Brezhnev remains only *primus inter pares*.

Current Soviet *Westpolitik* is thus a consensus policy of the Soviet collective leadership headed by Brezhnev. Under different circumstances, one could easily imagine Brezhnev, if he considered it in his interest as General Secretary, heading a coalition of Soviet leaders in favor of seeking a rapprochement with China—as in fact he already tried to do in 1964-65. As a skillful bureaucrat playing the role of General Secretary of the CPSU, Brezhnev guides his decisions primarily by whether or not they will strengthen his position and prestige within the Politburo. If he decides wisely, he might possibly become the first General Secretary in Soviet history to retire honorably from office. And if, after passing from the political scene, he decides to write his memoirs as his predecessor did, it will be intriguing to learn how Brezhnev, private citizen, interprets the actions of Brezhnev, party General Secretary.

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Profiles of Political Persecution

By Jane P. Shapiro

ALEXANDER DOLGUN with PATRICK WATSON: *Alexander Dolgun's Story: An American in the Gulag.* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1975.
MICHAEL SOLOMON: *Magadan.* New York, Auerbach Publishers, 1971.
JOSEPH BERGER: *Nothing But the Truth.* New York, John Day Company, 1971.
BELA SZASZ: *Volunteers for the Gallows.* Transl. by Kathleen Szasz. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1971.
NINA KARSOV and SZYMON SZECHTER: *In the Name of Tomorrow.* New York, Schocken Books, 1971.
ZHORES MEDVEDEV and ROY A. MEDVEDEV: *A Question of Madness.* Transl. by Ellen de Kadt. New York, Vintage Books, 1971.

RECENT YEARS have seen the publication in the West of a growing number of personal memoirs written by individuals who experienced varying degrees of official persecution for political offenses in the Soviet Union and some East European countries. Some relate back to the period of Stalin's Great Purge of the 1930's,[1] others to the postwar Stalin-directed terror of the late 1940's and early 1950's in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and still others to more recent times. All these periods and locales are represented among the six books under review, which consequently permit the reader to draw comparisons between the methods employed in Stalin's time and those employed today as well as between the Soviet and the East European treatment of political prisoners. Yet, diverse as the accounts are in respect to time and locale, each author expresses a conscious, almost desperate need to describe "what happened," to tell the "whole story" —not only in order to alert present generations to past horrors and atrocities committed in the name of building socialism, but also to warn them that such methods of social control have not been permanently renounced by the Communist regimes and could well recur, if in less severe form.

Alexander Dolgun's Story: An American in the Gulag is the most recently published memoir of a survivor of Stalin's prison camps. Born in the United States, Dolgun had gone to Moscow in 1933 as a young boy together with his mother and sister to join his father, an American technician then employed in the Soviet Union. After World War II, while working as an employee of the US Embassy in Moscow, he was arrested by the Soviet authorities and spent almost six years in Soviet labor camps before being released and "rehabilitated" in 1956. Though Dolgun had never renounced his US citizenship, he was declared a naturalized Soviet citizen—without his knowledge or permission—while in camp. After his release, he sought to emigrate to the United States, but it was not until 1971 that he and his family were at last granted permission to leave the Soviet Union.

Dolgun, who is referred to several times as "Alexander D" in Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956,* provides evidence that amply demonstrates man's extraordinary capacity for self-preservation. In the camps, he learned quickly that almost any work was preferable to hard manual labor in the mines or quarries, where the prisoners had to toil long hours, often in subfreezing temperatures. So he befriended several staff doctors in the camp

[1] The most complete account of the Great Purge is Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror,* New York, Macmillan, 1968. Earlier-published memoirs (in English) by political prisoners who survived prison and labor camp sentences include Eugenia Ginzburg, *Journey into the Whirlwind,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1967; Alexander V. Gorbatov, *Years Off My Life,* New York, Norton, 1965; Joseph Scholmer, *Vorkuta,* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954; Alexander Weissberg, *The Accused,* New York, Simon & Schuster, 1951; and Elinor Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps,* Chicago, Regnery, 1951.

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hospital and managed to secure appointment as a *feldsher* (doctor's assistant). He knew almost nothing of medical practice at the time, but he learned quickly and soon was competent enough to dispense such medicines as were available, and even to handle amputations and appendectomies.

Unlike most ex-prisoners' memoirs, Dolgun's story goes beyond his experience in the camps to provide a sense of what life was like in Moscow for camp inmates after their rehabilitation. By 1956, the convictions of most surviving political prisoners of the Stalin era had been reviewed and declared invalid, and those rehabilitated were permitted to return to their homes. Dolgun was concerned that he would be denied employment because of his camp record, and he was surprised when told by a prospective employer at the Ministry of Health: "You must be really naive. There are so many highly skilled former political prisoners in Moscow that we couldn't fill our key jobs if we left them out" (p. 331). Several years later, he was urged to become a party member in spite of his record—a suggestion which he considered an "obscene insult"—and was assured that since many innocent people had been "wrongly imprisoned" during the Stalin period, his past record would have no effect on his qualifications for party membership.

Dolgun also details his efforts over a 15-year period, after his release and return to Moscow, to obtain an exit visa to emigrate to the United States. In view of his claim to American citizenship, he sought to enlist the support of the US State Department for his request, but he had rather low expectations as to just how much the US government would do on his behalf, as he believed that the US Embassy in Moscow had confined itself to sending formal notes of protest to the Soviet authorities at the time of his arrest. Ultimately, however, long and persistent efforts by his sister and the US Ambassador to Austria, John P. Humes, led US Secretary of State William Rogers to intervene personally with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on Dolgun's behalf, and he and his family were granted exit permits to leave the USSR.

MICHAEL SOLOMON'S *Magadan* recounts the author's arrest, his conviction by an NKVD *troika* (three-man prosecution panel), and his experiences while serving a seven-year sentence in Siberian labor camps. A Romanian who left his country in 1939, joined the "Free Romania Movement" in Palestine (he is Jewish), and later served with the British Army in the Middle East and North Africa during World War II, Solomon returned to his native land in 1948 and was working as a journalist when he was arrested and accused of spying for the British intelligence service. His account of the tortures he endured first in Romanian and later in Soviet prisons, of the horrors he experienced on prison transport trains and ships, and finally of the harsh conditions of labor camp life at the Magadan complex in Far Eastern Siberia is moving, but it does not add much to what interested Western readers already know about Soviet treatment of political prisoners during pre-conviction interrogation and later in the camps themselves. In the fall of 1955, Solomon was repatriated, only to be incarcerated in Romanian prisons for another nine years for "crimes committed against the Soviet government." In a concluding chapter, he suggests that the Soviet regime is currently confronted with increasing unrest among youth, most of whom reject the horrors of the Stalinist system even though they were born after Stalin's death and did not experience these horrors personally.

JOSEPH BERGER states that his purpose in writing *Nothing But the Truth* was to recount what he personally experienced during that period of Soviet history when a whole generation was destroyed. The author, a native of Poland, emigrated shortly after World War I to Palestine, where he became a member of the first Palestinian Communist Party in 1922, later becoming its Secretary. He subsequently went to Moscow to work full-time for the Comintern, but was arrested as a "Trotsky agitator" in January 1935. First sentenced to five years in labor camps, he was resentenced to death in 1941, but the death sentence was later commuted to a ten-year term. He was released from labor camp in 1951 but was exiled to Eastern Siberia and assigned to collective farm work. He was finally rehabilitated in 1956 and permitted to emigrate the following year.

Most of Berger's memoir is devoted to short vignettes of a variety of inmates whom he met in prisons or in the camps. In contrast to the statements one usually finds in labor camp memoirs that party members never lost faith in the party and its wisdom, the author notes that many of the party people he met in the camps were not surprised at the treatment meted out to them by the regime because they were convinced "that the state they had created was dangerous, and par-

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ticularly dangerous to the men who had created it" (p. 74). Berger himself apparently never lost faith, although his wife, whom he did not see once during his 16 years of incarceration, did.

In the closing chapter of his book, Berger devotes greater attention to political issues than he does in the earlier chapters, touching on such matters as the rehabilitation of political prisoners and the nature of the political leadership during the Khrushchev years. Unfortunately, he provides little here that is new or insightful, and the more valuable part of his book is that which relates the details of his experiences, especially those connected with the several reviews of his case. Unlike *Magadan, Nothing But the Truth* is an optimistic book, written by a man who never permitted himself to doubt that he would survive nearly 20 years of almost unbearable hardship; indeed, he rarely refers to the personal suffering he endured. Berger emerges not as a bitter, disillusioned ex-Communist, but as a man of great humanity and unflagging faith. That faith is implicit in his concluding observation that a "profound process of spiritual rebirth [is] going on within the youngest generation now growing up in the USSR"—a rebirth not limited to students and intellectuals alone. Old standards and values are being rethought, he writes, and many are being criticized and discarded (p. 273).

BELA SZASZ' *Volunteers for the Gallows* is much narrower in scope than the Berger, Solomon, or Dolgun memoirs, focusing primarily on the brutal treatment inflicted on political prisoners by the Hungarian secret police and prison authorities in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Born in Hungary, Szasz had joined the Hungarian CP during his student days at Budapest University in the 1930's. One of his acquaintances and fellow students, also a party member, was Laszlo Rajk, who later held the critical post of Minister of the Interior in the post-war Hungarian coalition government and thus was instrumental in bringing about the Communist takeover of 1947. Rajk subsequently was appointed Foreign Minister in the Communist government but soon thereafter became one of the best-known leaders to fall victim to the Stalin-ordered "Titoist" purges in Eastern Europe. Because of his connections with Rajk, Szasz was arrested in 1948 while serving as head of the Press and Information Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and was subjected to 18 months of typically brutal interrogation before being brought into court in one of several secondary "show trials" linked with the Rajk affair. Tried along with several other defendants, Szasz received a 10-year prison sentence. He relates that convict life was in its own way as harsh as pretrial detention, but that prison conditions began to improve in the fall of 1953.

Released from prison in September 1954, Szasz firmly rejected an offer to return to his old position at the Ministry of Agriculture and instead went to work as a translator for a publishing house. His case was reopened the following spring, and the court exonerated him of the charges on which he had been convicted. Szasz provides a concluding chapter on the background of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which he witnessed, but adds nothing to what we already know of these events. His account of the posthumous funeral service for Rajk, which was one of the events that precipitated the revolution, is very moving. Szasz himself participated in the service, delivering a brief address before the thousands of mourners in which he declared that Hungarians wanted "to bury forever lawlessness, tyranny, the Hungarian disciples of iron-fisted rule, the moral dead of the shameful years" (p. 238). Pessimistic about the prospects following the crushing of the revolution and particularly about the caliber and integrity of the new leadership under Janos Kadar (whom he had met just after both had been released from prison), he chose to emigrate in late 1956.

THE BOOK BY Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter, both Polish Jewish intellectuals, is a record of their own personal struggle for free expression in their native Poland in the 1960's. Szechter, a historian and Communist party member, had been deported to the Soviet Union after the German-Soviet dismemberment of Poland in 1939, finally returning to Poland in 1958, no longer a Communist. Nina Karsov, whose parents had been killed by the Nazis when she was an infant and whose stepmother was imprisoned by the Communist regime for "anti-Polish activities" but was later released and rehabilitated, was a Warsaw University student when she met Szechter and agreed to become his research assistant. She and Szechter undertook to analyze communism as a system of rule in Poland of the 1960's. They also gathered material on the treatment accorded political dissenters and on the anti-Semitic policies instituted by the regime after 1965, when

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Polish Jews were systematically removed in large numbers from the army, the police, and the universities. Szechter claims to have written the record of these matters, although he and Karsov agreed that she should claim responsibility for it in the event of its discovery by the police, so that both would not have to go to prison. *In the Name of Tomorrow* relates what happened from August 1966, when the record—labeled "Nina Karsov's Diary"—was discovered and she was arrested, through November 1968, when she and Szechter were both permitted to emigrate from Poland to Israel. The chapters, alternately written by each of the two authors, describe their individual experiences during these two years. Unfortunately, the reader is not always able to identify the narrator easily, and because each author feels the need to provide background biographical detail, one is apt to lose the thread of the narrative. Generally speaking, however, one comes away with a much clearer picture of Szechter's activities, thoughts, and concerns than of Karsov's.

Szechter and Karsov both emerge as individuals of courage and conviction. So does Szechter's wife, Lida, who agreed to divorce him in August 1967, after 21 years of marriage, so that he could marry Karsov and thus make it possible for her to emigrate to Israel (she lacked documentation to establish her Jewish parentage). Lida, together with the Szechters' son, emigrated to Israel in September 1967 and was reunited with Szechter in late 1968 in London, where they were remarried after a British judge dissolved the Szechter-Karsov marriage at the request of all concerned.

Although Karsov does not provide much detail, she apparently was not treated brutally in prison, either before or after trial. Indeed, the book suggests that contemporary security police tactics in Eastern Europe are far more restrained than those employed during the "Titoist" purges of the early 1950's. Foreign public opinion may have been partly responsible for the leniency shown to Karsov, for only a month after she was proclaimed "Prisoner of the Year" by Amnesty International, she was released from prison, with two years of her three-year sentence still remaining, and was permitted to emigrate.

ZHORES AND ROY Medvedev's *A Question of Madness* sheds light on a less physically brutal method of dealing with political dissent that has come into vogue in the Soviet Union in recent years—namely, commitment to a psychiatric hospital rather than arrest and prison detention. Zhores Medvedev, a biochemist, incurred the displeasure of the Soviet authorities—and became known in the West as a leading figure in the Soviet dissident movement—as a result of the publication abroad of his book, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* (1969), which had been rejected for publication in the Soviet Union, and of *The Medvedev Papers* (1971), containing two lengthy essays in which he was sharply critical of official limitations imposed on the right of Soviet scientists to meet, correspond, and collaborate with their counterparts abroad on scientific research projects. In an attempt to end his activities, the Soviet authorities chose to employ the device of commitment to psychiatric care rather than judicial methods (*i.e.*, arrest and trial). He was not the only Soviet political dissident to undergo this treatment; many others have been subjected to it, most prominent among them former Major-General Piotr Grigorenko and poetess Natalia Gorbanevskaia.

A Question of Madness relates the events, and the roles played in them by the two authors (who are twin brothers), that took place between May 29, 1970, when Zhores Medvedev was forcibly abducted by the Soviet security police and committed to a psychiatric hospital in Kaluga, about 120 miles southwest of Moscow, and June 17 of the same year, when he was released and permitted to return to his home in nearby Obninsk. The authors utilize the same scheme of narration as that employed by Szechter and Karsov, each relating his own story in separate chapters, but they do it more successfully.

Roy played a key role in bringing about his brother's release. Living in Moscow, he quickly received word of Zhores' commitment and proceeded to alert influential friends and acquaintances in the scientific community and other professions. All these people unhesitatingly sent letters and telegrams of protest to high Soviet officials, including CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Aleksei Kosygin, Procurator General R. A. Rudenko, and Minister of Health B. V. Petrovsky. In mid-June, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote and circulated a letter entitled "This is How We Live," in which he condemned the illegal methods employed in Zhores' forcible arrest and hospitalization. Many of the protesters further demonstrated their support of Zhores by going to Kaluga to visit him in the hospital. His supporters also sought to enlist the backing of world public

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opinion by gathering signatures on a protest declaration at an international symposium on genetics held in Moscow in early June, and they planned similar efforts on his behalf at other international gatherings scheduled to take place in the USSR later in the summer. All this publicity and pressure undoubtedly played a large part in the authorities' decision to release him on June 17.

Zhores, who spent a little less than three weeks in the hospital, was fortunate enough not to be subjected to drug treatment. He gives a most interesting account of the psychiatric hospital regimen and of his "interviews" with psychiatrists, which he reconstructed and wrote down as soon as possible after each session. It should be noted here that the use of psychiatric treatment as a means of social control is not an invention of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. It has its roots in 19th-century Tsarist Russia, but was little used during Stalin's time. As has frequently been observed in the West, it is a more sophisticated but ultimately no less deleterious method of handling "politically dangerous" citizens than consigning them to prisons and labor camps.

Taken all together, these memoirs serve to point up the restraints that have been imposed on the secret police and the use of terror in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since Stalin's death. Both Karsov and Medvedev were arrested for real rather than imagined political activities—that is, for criticizing governmental policy in a manner that the authorities deemed impermissible. (Indeed, in Stalin's time, Szechter, too, surely would not have escaped arrest and imprisonment.) Yet, Karsov and Medvedev were treated far more leniently than they would have been two decades earlier, as the other memoirs emphatically attest. In Stalin's day, there had been only a slight possibility of securing an early release from prison or labor camp, and political prisoners had rarely, if ever, been permitted visits from relatives or friends.

The Western reader also cannot fail to be impressed by the extent to which Soviet public opinion, as in the Medvedev case, now can be aroused against official injustice to the point of having an apparent influence on the decisions of the authorities. The Soviet intellectual community was willing to rally to Zhores Medvedev's cause, and such action in his support seems to have been a decisive factor in forcing the Soviet authorities to grant his release without delay. Such efforts to mobilize public opinion against a governmental action could not even have been attempted during the Stalin era without drawing down upon the protestors a punishment at least as severe as the one they were protesting against.

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Maoist Strategies of Revolution and Development

By Michael Y. M. Kau

RICHARD C. THORNTON: *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917-1972.* Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1973.
JÜRGEN DOMES: *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972.* Trans. by Rudiger Machetzki. New York, Praeger, 1973.
ILPYONG J. KIM: *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi Under the Soviets.* Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1973.

IT TOOK THE Chinese Communists nearly 30 years of zigzag policies and violent struggles, dating from the start of their organized activity in the early 1920's, to attain ruling power in China. In the last 25 years, since the establishment of Communist rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao has brought about drastic revolutionary changes affecting the social, political, and economic life of the now more than 800 million Chinese. The methods and strategies of both the Communists' revolutionary movement of 1921-49 and their socialist transformation of Chinese society since 1949 have been the subject of intensive academic and intellectual interest, as evidenced by the publication of literally hundreds of scholarly books and articles in the past two decades.[1] Today, China's experience in revolution and development is also sparking growing political and ideological attention outside China, particularly in the underdeveloped countries of the Third World.[2]

Historians and social scientists are concerned with such basic questions as: How and why did the Chinese Communist movement take root and grow as a formidable political force in the theoretically "backward" agrarian society of China? What were the key factors that contributed to its political and military successes? What role did the Comintern and other external forces play in China? How relevant was the ideology of Marxism-Leninism? And how decisive were the revolutionary strategy and leadership techniques developed by Mao in the crucial years of the 1930's?

For the period after the CCP takeover, the strategies and programs of China's large-scale socialist reform and transformation of society have equally fascinated Western scholars. What explains the revolutionary dynamism of the transformation and the shifting strategies of development? Why was the Soviet model replaced by the Maoist model in the late 1950's? What caused the constant "struggle between two lines"? How can we explain the origin and impact of the Cultural Revolution? Has Mao's charisma been routinized as a result of the growth of the Chinese bureaucracy? What is the pattern of interaction among the party, the army, and the state bureaucracy? All these questions have been important subjects of scholarly inquiry.

In recent years, moreover, the Maoist experiences of revolution and development have been moving from the realm of academic interest into the arena of practical world politics. Maoism, as a radical ideology, a model of revolution, and a strategy for socioeconomic development, has begun to

[1] Two series of scholarly studies on China —"Studies in Chinese Government and Politics" and "Studies in Chinese Society," both sponsored by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies—illustrate this growing interest. Two examples of these studies are: A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Politics in Action*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969; and Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1972.

[2] See Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971; and Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.

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exert a growing appeal and attraction beyond China's borders. The Maoist leadership now openly claims that China's experience in protracted guerrilla fighting and "people's war" offers a living model of revolutionary struggle for impoverished countries suffering from the political and economic exploitation of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism. Likewise, Peking maintains that the strategies of "mass mobilization" and "self-reliance" tested successfully in China provide the answer to the critical problems of economic development and nation-building confronting the underdeveloped countries. Unlike the industrialized nations of the West, China suffered in the past from external oppression and exploitation and is now a "developing" country itself. Therefore, the Chinese argue, their revolutionary experience and proven strategy are particularly relevant to the many underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[3] Today, with China emerging as a major power in the world arena and as self-appointed leader of the Third World, Peking's moral and political claims can no longer be dismissed.[4]

The books under review represent three of the most recent products of major research efforts by specialists on Chinese communism—two of them political scientists and one a historian. While the books cover different historical periods and time spans, all three are concerned specifically with the processes and strategies of Communist revolution and development in China, and their substantive focuses and concerns are complementary. The major grounds covered and the key questions asked are by no means unfamiliar, but the authors offer new perspectives as well as fresh insights and interpretations. They have also taken advantage of newly available source materials, such as Red Guard publications and the Ch'en Ch'eng collection,[5] to derive new data bases for their analyses.

OF THE THREE books, *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917-1972*, by Professor Richard C. Thornton of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, covers the longest time span, tracing the development of the Chinese Communist movement from the 1917 victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia down to the purge of Lin Piao in late 1971. Focusing centrally on power politics and external interventions, the analysis is chronologically divided into three parts: (1) the period from the beginnings of the Chinese Communist movement under the manipulations of the Comintern to the emergence of Mao as the dominant leader in Yenan, 1917-41; (2) the period of power struggle and civil war between the Communists and Nationalists, with increasing involvement of the United States, 1941-49; and (3) the period of Communist rule after 1949, marked by the emergence of Sino-Soviet conflict. Throughout the book the theme of power struggle is clearly dominant. The author treats in great detail the complex processes and intrigues of this struggle among contending political leaders and factional groups within the CCP and between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT), as well as the impact on the CCP of struggles in the Kremlin and in the Comintern. As a historian, Thornton has done a remarkably good job of presenting an articulate account and provocative interpretations of the first two periods of development. Unfortunately, however, his political analysis of developments since 1949 falls short of the standard set in the first two-thirds of the book.

In his analysis of the long history of the endless struggles for power, Thornton advances two key theses: (1) that power motives and intrigues have carried far greater weight than ideological and policy disputes in all major political conflicts; and (2) that the outcome of political struggles within the CCP and between the CCP and the KMT has largely been determined by political and power inputs from external sources. Both these theses are essentially valid, but Thornton often seems to be carried away by his own arguments, with the result that he overestimates the importance of power motives and external influences at the expense of other factors. In-depth analysis of policy conflicts and ideological disputes is brushed aside in favor of superfluous speculations about factional politics and the power ambitions of rival Communist leaders—*e.g.*, in Mao's conflicts with Li Li-san, the "28 Bolsheviks," Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Shao-ch'i,

[3] A good example of this thesis is Lin Piao's *The Victory of People's War*, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1965.

[4] See Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's recent speech at the United Nations, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 15, Supplement, April 12, 1974.

[5] This collection consists of a wide variety of Communist documents, periodicals, and books gathered by General Ch'en Ch'eng during the Kuomintang campaigns against the Kiangsi Soviet in the 1930's. These rare materials, primarily covering the 1930-34 period, are now available on 21 reels of microfilm at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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etc.[6] Similarly, careful examination of the respective political and organizational strengths and weaknesses of the CCP and KMT and consideration of China's internal political dynamics are slighted in favor of attributing overriding importance to external power manipulations and policy decisions made in Moscow or Washington—thus, Thornton would have us believe that the shifting course of the CCP-KMT civil war in China was virtually predetermined by certain decisions made in the Soviet Union or in the United States, and that even the key developments in China's Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969 were influenced by external forces. To analyze internal political events in the context of significant external inputs is certainly important, but to attribute every twist and turn in these events to power intrigue and foreign manipulation is an oversimplification. Kremlinologists will undoubtedly enjoy Thornton's emphasis on power intrigues and international conspiracies, but others may find his arguments too speculative and unbalanced.

FIRST PUBLISHED in German in 1971, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972,* by Jürgen Domes, Professor of Political Science at the Free University of Berlin, focuses exclusively on internal politics since 1949. Like the Thornton book, this study also ends with the fall of Lin Piao in late 1971 (because of the lack of source materials at the time of their writing, both authors treat the Lin Piao affair only briefly).

On the basis of shifting ideological orientations and developmental strategies, Domes periodizes post-1949 developments in three major phases: (1) the initial phase of socialist reform and construction, 1949-57, marked by a strong reliance on the "advanced experience" of the Soviet Union; (2) the shift to an experimental application of Maoist strategy, characterized by mass mobilization and radical social, economic, and political changes in 1958-59, followed by a period of "struggle between the two lines" during 1960-65; and (3) the intensification of violent policy conflict and power struggle between Mao and the "revisionists" during 1965-72, as most strikingly manifested in the crisis of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. Domes concludes that while Mao may have won the power struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Lin Piao, and the "New Right," the Cultural Revolution marked the end of Mao's charismatic power and personalized rule. The institutional bases of power, particularly the military base, and the trend toward "revisionist" pragmatism have largely survived the Cultural Revolution.

Generally, Domes takes a relatively cautious and balanced approach in his analysis. In contrast to Thornton's one-sided emphasis on the theme of "power struggle," Domes examines the political process in terms of both power struggle and policy conflict. By adopting such a dual-variable approach, he succeeds in constructing a more complex methodological framework of analysis, in presenting a more refined view of the anatomy of the political process, and in bringing into clearer focus the interaction between power factors and issues. Political developments since 1949 are thus seen in terms of a shifting configuration of political forces centering around dominant leaders (Mao, Liu, P'eng, etc.), key institutional groups (party, army, state bureaucracy, etc.), and major ideological and policy positions (collectivization, class struggle, Great Leap Forward, etc.).

The balanced perspective maintained by Domes is also evident in his evaluation of the strengths of Communist rule in China. He argues that the ability of the leadership to carry out extensive socialist reforms and programs has rested simultaneously on both ideological mobilization and coercion. Through the leadership technique of the "mass line," the party has repeatedly carried out large-scale ideological campaigns to mobilize the masses for political support and policy implementation; and in the name of "proletarian dictatorship," the leadership has exercised authoritarian control and coercion against class enemies and the intellectuals. Domes skillfully avoids superfluous speculations about power motives and intrigues and frequently relies on quantitative data to substantiate his arguments. It may be noted, however, that most of the author's information on physical coercion and executions is based on sources of a speculative nature (pp. 47-66).

Domes' attempt at the end of the book to give an overall assessment—even if brief—of the achievements and failures of Communist rule is commendable. The conclusion he reaches is rather

[6] These four conflicts occurred in 1928-30, 1930-35, 1935-37, and 1966-69, respectively. For details and interpretations of the policy and ideological aspects of the disputes, see, *e.g.*, Jerome Chen, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967; Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951; James P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power*, New York, Praeger, 1972; and Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shaoch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Berkeley Calif., University of California Press, 1974.

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negative. In particular, he takes exception to the common view that "the sacrifices made by the Chinese people since the CCP takeover have benefited an unusually effective development policy" (p. 235). His negative assessment inevitably raises controversial questions of perspective, criteria, and value bias. Some examples may help illustrate the point. The author is particularly critical of the unimpressive economic growth rate and the suppression of the intellectuals and individual freedom in China (pp. 229-44). He asserts that the Maoist leadership technique and developmental strategy may be good for engineering sociopolitical change but are not at all useful in promoting economic advance. However, if one starts out from a broader definition of "economic development" that takes into account not only quantitative measures of growth but also such qualitative measures as institutional reform and the general well-being of the people (*i.e.*, agrarian reform, distributive justice, social security, etc.), one may come to a different conclusion. Also, in measuring China's economic development, what weight should one assign to progress in education, public health, and communications, which Domes rates so highly (pp. 231-32)?

THE BASIC QUESTION of the processes and strategies of Chinese communism is also the primary focus of *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets*, by Professor Ilpyong J. Kim of the University of Connecticut. In contrast to Domes' and Thornton's treatments of long historical periods, Kim focuses on the four-year interval from 1931 through 1934, a crucial period that witnessed the establishment of China's first Soviet Republic in Kiangsi Province of southeastern China. The period was ushered in by Mao's successful formalization of his revolutionary leadership technique of mass mobilization through the operation of a soviet government based in the countryside, and it ended with the Communists' retreat and escape from the KMT's military encirclement campaigns to establish a new base area in northwestern China. From Thornton's perspective of power struggle, the period marked "an almost total defeat of the Communist movement and of Mao Tse-tung" (p. 49). However, from Kim's different perspective of the development of revolutionary strategy and leadership technique, it was a period of significant achievements and success. Despite serious political and military setbacks, Mao and his followers managed to develop and test systematically the concept and techniques of the "mass line" in the revolutionary base area. The organizational strategy developed by Mao at that time, according to Kim, became a crucial foundation stone for the ultimate victory of the Communist movement and greatly influenced the process and style of China's mass mobilization model of political transformation and economic development.

The mass-line strategy, as developed in the Kiangsi Soviet, involved a set of highly complex and sophisticated organizational principles, procedures and techniques. It was designed to serve as a mechanism for raising the masses' ideological and political consciousness and for mobilizing the masses to support the revolutionary war, to participate in sociopolitical reforms, and to perform concrete organizational tasks. Moreover, it was calculated to create a close linkage between the cadres and the masses, between the government and the grass-roots mass organizations (such as the corps of poor peasants and the farm laborers' unions), and between policy formulation at the higher levels and task implementation at the lower levels.

Because its focus is on the short period of the Kiangsi Soviet, Kim's analysis achieves levels of depth, detail, and sophistication that the more diffuse studies of Domes and Thornton fail to attain. To the variables of policy conflict and power struggle, Kim adds organization and leadership technique and thus succeeds in constructing an even more complex and imaginative analytical framework. The reader who is particularly concerned with the organizational strategy and leadership technique of the Maoist model of revolution will surely find Kim's contribution invaluable.

In sum, the three books under review are all works of serious scholarship and make important contributions, from different perspectives and data bases, to our knowledge of Maoist strategies of revolution and development. A quick comparison of their respective strengths and limitations suggests two conclusions of methodological interest: (1) that the depth of analysis is clearly related

[7] Issues of a similar nature have previously been raised by a number of leading China scholars. See e.g., Maurice Freedman, "What Social Science Can Do for Chinese Studies," *Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor), August 1964, pp. 523-30; A.M. Halpern, "Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. 15, No. 3, April 1963, pp. 361-76; and John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *ibid*, Vol. 18, No. 3, April 1966, pp. 503-24.

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to the time span covered; and (2) that the degree of sophistication is positively related to the number of variables built into the analytical framework. It follows that focusing on a shorter period of time and taking into account more variables tend to produce analyses of greater depth and sophistication. The penetrating quality of Kim's study owes much to his judicious choice of topical focus and analytical framework, while the limitations of the Domes and the Thornton volumes stem in large part from the necessity to sacrifice depth to breadth. Despite the latter's contributions to a broad historical overview of the evolution of Chinese communism, crucial variables and important data are often lost in summaries and generalizations. This points to the question of whether the time has perhaps come when greater emphasis on "micro" as opposed to "macro" studies of the Maoist models of revolution and development is needed in order to maximize the effectiveness of our research efforts.[7]

(Footnote 7 appears on p. 82.)

Patterns of Chinese Growth

By Christopher Howe

KANG CHAO: *Capital Formation in Mainland China, 1952-1965.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.
CHU-YUAN CHENG: *The Machine-Building Industry in Communist China.* Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
M. GARDNER CLARK: *The Development of China's Steel Industry and Soviet Technical Aid.* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1973.

THE YEAR 1975 marks the 20th anniversary of the publication of the First Five-Year Plan in the People's Republic of China and is an appropriate time to review some of the changes that have taken place in the pattern of Chinese economic growth since that event. In this regard, data released during the past several years have enabled observers not only to discern with greater precision the long-term swings in China's overall growth but also to analyze some of the interesting changes that have taken place in the intersectoral balance of the economy since 1959 (when publication of official statistics virtually ceased). As an added bonus, the appearance of a new collection of Mao's speeches entitled *Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui* (Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung)[1] has provided fascinating and completely unexpected insights into the making of economic policy during the turbulent years after initiation of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. These materials serve to underline the depth of the economic crisis that resulted from the Communists' policies of rapid capital accumulation and priority concentration on developing the modern industrial sector—a crisis compounded by the Great Leap Forward. They also reveal the difficulties involved in subsequent efforts to reorder sectoral priorities, reconstruct an effective system of economic administration, and determine the appropriate role of foreign technology in China's industrialization. While there are currently under way a number of important surveys of the quantitative aspects of these problems (several of the reviewed volumes have contributions to make in this area), the primary focus of the present dis-

[1] Two volumes under this title, one apparently originating in 1967 and the other in August 1969 (both in the People's Republic), were reproduced on Taiwan in 1973. A discussion of the authenticity and significance of these volumes is contained in Stuart R. Schram, "A Review Article—Mao Tse-tung: A Self-Portrait," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 57, January-March 1974, pp. 156-65. Photo reproductions of both volumes are available through the Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries, Washington, DC.

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cussion will be on matters of economic policy and planning, particularly those relating to the policy of economic self-reliance.

The volumes by Kang Chao and Chu-yuan Cheng contain material relevant to both quantities and policy. Building on his earlier work on the construction industry and industrial production,[2] Chao has now arrived at new estimates of capital formation for the period 1952-65. "Hard" data in this area are scarce, but Chao has estimated separate series for (1) construction and installation, (2) domestic production of machinery and equipment, (3) net imports of machinery and equipment, (4) output of office furniture, and (5) tool production and rural investment. Because of the deterioration in the quality of available data after 1957, he makes separate series for 1952-57 and 1958-65.

Chao's estimates highlight several important facts. First, they indicate a level of investment under the Communists so far above that achieved during the early industrialization of the 1930's as to constitute the beginning of a genuine economic revolution in China. K. C. Yeh has estimated that gross domestic capital formation in the years 1931-36 varied from 6.6 to 9 percent.[3] Inasmuch as capital consumption ran at about 5 percent, net capital growth was miniscule, and it is doubtful whether per capita incomes were increasing at all. Chao's data for the 1950's suggest that the share of gross domestic product allocated to investment grew from about 10 percent to 20 percent between 1952 and 1957, reaching 20.8 billion yuan in the latter year (calculated in 1952 prices). Thereafter, capital formation reached an absolute peak of 43.4 billion yuan in 1959, fell to 9.4 billion yuan in 1962, and then rose in 1965 to 22.3 billion yuan—a level just above that achieved in 1957. Thus, in addition to demonstrating the accelerating rate of capital formation through 1959, the data serve to highlight the magnitude of the downturn after that year. The reviewer would note that the picture of the slump in capital formation may have been exaggerated by Chao, for it is at least arguable that agricultural investment for the post-1959 period was higher than he estimates.

The data presented by Chao also throw light on several other matters. With regard to the structure of investment, Chao's figures for 1952-57 indicate that the share of agriculture (excluding rural housing construction) in total capital formation was larger than might be expected given the official emphasis on developing the industrial sector, and also larger than is popularly supposed. In 1952, gross fixed investment in agriculture represented 31.8 percent of total investment compared to a share of 22 percent for industry. By 1957, even though the priorities had clearly shifted, with industry accounting for 36.5 percent of total investment, agriculture still accounted for 23.5 percent.

In addition, Chao uses his work on ruble-yuan exchange rates to arrive at new estimates of the value of China's machinery imports (largely from the Soviet Union). The reworked data, which shed light on the degree of China's external dependence, show that the proportion of net imports of machinery in total imports plus domestic output of machinery fell from a peak of 36 percent in 1952 to 20 percent in 1959. The data on the machine-building industry presented in Chu-yuan Cheng's volume confirm the continuation of this decline in dependence on imports into the 1960's, although this dropoff—in addition to reflecting a new emphasis on self-reliance—also reflected various other economic factors, including overall lower levels of investment as well as a growing domestic technical and productive capacity.

THE VARIATIONS in investment indicated in the Chao study reflect an economic experience of traumatic dimensions—the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath. The Leap began as an attempt to accelerate economic growth at a rate without precedent in world economic history (nothing in the Soviet First Five-Year Plan period equals the Chinese actions and speeches of 1958). It ended in economic disaster and a radical reorientation of domestic and foreign economic policy, necessitated in part by the break with the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet economic aid. Gardner Clark's monograph on the Chinese steel industry does more to illustrate the significance of these developments than any other study of Chinese industry known to the reviewer; for although the study was written without access to Chinese-language materials, the author has the advantages of a thorough knowledge of steel technology and the Soviet steel industry as well as of the pre-1949

[2] See his *Rate and Pattern of Industrial Growth in Communist China*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965, and *Construction Industry in Communist China*, Chicago, Aldine, 1967.

[3] See T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1960*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, Part 1.

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history of the Chinese steel industry.

The first point that Clark demonstrates is how truly important Soviet aid was to Communist China. Statistical aggregates on "external dependence" and Soviet aid in themselves do not suffice to illustrate the basic point that without the Soviet contribution the growth of China's steel industry in the 1950's would have been very slight indeed. During this period, the Soviets were world leaders in such important areas as raw material treatment and blast furnace development, and it is apparent that the latest technology was shipped straight to China. In addition to providing equipment, the Soviet Union began to create in China a local capacity to design and install large-scale mining and steelmaking enterprises and, in the interim, supplied the Chinese with sufficient Soviet advisers to install the equipment supplied. The total package—equipment, resident advisers, training of Chinese staff, and general guidance concerning everything from basic research to raw material supply—added up to an integrated effort that had no previous parallel in relations between industrialized and non-industrialized economies. It should, perhaps, be noted here that Cheng's study of the machine-building sector confirms the equally crucial role played by the Soviet Union in that closely related industry.

There was, to be sure, a certain irony in the focus of the Soviet efforts—rehabilitation of the nine blast furnaces at Anshan and installation of one new furnace there. These plants had been left in ruins by the Japanese and later plundered by the USSR at the close of World War II.

In any event, the Chinese achieved remarkable successes during the First Plan period (1953-57) due partly to Soviet aid and technical guidance. Iron and steel output grew rapidly, and the productivity of capital equipment reached levels twice as high as those previously achieved at Anshan by the Japanese. The only potentially serious problems lurking on the horizon related to the failure to invest sufficiently in facilities for the mining and handling of low-quality Chinese raw materials and the somewhat questionable technical and economic viability of the new iron and steel centers under construction at Paotow in Inner Mongolia and at Wuhan.

Nonetheless, with plans in hand for the completion of the plants at Wuhan and Paotow, the Chinese seemed set to become substantial steel producers by the 1960's. Instead, the Great Leap was launched, with its emphasis on further acceleration of the growth of iron and steel output by means of a radical decentralization of future production facilities. The result was a setback from which China only began to recover by the late 1960's. Despite the outcome, one cannot argue that the idea of building "backyard" blast furnaces was totally absurd: the dispersed location of small, high-grade iron ore deposits and the problem of transportation involved in exploiting them for iron and steel production recommended the creation of small-scale localized plants. However, serious technical errors negated any potential gains. Foremost among these errors was an underestimation of the problems involved in treating the other, low-grade raw materials required for making iron and steel. There was also an underestimation of the inputs of managerial and skilled labor needed to operate small plants, and the real advantages of small-scale *modern* operations were confused with the imagined advantages of an ideologically-rooted revival of indigenous types of activity. The resulting output was of low quality, often useless, and it was achieved at the expense of both agricultural production and the modern steel sector.

Equally important, though less well-known, was the cost of the Soviet withdrawal in 1960. This cost was borne throughout China, but the particular victim was the integrated iron and steel plant at Paotow. Construction of this project had begun in 1957, but the plans got embroiled in the Great Leap and then were wrecked by the precipitate Soviet withdrawal of all technical advisors from China in July 1960. According to Clark, the result was that *none* of the planned construction projects was completed between 1960 and 1968. An important consequence of the steel fiasco was that China lacked anticipated facilities for producing railway equipment. This contributed to the virtual disappearance of the railway building program in the 1960's, which in turn impeded other forms of economic progress.

What does Clark's history of the first decades of steelmaking in the People's Republic tell us about the prospects for this industry in the 1970's. As he himself points out, current Chinese claims for steel output are hard to evaluate in the absence of information on quality. Nonetheless, Clark's analysis, when combined with certain developments since publication of his book, permits us to draw several conclusions about the present and future situation.

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The first is that China, having for all intents exhausted the growth potential of the original long-term plans drawn up for the steel industry with the Russians in the 1950's and facing growing demand for domestic production of high-quality steel for the development of inland oil fields and revived investment in transportation, once again appears to be turning to external sources for assistance. Thus we have the recent agreements entered into by China with a German consortium and the Nippon Steel Company for the supply of complete cold rolling and hot strip mills.[4] From the contracts concluded or under discussion, it would appear that China plans to complete an enormous complex at Wuhan possessing one quarter of the country's total capacity to produce crude steel with modernized equipment and including advanced finishing facilities. These measures also include plans for training Chinese specialists and for supplying foreign technicians to go to China. These recent developments confirm the whole thrust of Clark's monograph, even though they occurred after the book was published.

The second point of interest about the current situation is that two legacies remain from the Leap. One is that while old-fashioned indigenous production has largely disappeared, modern small-scale iron and steel plants have a continuing and, in fact, growing place in the Chinese economy due to the aforementioned raw material and transport factors. How large this role should be and how long it will last are unanswered questions. Doubt arises on these matters because technical progress in the steel industry during the decade in which the Chinese have been piecing together the wreckage of the original Soviet plans has greatly increased economies of scale. Given better transportation also, these economies may far outweigh the benefits now derived from operating a blend of medium-sized and small plants. As we study this issue, we are reminded of Clark's observation that the economics of steel technology appear to render variations in factor endowment completely irrelevant.

The other legacy of the Great Leap is the emergence of Shanghai as an important metallurgical center. During 1958, Shanghai was at the forefront of the small-scale blast furnace campaign, but even after this evaporated, development of a local iron industry held forth the promise of real economic gains because of numerous natural linkages into the city's steel, shipbuilding, vehicle, and machinery industries; because skilled manpower was readily available there; and because Shanghai occupied a pivotal position in the rail and sea transport systems. The publicized success of Shanghai contrasts sharply with the unknown fate of the ambitious but troublesome project at Paotow.

Two outstanding lessons emerge from these studies. The first is that growth of the modern industrial sector in China requires access to at least a modicum of foreign technical knowledge, experience and commodities. The second is that the Chinese must be very careful in making decisions on the location of industry, since the costs of politically or strategically motivated location decisions may be very high and may persist over long periods of time.

[4] *The Financial Times* (London), Sept. 3 and Oct. 25, 1974.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.

ARAB COMMUNISM

TO THE EDITORS: I had some questions about John Cooley's interesting article, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism" (*Problems of Communism,* March - April 1975), mostly on the grounds of its timeliness. In his statement that the only legal Arab Communist parties are those of Lebanon and Iraq (p. 22), he ignores Morocco's (Communist) Party of Progress and Socialism, which had its own (and government-approved) Congress in February 1975. And although he may be technically correct about the Syrian Communist Party's being illegal, it does in fact (as Mr. Cooley himself later points out) have about the same freedom of action as does its Iraqi counterpart. So what one actually has in the Arab world are four Communist parties more or less free to participate in the political life of their respective countries (Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria) and four that are *de facto* as well as *de jure* illegal (Algeria, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia).

Mr. Cooley's notation of the Syrian Communist Party factionalism caused by the Daniel Nehme (Nimah) and Riyad al-Turk groups (pp. 31-32) appears to be accurate. He does not, however, follow through to note that by late 1973 the former faction had been reintegrated into the Khalid Bagdash-led main line of the party while al-Turk's group had withdrawn completely to form a separate organization (see *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1974,* Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, p. 270). This state of affairs was confirmed when the membership of the new Syrian Communist Party Politburo was published in *Al Safir* (Beirut), October 1, 1974.

Finally, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine is no longer anti-Soviet, as stated in the article (p. 39). This could be seen in certain events involved in its sixth anniversary celebration, observed on February 23, 1975. The keynote speaker thereat was Nicola Shawi, Secretary General of the very pro-Soviet Communist Party of Lebanon. Radio Moscow, moreover, was glowing in its praise of the guerrilla organization on this occasion (in a broadcast of February 26, 1975).

It is acknowledged that both the Front's anniversary celebration and the Moroccan party congress in late February (mentioned in the first paragraph above) probably occurred after the submission of Mr. Cooley's draft. These instances are cited here merely as capstones to previously developing trends. For example, *Le Monde* (Paris), on August 29, 1973, noted the open operation of the Party of Progress and Socialism. And the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had sent a delegation to Moscow in November 1974, was receiving a favorable press play from the Lebanese Communist *Al Nida* (Beirut) by February 1, 1975, if not earlier.

WALLACE SPAULDING
McLean, Virginia

MR. COOLEY REPLIES: In answer to Mr. Spaulding's comments, Morocco's Party of Progress and Socialism is, in effect, a Communist party led by the old veteran of orthodox North African communism, Ali Yata. It was outside the scope of my article, which examined the Communist movements of several key Eastern Arab states (and tried to determine how these movements have been affected by Soviet Middle East policy). In any event, Yata's party in Morocco has been through a series of court trials and subjected to royal decrees which, over the years, have forbidden it to use the term "communism" or the adjective "Communist." Its program and aims are bland, indeed, and revolution has vanished from its practical program—if not from its rhetoric—in the years since it was actively participating in the nationalist campaign against the French protectorate (c. 1950-56). Mr. Yata, with his lavish Rabat villa and his place at many official royal ceremonies, has truly become an establishment figure in the Moroccan monarchy, and he has many friends in all Moroccan political camps.

Mr. Spaulding's comment about the later developments in the Syrian Communist movement is absolutely correct. I omitted them because I did not think they were really significant. Bagdash is still, relatively speaking, the main figure in the orthodox Syrian CP and indeed in Arab communism generally.

As regards the Popular Democratic Front, whatever may have been said in speeches by Shawi or in Moscow broadcasts, the Front's leader, Nayef Hawatmeh, has followed a policy that is far to the left of Moscow in the Middle East, supporting guerrilla and terrorist action (which Moscow accepts only with lukewarm approval, and only sometimes). It is true that Hawatmeh supports the policy of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat in favor of creating a Palestinian state in any liberated Palestinian territory—which is also Moscow's political line, though it is not that of the Arab "rejection front" adhered to by other Marxist Palestinian groups. Moscow would like to gath all of them into its fold if it could, but if it spoke its true mind about them, my guess is that all would be accused of "leftist deviationism"!

JOHN K. COOLEY
Beirut, Lebanon

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VIEWS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY

TO THE EDITORS: Raymond Garthoff's article, "SALT and the Soviet Military" *(Problems of Communism,* January-February 1975) is purportedly written from an "informed perspective" but contains numerous omissions, errors, and inconsistencies when subjected to close scrutiny. Having so scrutinized it, I must conclude that Garthoff's observations concerning the Soviet military attitude in 1969 as well as at the present time constitute an awkward, invalid and deceptive mix of politically-inspired assertions and wishful thinking—not carefully-documented scholarly analysis.

Garthoff fails to cite any Soviet source to support the section entitled "Soviet Objectives in SALT," preferring to cite American interpretations of varying degrees of currency and usefulness. Furthermore, in the section entitled "Military Doctrine," only a single *Pravda* article is cited. This approach, or lack of one, would be hardly adequate in a freshman term paper to support the contentions of the article. Any serious commentary on Soviet affairs would not methodologically isolate the Soviet approach to SALT from the Soviet world view in general. Garthoff omits any mention of, or reference to, the Leninist politico-military dialectic which permeates recent Soviet military writings, especially the book, *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War.*[1]

The thesis behind current Soviet military thought has not changed significantly since SALT I. If anything, the writings are bolder regarding nuclear war since the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity with the US—especially as to the desirability of initiating nuclear strikes in certain circumstances. Garthoff misleadingly asserts: "By 1969, the Soviet military had reached the conclusion that strategic superiority in the sense of a first-strike option, permitting escape from a crushing retaliatory strike, was not possible for either side in contemporary conditions."

Such a statement is a perfect example of the invalid common attempt to "mirror-image" Soviet doctrine in terms of US doctrine. The "straw man" is the demand for retaliation-proof first-strike capability by the Soviet Union as an absolute precondition for preemption. As can be seen by their writings in recent years, the Soviets understand that no such condition of absolute safety is possible in the real world. Neither is it necessary in order to contemplate a preemptive nuclear blow. Politico-military doctrine involves matters of *relative,* not absolute, advantage. Contrary to Garthoff's unfounded assertion, Soviet military doctrine is very favorably disposed to preemption by means of what Col. A. Sidorenko of the Frunze Military Academy termed "massed nuclear strikes," [2] where the enemy and the Soviet Union are locked in conventional combat. The means necessary to launch such strikes would no doubt require a measure of Soviet strategic-nuclear superiority which SALT may or may not prevent them from achieving. To quote a leading Soviet military theoretician, Col. V. Khalipov (a major contributor to the Milovidov-Koslov book): "There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war." [3] In ignoring contemporary Soviet military attitudes, the Garthoff article was unrealistic and "disorienting" to students of the SALT process.

LEWIS A. FRANK
Washington, D.C.

MR. GARTHOFF REPLIES: I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Mr. Frank's remarks, although the task of doing so is made difficult by his polemical approach.

Mr. Frank seems chiefly troubled by my use of an approach drawing principally on sources other than published Soviet military writings. (Some other readers, familiar with my extensive use of such materials in other publications over the years, may welcome the change.) Mr. Frank would broaden his own understanding if he recognized that there are sources for learning about Soviet attitudes and objectives in addition to Soviet publications. He would also do well to recognize the importance of interpreting Soviet writings, and specifically to take account of the observations made by Matthew Gallagher in a review appearing in the March-April 1975 issue of *Problem of Communism,* in which he notes some of the particular purposes underlying certain Soviet military writings (including, it so happens, one of the two sources cited by Mr. Frank). Mr. Frank should also eschew citing statements out of context, as when he cites a Soviet author (who in turn cites "foreign" and "NATO" sources for the discussion) on the application of nuclear strikes in a situation of ground forces in field combat—a context irrelevant to the point under discussion (and obviously not "contrary to Garthoff's unfounded assertion," since I make no assertion whatever about that situation). Nor do I address in the article Soviet "absolute" or any other kind of "preconditions for preemption." It is not I who has been indulging in building "straw men."

I also deny that I engage in "mirror-image" thinking in my characterization of Soviet military thinking in 1969 and subsequently. I understand how a reader such as Mr. Frank could be inclined to question the basis for my assertion that by 1969 the Soviet military had reached the conclusion that strategic superiority, in the sense of a first-strike option, was not possible in contemporary conditions. I regret that I am not in a position at this time to document that assertion on the open record in a way that might convince even Mr. Frank, but I can assure him and other readers that my conclusion is not based on mirror-image extrapolation.

I do not believe it is necessary to rebut Mr. Frank's polemical thrusts, but I do wish to reject categorically his statement that my observations include "politically-inspired assertions."

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Washington, DC

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[1] Major-General A.S. Milovidov and Col. V.G. Kozlov, Eds., *Filosofskoe Nasledie V.I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoi voiny,* Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972; translated in US Air Force series, *Soviet Military Thought,* Vol. 5, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974. See Chapter I, pp. 7-22.

[2] Col. A.A. Sidorenko, *Nastuplenie (The Offensive),* Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970; translated in US Air Force series, *Soviet Military Thought,* Vol. 1, 1973. See p. 111.

[3] Milovidov, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

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Problems of Communism

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